On December 16, 2024, eight days after Bashar al-Assad fled and his regime collapsed amid the expansion of the “Deterrence of Aggression” operation led by opposition factions under the leadership of Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham (HTS), \u00a0the <\/a>\u00a0Autonomous Administration<\/u> in northeastern Syria announced the launch of what it termed the “Syrian Dialogue Initiative.” This initiative underscored the importance of cooperation between the Democratic Autonomous Administration and the Political Administration in Damascus (the recognized designation for the new authorities in Damascus at that time) in building a new Syria.<\/p>\n In the weeks that followed, official statements and media leaks from both sides confirmed that negotiations were underway. These developments reflected a mutual desire to reach a peaceful agreement and avoid a military resolution. They aligned with public opinion assessments and popular movements across northeastern Syria and other Syrian regions.<\/p>\n \u00a0The <\/a>negotiation<\/u> process, however, faces numerous internal, regional, and international challenges, with several complex issues emerging as focal points. Chief among these are the military integration of the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) into the newly established Syrian army, the management of natural resources\u2014including oil fields\u2014and the political and administrative representation <\/a>of the region\u2019s population in the negotiation process or any potential agreement.<\/p>\n These matters are closely linked to broader discussions on governance structures and the distribution of administrative powers, taking into account the region’s historical context and demographic composition, as well as the governance experience of the Autonomous Administration in northeastern Syria in recent years. The Autonomous Administration has put forward a governance model based on local autonomy and diversity management mechanisms, which diverges from the governance frameworks previously implemented in Syria, both during and before the conflict. This model plays a pivotal role in shaping the progress of negotiations regarding the region\u2019s military, civil, and administrative structures, as well as its level of coordination or integration with the corresponding Syrian national institutions.<\/p>\n This paper presents the perceptions and ideas of a group of stakeholders involved in public affairs in Qamishli, Raqqa, and Deir Ezzor regarding the optimal model for local governance in these areas. It also considers the priorities and potential mechanisms for its implementation, offering a proposed conception of this model along with the relevant determinants and considerations.<\/p>\n This paper is part of Justice for Life’s broader efforts to enrich public debates and provide a knowledge-based and technical foundation for advocacy efforts. The objective is to influence policymakers in a manner that fosters political and civic participation.<\/p>\n Methodology<\/strong><\/p>\n This paper primarily draws on input gathered through focus group discussions with key figures from public affairs actors in Raqqa, Qamishli, and Deir Ezzor, aimed at addressing the following overarching question:<\/p>\n What is the most suitable local governance model for northeastern Syria following the fall of Bashar al-Assad’s regime? What mechanisms can ensure local residents’ participation in managing their affairs and the region’s resources?<\/p>\n The three sessions aimed to explore potential models of local governance in northeastern Syria following the collapse of Bashar al-Assad’s regime. This involved examining the relationship between the region, its governance structures, and the central administration in Damascus. The discussions also aimed to gather the perspectives of local stakeholders from various parts of northeastern Syria on the most suitable approaches that ensure residents’ rights, encourage their active participation in managing local issues, and facilitate the fair distribution of regional resources in a way that honors the region’s unique characteristics.<\/p>\n The discussions during these sessions were based on several core principles and assumptions, namely:<\/p>\n Additional Methodological Notes<\/strong><\/p>\n Three sessions, each with 8 participants, were conducted in Qamishli, Raqqa, and Deir Ezzor between January 19 and 28, 2025. Key community leaders, civil society representatives, and members of local administration structures from the three regions attended the sessions.<\/p>\n The sessions took place in the second half of January, before the National Dialogue Conference in Damascus on February 24-25, 2025, and before the “victory conference” held in Damascus on January 29, at which Ahmad al-Sharaa was declared president of Syria.<\/p>\n In total, the three sessions involved 24 participants, with 8 participants from each region, including 11 women. While this represents a small and non-representative sample, it is important to note that the participants are active figures in public affairs, and their perspectives may not necessarily reflect the broader views of society.<\/p>\n The sessions included representatives from Qamishli, the Raqqa governorate, and various areas of Deir Ezzor that are under the control of the Autonomous Administration. However, they did not include representatives from parts of Deir Ezzor controlled by the Damascus government or from areas governed by the Autonomous Administration in the Aleppo governorate. In this paper, the term “Northeast Syria” refers to the areas covered by these sessions.<\/p>\n Amid the rapid developments that followed the fall of Bashar al-Assad’s regime on December 8, the relationship between the areas controlled by the Autonomous Administration in northeastern Syria and the rest of Syria\u2014particularly with the new authorities and the caretaker government in Damascus\u2014emerges as a central issue in the transition to the post-Assad phase. Most participants from the three regions agree that the future of this relationship remains uncertain and tense, although there are notable differences in how the situation is analyzed and perceived.<\/p>\n The second theme of the dialogue sessions centered on examining the past experiences and history of the northeastern Syrian region to identify both positive practices and policies, as well as those to be avoided, in order to achieve the region’s aspirations. Specifically, participants discussed potential guarantees to prevent the marginalization policies the region suffered under decades of Assad regime rule. Nearly all participants concurred that this period, its causes, and the mechanisms to ensure it does not happen again should be thoroughly analyzed.<\/p>\n In contrast, participants also analyzed the experience of the Autonomous Administration in recent years, revealing significant differences between the regions. While participants from Raqqa and Qamishli acknowledged that some positive practices or models could be examined and employed in discussions about local governance mechanisms in Syria, participants from Deir Ezzor offered a strongly negative assessment of this experience. They regarded the Autonomous Administration’s governance as a failed experiment that has led to increased marginalization, corruption, and nepotism in the region.<\/p>\n The Assad Regime Centralized North-eastern Syria<\/strong><\/p>\n Northeast Syria and the Experience of the Autonomous Administration<\/strong><\/p>\n Conclusion<\/strong><\/p>\n The outcomes of the three sessions held to discuss the possibilities and the most appropriate model for managing the northeastern areas of Syria and their relationship with the central government in Damascus reveal the complexity of internal and external influencing factors, as well as the lack of agreement or consensus among civil actors in these areas on a unified vision. The views varied widely, ranging from advocacy for administrative decentralization, as proposed by the Autonomous Administration in northeastern Syria\u2014an idea most prominently supported in Qamishli\u2014to calls for rejecting decentralization in favor of full integration with the Damascus government within a single centralized state, a viewpoint that prevailed during discussions in Deir Ezzor. Between these two positions, various regions expressed preferences for hybrid models, concepts of local governance, or expanded administrative decentralization.<\/p>\n Interestingly, despite some regions and participants rejecting decentralization, certain ideas or proposals were presented that appeared to align with this principle. For instance, there were calls for the creation of elected local councils with significant powers to encourage participation at the national level. These councils would be supported by a legal framework regulating the relationship between the central government and the regions, ensuring respect for local diversity while promoting a unified national vision.<\/p>\n On the other hand, the sessions revealed a strong consensus on the necessity to activate channels for community participation and to strengthen mechanisms for the effective representation of various components and segments of society, including ethnic, religious, and sectarian groups, as well as social structures such as tribes and non-identity groups like intellectuals and technocrats. The discussions also highlighted the critical role of civil society and both civil political and non-political actors in achieving these mechanisms by leveraging technical expertise, creating tools to enhance participation, addressing issues of representation and legitimacy, and promoting knowledge, community empowerment, and civil peace. All these elements are deemed essential for initiating a Syrian national dialogue that would lead to a state governed by law and freedoms, ensuring the rights of all citizens regardless of their affiliations or orientations.<\/p>\n A Proposed Model for the Issue of Local <\/strong>Governance<\/strong><\/p>\n Therefore, to address the central question posed in this paper, the most suitable model for managing the regions of northern Syria is one that draws upon multiple points of convergence among various groups and areas while recognizing the differences in experiences and perceptions. An examination of the region\u2019s recent history and the different governance models it has experienced leads to the conclusion that none of these models should be replicated in their current form. Instead, a hybrid model should be developed, ensuring that the region’s residents have the right and capability to participate effectively in decision-making processes related to their lives and region. This can be accomplished by securing their rights to freedom of expression, assembly, and political representation within a constitutional framework grounded in citizenship and equality for all Syrians.<\/p>\n Therefore, this model should develop within these parameters, informed by extensive and ongoing local and national dialogues. It must include a broad spectrum of groups and stakeholders, such as civil society organizations, political movements, community and religious leaders, business owners, and individuals with technical skills and expertise. This can be achieved by harnessing the richness and diversity of civil actors in the region, utilizing the strengths of civil society, and drawing on the accumulated knowledge in areas like community organization, knowledge creation, political and human rights empowerment, media mobilization, and advocacy throughout northeast Syria and the country as a whole.<\/p>\n\n
Findings of the Focus Group Discussions <\/strong><\/h1>\n
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