Mohammed Olabi<\/p>\n
The 2026 wheat season began with a level of optimism rarely seen in Syria in recent years. Cultivated areas expanded relative to several previous seasons, rainfall reached exceptionally high levels, and expectations grew that improved harvests could help ease mounting economic pressures and strengthen food security in a country still grappling with one of the world’s most severe humanitarian and economic crises. Yet, in the months leading up to the harvest, these hopes gradually gave way to renewed uncertainty. Debate intensified over government wheat procurement prices, while rising water levels in the Euphrates River caused extensive damage across parts of Raqqa and Deir ez-Zor, creating an additional challenge for agricultural producers. Conclusion<\/strong> References<\/strong> Mohammed Olabi The 2026 wheat season began with a level of optimism rarely seen in Syria in recent years. Cultivated areas expanded relative to several previous seasons, rainfall reached exceptionally high levels, and expectations grew that improved harvests could help ease mounting economic pressures and strengthen food security in a country still grappling with one […]<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":7,"featured_media":15243,"comment_status":"closed","ping_status":"closed","sticky":false,"template":"elementor_theme","format":"standard","meta":{"footnotes":""},"categories":[641],"tags":[],"class_list":["post-15242","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","has-post-thumbnail","hentry","category-human-rights-journalism"],"blocksy_meta":[],"yoast_head":"\n
\nThese developments have unfolded at a particularly critical moment. According to data from Syria\u2019s Food Security Sector, approximately 13.3 million people face varying degrees of food insecurity. [1] Simultaneously, the World Food Program has been compelled to reduce its food assistance operations in Syria by nearly 50 percent because of acute funding shortages [2]. Under such circumstances, every ton of wheat produced domestically takes on greater significance, and agriculture assumes a role that extends beyond economic production to encompass broader concerns for social stability and national food security.
\nCurrent estimates suggest that Syria requires around 2.5 million tons of wheat annually to meet its basic consumption needs [3]. Food security assessments have also highlighted the persistent climatic and economic pressures confronting the agricultural sector [4]. Despite these challenges, wheat cultivation under the 2026 agricultural plan reached approximately 86 percent of the targeted area, raising expectations of a stronger harvest than in several recent years [5].
\nHowever, before the season could deliver on these expectations, it became the subject of an intense economic debate and was subsequently confronted by an even more formidable challenge imposed by environmental conditions.
\nWheat and the Foundations of Food Security<\/strong>
\nFew crops occupy a position in the Syrian economy comparable to that of wheat. Beyond serving as the principal staple food for the majority of Syrian households, wheat production represents a vital source of income for tens of thousands of farming families, particularly in Al-Hasakah, Raqqa, and Deir ez-Zor\u2014governorates that have traditionally constituted the country’s primary grain-producing region.
\nAs a result, fluctuations in wheat production or changes in the economic incentives governing its cultivation are quickly reflected in local livelihoods, market activity, and food supply chains. Their effects extend far beyond producing areas, influencing economic and food security conditions across the country due to wheat\u2019s central place within Syria\u2019s food system.
\nThis reality has become increasingly important in recent years as household purchasing power has declined, poverty levels have risen, and international assistance has contracted. In this context, sustaining domestic agricultural production has become a key factor in mitigating economic hardship and reducing reliance on imports and external aid.
\nPricing Disputes and the Economics of Wheat Production<\/strong>
\nThe current crisis began when the Ministry of Economy and Industry set the wheat procurement price for the 2026 season at 46,000 new Syrian pounds per ton [6], [7]. From the government’s perspective, the decision reflected fiscal considerations related to public resource management and expenditure control. For many farmers, however, the announced price appeared disconnected from the economic realities they confront on a daily basis.
\nOver the past several years, the costs of agricultural inputs\u2014including seeds, fertilizers, fuel, transportation, irrigation, and equipment maintenance\u2014have increased substantially. Field reports and farmers\u2019 testimonies suggest that many of these inputs are effectively priced according to regional or international market dynamics and are therefore highly sensitive to exchange-rate fluctuations and recent currency volatility. By contrast, the state procures wheat according to administratively determined local prices and a fixed exchange-rate framework. At the same time, producers operate in an environment characterized by considerable uncertainty, elevated risks, and limited protection mechanisms, conditions that have fueled widespread protests across farming communities [9]\u2013[11]. Agricultural economics literature consistently emphasizes that sustainable production depends on the existence of a sufficient economic margin that allows producers to absorb weather-related risks, market fluctuations, and potential seasonal losses.
\nAs criticism intensified across several regions, a presidential decree granted wheat farmers an additional bonus of 9,000 new Syrian pounds per ton [12]. Although the measure helped ease tensions and reduce public discontent, it did not resolve the underlying issues driving the controversy. Many farmers rejected the notion of \u201cpresidential grants\u201d or exceptional concessions, arguing that they were seeking fair compensation for their production costs rather than discretionary benefits.
\nEven after the adjustment, the final procurement price remained below the level advocated by many farmers and agricultural stakeholders. The presidential decision increased the total procurement price to approximately 55,000 new Syrian pounds per ton, yet demands persisted for a pricing framework that more accurately reflects rising production costs and the risks associated with cultivation. Some estimates placed a fair market-support price between USD 450 and USD 550 per ton, based on prevailing production costs in Syria\u2019s principal agricultural regions [9]. Consequently, while the decree succeeded in reducing political and social tensions surrounding the issue, it failed to eliminate the widespread perception that a significant gap remains between official pricing policies and the economic realities of agricultural production.
\nThe recurrence of similar disputes over successive seasons highlights the urgent need for a more stable, transparent, and participatory mechanism for determining the prices of strategic crops [7]. Such a mechanism would help integrate agricultural pricing into a broader and more coherent economic policy framework, rather than allowing it to re-emerge each year as a contentious issue driven by public pressure and farmer protests.
\nMoreover, the controversy extended beyond the procurement price itself. Video testimonies circulated by farmers pointed to difficulties encountered during the marketing process, including delays in state procurement and the rejection of certain quantities of wheat due to technical specifications, quality classifications, or administrative procedures. According to testimonies from farmers in Deir ez-Zor, harvesting costs have also become closely linked to the broader pricing debate, further increasing pressure on producers already operating under challenging economic conditions.
\nBroader Transformations Beyond Wheat Pricing<\/strong>
\nThe controversy surrounding wheat pricing cannot be understood in isolation from the broader economic transformations that have accompanied Syria\u2019s transitional period. Available evidence suggests that the state’s fiscal performance during 2025 relied heavily on policies characterized by austerity-oriented measures, including tighter expenditure controls and reductions in certain forms of subsidies, as well as social and productive spending. In some respects, these policies effectively transformed expenditure restraint into a source of fiscal surplus for the state [13].
\nFor the agricultural sector, such shifts have translated into a greater transfer of economic burdens onto producers themselves. Reductions in support for production inputs or essential public services are directly reflected in higher cultivation costs, while simultaneously weakening farmers\u2019 ability to absorb economic and climatic shocks.
\nThe consequences of these policies are often gradual rather than immediate. Their effects accumulate over time as farmers face rising production costs alongside narrowing profit margins. Under such conditions, producers become increasingly exposed to fluctuations in prices, weather patterns, and market conditions. With each passing season, their capacity to replace equipment, invest in productivity improvements, or withstand unforeseen losses diminishes further. The result is not merely a threat to individual livelihoods but a growing challenge to the long-term sustainability of the agricultural sector itself.
\nIt was within this broader context that the fragility of eastern Syria\u2019s agricultural economy became particularly apparent. The crisis emerged at a time when many producers were already operating with limited financial resilience and constrained adaptive capacity. Consequently, any additional shock\u2014whether economic, environmental, or climatic\u2014was bound to have a far greater impact than it would have under more favorable circumstances.
\nRather than representing an isolated incident, the wheat pricing dispute exposed deeper structural vulnerabilities within the agricultural sector. These vulnerabilities stem not only from immediate market conditions but also from the cumulative effects of policy choices that have gradually reduced the sector\u2019s capacity to withstand external pressures. As a result, eastern Syria\u2019s farmers entered the 2026 season with fewer resources, narrower margins for maneuver, and a diminished ability to cope with the challenges that would soon follow.
\nWhen the Euphrates Overflowed<\/strong>
\nWhile debates over wheat pricing were still unfolding, rising water levels in the Euphrates River introduced a new and more immediate challenge across large parts of Raqqa and Deir ez-Zor. What had begun as an economic dispute soon evolved into a multifaceted crisis affecting agricultural land, standing crops, infrastructure, and local livelihoods throughout the region [14] , [15].
\nFloodwaters swamped extensive tracts of farmland along the riverbanks, river islands, and haw\u0101yij\u2014fertile alluvial areas that rank among the most productive agricultural zones in eastern Syria. A number of crops approaching harvest suffered partial or complete destruction at a critical moment when farmers were preparing to market their produce and recover a portion of their investments and labor costs [16], [17].
\nAccording to government figures and assessments conducted by humanitarian organizations operating in the area, approximately 26,000 dunums of agricultural land were affected by the flooding. The same sources report that 3,040 households and 706 homes sustained damage in Deir ez-Zor alone. Media reports further indicated that numerous water stations and irrigation pumps were rendered inoperable as a result of the flooding [16] \u2013 [19]. Agricultural roads and essential service infrastructure that support local economic activity also suffered damage, highlighting the extensive scale of disruption experienced by rural households and agricultural livelihoods across the affected areas.
\nThe impact extended beyond crop production. Livestock, feed storage facilities, grazing lands, and several fish-farming projects were also affected, expanding the consequences of the disaster to encompass multiple components of the rural economy and a broader range of economic actors [14], [15], [20].
\nPerhaps the most consequential aspect of the crisis, however, was the damage inflicted on productive assets themselves. While the loss of a harvest represents a significant setback for any farmer, the destruction of irrigation pumps, engines, and agricultural infrastructure compromises the ability to resume production in subsequent seasons. At that stage, the effects of the disaster extend beyond a single agricultural cycle and evolve into a longer-term development challenge, with consequences that may continue to shape livelihoods and agricultural productivity for years to come.
\nBeyond the Immediate Damage<\/strong>
\nThe recent flooding highlights a dimension of natural disasters that is often overlooked in public discourse. The severity of a crisis cannot be measured solely by the number of dunums submerged or the number of homes damaged. Equally important is the extent to which affected communities are able to recover and rebuild their livelihoods once the floodwaters recede.
\nIn eastern Syria, where substantial segments of the population depend directly or indirectly on agriculture, the consequences of declining agricultural production extend far beyond the farming community itself. Reduced output affects traders, seasonal laborers, transport providers, service sectors, and a wide range of economic activities that depend on the agricultural cycle. As a result, agricultural shocks tend to generate ripple effects throughout the broader rural economy.
\nThe implications are equally significant at the national level. Any reduction in wheat production places additional strain on Syria\u2019s food security system, particularly at a time when food insecurity remains widespread and humanitarian assistance continues to decline [1], [2]. In such a context, losses in domestic agricultural production carry consequences that reach beyond local economies and directly affect the country\u2019s capacity to meet basic food needs.
\nThis challenge becomes even more acute when economic pressures intersect with climate-related shocks. Under these circumstances, losses do not simply accumulate; the resilience of local communities is progressively weakened. Repeated shocks erode household assets, reduce coping capacities, and diminish communities\u2019 ability to recover independently. Consequently, the need for effective and sustainable public interventions becomes increasingly urgent, not only to address immediate damages but also to strengthen long-term recovery and resilience.
\nThe recent floods therefore illustrate a broader reality: the true cost of climate-related disasters is measured not only in physical losses, but also in their capacity to undermine livelihoods, weaken local economies, and reduce the ability of vulnerable communities to withstand future shocks.
\nWhat Is Needed Today?<\/strong>
\nAddressing the current crisis requires a response that extends beyond temporary financial compensation, important though such measures undoubtedly are. Rapid compensation for damaged crops and lost agricultural assets remains essential to sustaining agricultural activity and preventing additional producers from withdrawing from the rural economy. Yet recovery cannot be reduced to compensation alone. The rehabilitation of damaged infrastructure\u2014particularly water stations, irrigation networks, and agricultural roads\u2014is equally critical. Restoring productive capacity depends not only on individual farmers but also on the broader infrastructure and economic environment that enable agricultural production to continue.
\nInternational experience demonstrates that meaningful recovery from agricultural crises cannot be achieved solely through post-disaster compensation. Long-term resilience requires addressing the structural factors that increase farmers\u2019 vulnerability to economic and environmental shocks. In Syria\u2019s case, this points to the urgent need for an agricultural system that provides producers with greater predictability and stability while reducing the extent to which economic and climatic risks are borne entirely by farming households [21], [22].
\nSuch a system begins with agricultural pricing policy. Research published by the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO), together with assessments conducted by the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), emphasizes that effective government procurement policies must be closely aligned with actual production costs and must allow producers to secure returns sufficient to sustain agricultural activity over time. These costs encompass not only seeds, fertilizers, fuel, irrigation, and transportation, but also the risks associated with weather variability, price fluctuations, and potential seasonal losses. Establishing a transparent pricing mechanism for wheat\u2014one based on regularly updated production-cost assessments and announced well before the start of the agricultural season\u2014would provide farmers with a stronger basis for planning and investment decisions. Equally important, it would reduce the uncertainty that has characterized recent agricultural seasons [21], [23].
\nThe process through which decisions are made is no less important than the prices themselves. Studies published by the FAO and the World Bank indicate that involving farmers and other stakeholders in the formulation of agricultural policies contributes to improving policy quality, increasing effectiveness, and strengthening acceptance among those most directly affected. Establishing institutionalized channels for regular dialogue with farmers, agricultural unions, and professional associations prior to setting strategic crop prices could therefore contribute to more realistic and sustainable policies while reducing the tensions that accompany nearly every harvest season. Farmers possess firsthand knowledge of production costs, operational constraints, and local market realities; incorporating this knowledge into policymaking can significantly improve both the accuracy of policy design and its developmental impact.
\nAt the same time, there is a pressing need to strengthen agricultural risk-management systems. Evidence from numerous countries demonstrates that reliance on compensation after disasters occur is often more expensive and less effective than investing in preventive mechanisms beforehand. For this reason, World Bank research on agricultural insurance advocates a diversified approach that combines natural-disaster insurance, emergency funds, and risk-sharing arrangements involving governments, producers, and financial institutions [22]. The objective of these mechanisms is not necessarily to eliminate losses entirely, but rather to prevent a single climatic shock from escalating into a prolonged economic crisis that forces farmers to reduce production or abandon agricultural activity altogether.
\nThis challenge is particularly relevant in Syria, where recent developments suggest that floods, droughts, and extreme weather events can no longer be viewed as exceptional occurrences requiring only emergency responses. Climate change is increasing both the frequency and severity of such events, amplifying their impact on agricultural production and rural livelihoods. Consequently, greater investment in early warning systems, improved water-resource management, and stronger adaptive capacities among agricultural communities has become increasingly important. These measures constitute central pillars of the international literature on agricultural resilience and are widely recognized as essential components of long-term adaptation strategies.
\nUltimately, protecting Syria\u2019s food security depends on far more than the quantity of wheat procured by the state after harvest. It also depends on the state’s ability to create conditions under which wheat cultivation remains a viable and sustainable economic activity. Farmers who understand in advance how their crops will be priced, who have access to mechanisms that help them manage risk, and who operate within resilient infrastructure are far more likely to invest, produce, and remain engaged in agriculture. In the absence of these conditions, each agricultural season remains vulnerable to the uncertainties of markets, weather conditions, and short-term policy decisions\u2014circumstances that weaken agricultural productivity and further undermine food security over the long term.<\/p>\n
\nThe wheat and flood crisis in eastern Syria illustrates the profound interdependence between economic policy, development priorities, climatic realities, and food security. Farmers entered the 2026 season amid steadily rising production costs, only to confront widespread controversy over government procurement prices. Before this debate could be resolved, rising water levels in the Euphrates River inflicted extensive damage on crops, infrastructure, and productive assets, compounding the challenges already facing the agricultural sector.
\nThese developments underscore the fact that the challenges confronting Syrian agriculture extend well beyond a single season or an isolated crisis. At their core, they reflect the country’s broader ability to create a stable and supportive production environment\u2014one that provides farmers with the incentives, resources, and institutional support necessary to sustain agricultural activity while offering greater protection against recurring economic and climatic shocks. Achieving this objective requires more than equitable pricing policies. It also demands the development of effective risk-management mechanisms, sustained investment in agricultural infrastructure, and enhanced adaptive capacity in the face of increasingly volatile climatic conditions. Equally important is the need to expand the participation of producers in shaping the policies that directly affect their livelihoods, thereby improving policy effectiveness and strengthening trust between the state and economic actors within the agricultural sector.
\nWheat remains one of the foundations of economic and social stability in Syria. The events that have unfolded along the Euphrates in recent months therefore raise a question that extends far beyond the current harvest season: how can a more resilient agricultural sector be built in order to withstand future shocks and uncertainties? The answer to this question will play a decisive role in shaping the trajectory of Syria\u2019s food security in the years ahead.<\/p>\n
\n[1] Food Security Cluster Syria, \u201cSyria Food Security Sector Overview,\u201d 2026. Available: https:\/\/fscluster.org\/syria<\/span>
\n[2] World Food Programme (WFP), \u201cWFP Scales Back Food Assistance in Syria Amid Funding Shortfalls,\u201d May 2026. Available: https:\/\/www.wfp.org\/news\/wfp-scales-back-food-assistance-syria-amid-funding-shortfalls<\/span>
\n[3] 963 Media, \u201cBread in Syria: Shortages, Quality Gaps and the Economic Strain,\u201d Jan. 13, 2026. Available: https:\/\/963media.com\/en\/13\/01\/2026\/bread-in-syria-shortages-quality-gaps-and-the-economic-strain\/<\/span>
\n[4] FEWS NET, Syria Food Security Outlook Update, Apr. 2026. Available: https:\/\/fews.net\/middle-east-and-europe\/syria\/food-security-outlook-update\/april-2026<\/span>
\n[5] 963 Media, \u201c86% of the Wheat Planting Plan for the 2026 Season Has Been Completed,\u201d Apr. 2026. Available: https:\/\/963media.com\/archives\/67069 <\/span>
\n[6] Syrian Arab News Agency (SANA), \u201cMinistry of Economy and Industry Sets Wheat Procurement Price for 2026 Season,\u201d May 2026. Available: https:\/\/sana.sy\/economy\/syrian-economy\/2477214\/<\/span>
\n[7] Haid Haid, \u201cSyria\u2019s Wheat Price Crisis Needs More Than a Presidential Fix,\u201d Al Majalla, Jun. 3, 2026. Available: https:\/\/www.majalla.com\/node\/331382<\/span>
\n[8] Enab Baladi, \u201cFarmers Protest Syria’s Wheat Price Decision,\u201d \u0640June 2025. Available: https:\/\/www.enabbaladi.net\/758876\/\u0628\u0639\u062f-\u0645\u0631\u0633\u0648\u0645-\u0627\u0644\u0645\u0643\u0627\u0641\u0623\u0629-\u0627\u0644\u0627\u0642\u062a\u0635\u0627\u062f\u062a\u0639\u0644\u0646-\u0633\u0639\u0631\/ <\/span>
\n[9] Asharq Al-Awsat, \u201cGovt’s Wheat Pricing Fuels Farmer Protests across Syrian Provinces,\u201d May 18, 2026. Available: https:\/\/english.aawsat.com\/arab-world\/5274783-govts-%E2%80%98wheat-pricing%E2%80%99-fuels-farmer-protests-across-syrian-provinces<\/span>
\n[10] Enab Baladi, \u201cFarmers Protest Syria’s Wheat Price Decision,\u201d May 2026. Available: https:\/\/english.enabbaladi.net\/archives\/2026\/05\/farmers-protest-syrias-wheat-price-decision\/<\/span>
\n[11] Ultrasyria, \u201cHow Does the 2026 Wheat Pricing Threaten Food Security in Syria?,\u201d May 2026. Available: <\/span>
\nhttps:\/\/ultrasyria.ultrasawt.com\/\u0627\u0644\u062e\u0628\u0632-\u0641\u064a-\u0639\u064a\u0646-\u0627\u0644\u0639\u0627\u0635\u0641\u0629-\u0643\u064a\u0641-\u062a\u0647\u062f\u062f-\u062a\u0633\u0639\u064a\u0631\u0629-\u0627\u0644\u0642\u0645\u062d-\u0644\u0639\u0627\u0645-2026-\u0627\u0644\u0623\u0645\u0646-\u0627\u0644\u063a\u0630\u0627\u0626\u064a-\u0641\u064a-\u0633\u0648\u0631\u064a\u0627\u061f\/\u062f\u064a\u0646\u0627-\u0639\u0628\u062f\/\u0645\u062c\u062a\u0645\u0639-\u0648\u0627\u0642\u062a\u0635\u0627\u062f<\/span>
\n[12] Presidency of the Syrian Arab Republic, \u201cPresidential Grant for Wheat Farmers,\u201d May 2026. Available: https:\/\/sana.sy\/presidency\/2482291\/<\/span>
\n[13] Syrian Center for Policy Research (SCPR), Public Budgeting in Transitional Syria: Surpluses in the Accounts, Deficits in Development and the Reproduction of Inequality, Apr. 2026. Available: https:\/\/scpr-syria.org\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/04\/Public-Budgeting-in-Transitional-Syria-SCPR-AR.pdf<\/span>
\n[14] Lahlah Platform, \u201cThe Euphrates Flood in Raqqa and Deir ez-Zor: A Disaster Beyond Water,\u201d 2026. Available: https:\/\/lahlah.space\/\u0637\u0648\u0641\u0627\u0646-\u0627\u0644\u0641\u0631\u0627\u062a-\u0641\u064a-\u0627\u0644\u0631\u0642\u0629-\u0648\u062f\u064a\u0631-\u0627\u0644\u0632\u0648\u0631-\u0643\u0627\u0631\u062b\u0629\/<\/span>
\n[15] Syria TV, \u201cFrom Evacuation by Boats to Waiting for Compensation: The Story of Villages Hit by the Euphrates Flood,\u201d 2026. Available: https:\/\/www.syria.tv\/\u0645\u0646-\u0627\u0644\u0625\u062e\u0644\u0627\u0621-\u0628\u0627\u0644\u0642\u0648\u0627\u0631\u0628-\u0625\u0644\u0649-\u0627\u0646\u062a\u0638\u0627\u0631-\u0627\u0644\u062a\u0639\u0648\u064a\u0636-\u0642\u0635\u0629-\u0642\u0631\u0649-\u0636\u0631\u0628\u0647\u0627-\u0641\u064a\u0636\u0627\u0646-\u0627\u0644\u0641\u0631\u0627\u062a<\/span>
\n[16] Enab Baladi, \u201cEuphrates Flood: Submerged Fields and Water Stations Out of Service,\u201d May 2026. Available: https:\/\/www.enabbaladi.net\/810421\/<\/span>
\n[17] Enab Baladi, \u201cDeir ez-Zor Floods Nearly 17,000 Dunums of Agricultural Land,\u201d May 2026. Available: https:\/\/www.enabbaladi.net\/810792\/<\/span>
\n[18] Welat TV, \u201cEmergency and Disaster Management Ministry Reports Extensive Flood Damage in Deir ez-Zor,\u201d May 2026. Available: https:\/\/www.welattv.net\/ar\/node\/27664<\/span>
\n[19] Hawar News Agency (ANHA), \u201cFlood Damage Assessment in Deir ez-Zor,\u201d May 2026. Available: https:\/\/hawarnews.com\/ar\/142229<\/span>
\n[20] Al-Quds Al-Arabi, \u201cEuphrates Floods in Syria: Homes and Farmland Submerged, Infrastructure Damaged,\u201d May 2026. Available: https:\/\/www.alqudsalarabi.co.uk\/\u0641\u064a\u0636\u0627\u0646\u0627\u062a-\u0627\u0644\u0641\u0631\u0627\u062a-\u0641\u064a-\u0633\u0648\u0631\u064a\u0627-\u063a\u0631\u0642-\u0645\u0646\u0627\u0632\u0644-\u0648\u0623\u0631\u0627\/#gsc.tab=0<\/span>
\n[21] Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO), The State of Food and Agriculture 2021: Making Agrifood Systems More Resilient to Shocks and Stresses. Rome: FAO, 2021. Available: https:\/\/www.fao.org\/documents\/card\/en\/c\/cb4476en<\/span>
\n[22] Olivier Mahul and Charles J. Stutley, Agricultural Insurance for Development: Principles and Experience. Washington, DC: World Bank, 2010. Available: https:\/\/documents1.worldbank.org\/curated\/en\/911381468150325904\/pdf\/624950PUB0Agri00Box0361484B0PUBLIC0.pdf<\/span>
\n[23] Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), Agricultural Policy Monitoring and Evaluation 2024. Paris: OECD Publishing, 2024. Available: https:\/\/www.oecd.org\/agriculture\/agricultural-policy-monitoring-and-evaluation\/<\/span><\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"