The Local Councils in Deir Ezzor Transformations and Future Prospects

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Dedication

To Deir Ezzor province
The bride of freedom
whose dress was dyed with blood
And whose determination
was not breached by the tyrants

Prelude

Bridging the gap between the time of the revolution and the time of the daily life was a necessity imposed by the prolongation of the Syrian catastrophe with lots of disasters that ached the souls of the Syrians, burdened their shoulders, and cracked their hearts. Hence, they were in favor of their constant dreams for liberty, freedom, and dignity - at the expense of their personal interests – which they thought the moment they started the revolution that it would be quite fruitful.

In order to respond to that very necessity, they had to establish certain structures to bridge such gap, and to combine the two times in order to help Syrians achieve balance between what it takes to live in daily basis and what is imposed by their long-term goals and sacrifices.

Therefore, activists started to seek establishing local councils that are responsible of running the civic life and meeting the basic needs along with getting involved at the same time in the revolutionary movement in an organic manner to be supplemented by what it takes from organization in terms of social incubator.

As such, Deir Ezzor province was not behind in realizing this very necessity, so the activists tended to forming local councils in the cities and villages benefitting from pioneering experiences in Syria. And they were successful at some point and in some areas in achieving tangible success that is no less creativity than the rest of the experiences in Syria.

However, this new experiment collided with many barriers

imposed by the nature of the traditional structures in the province that was long established by Assad regime which transformed them into solid blocks in front of the attempts of advancement towards the dominance of the civic state. The existence of oil resources and wealth also contributed to creating such barriers where the sons of the province were deprived form that wealth over decades of dictatorship, which made it disputing point among the greedy powers after the disappearance of the regime' security fist, which in turn out-weighed the personal interest over the revolutionary one along with what came after of the imbalances between them where local councils were established to achieve that end.

No doubt the different loyalties for the entities-in the Syrian Opposition Coalition, which represents an umbrella for the Local Councils- played a vital role in hindering the work of the local councils.

As for the very experience that was practiced by the sons of Deir Ezzor, there were quite a lot of great achievements; the first of which was the genuine performance for democracy, away from the dominance of security apparatuses, and their ability to tackle the problematic issues of the province quite freely, and without fearing a suppressive power, won't be the end of such achievements.

This experience came to an end in the after math of ISIS's control over the majority of the province. Hence, it became a history that could be reviewed in terms of points of strength, or in terms of the points of weaknesses, in order to have a full image in the future which won't be promising without the revival of this very experience for encountering the challenges that the local council was established to eradicate, along with other challenges resulting from the events associated the disappearance of the local councils.

The research aims at shedding some light over this very experience and detecting its transformational stages, along with what it ended up with, in the province of Deir Ezzor.

The research is divided into a theoretical part that includes the concept of local administration, in order to clarify the differences between local administration and other similar concepts.

It also includes an illustration for local administration, its principles and objectives, along with a brief summary for the reality of local councils in Syria before and after the revolution.

Then, the theoretical part goes into depth in spotting light on the experience of the local councils in the province of Deir Ezzor, right from the beginning up to the end. To verify the findings, the researcher made interviews, phone calls, and on line meetings with activists who participated in the experience of the local councils.

Moreover, the research includes a practical part, where the researcher composed a questionnaire of 16 questions for a targeted sample through which the researcher attempted to combine the different views of the interviewees in order to understand the pro and cons of the experience, and the performance of their offices based on different demographical variations, and finally to estimate the needs of reviving the experience along with the conditions for that revival.

The findings of the questionnaire were analyzed by SPSS.

Based on the abovementioned findings, the researcher presented some recommendations that could be utilized in the future, if needed.

Finally, the research did also include a section for the annexes with the correlations tables to show the differences among the findings. It also included a sample of some projects supported by the Syrian Interim Government (SIG) in Deir Ezzor, and a charter of honor for the Al-Bukamal local council, which was the most successful experience in the province.

Theoretical Section

Types of Administrative Decentralization

Meeting the needs of the citizens and providing daily services which move life forward is of the most important functions of the State, without them, the state would become without real entity.

And because the task was a serious means of excretion heavy burden without abandoning it; it is, thus, a shift from the central, which means the concentration of decision-making authority in local affairs in the hands of the central administration in the capital to decentralization, which means the formation of local councils delegated to the state to carry out these tasks in their areas.

The trend towards decentralization manifested as a result of four reasons, according to Walter Kallen¹:

- Providing efficient management, as the local projects are more responsive to the needs and circumstances of the local community.
- Ensuring the achievement of democracy and the rights of individuals, which are the security keys when decisions are taken in line with the interests of the local population.
- Creating a spirit of competition among the local administration units.
- Preserving the rights of minorities by giving them a satisfactory degree to govern themselves.

The concept may get ambiguity caused by interference between it and the other concepts, including administrative decentralization and local governance.

Confusion between these concepts has been evident in the experiences of the local councils in Syria, as we shall see later.

¹⁻ Walter kalin, Workshop on the Decentralization Process, UNDP

Local administration or regional administrative decentralization is similar to administrative decentralization or self-interest in that both of which two photographs of a system of administrative decentralization, where the distribution of administrative functions between the central authority in the capital and among the local bodies or self-interest exercise the powers and functions independently of the central authority except to undergo some administrative control the legislator provided by the central authority on these local bodies of self-interest.

But sounding concepts reveal four differences between the two²:

- It is required in the local administration to be its units that exist in a harmonious society for its members, while the affiliation of one can be played in the administration of self-interest and not scattered units combining their communities this unified affiliation.
- The nature of the local administration is to be based on the principle of the election, while the election in the administration of self-interest is not required
- Local administration is based on component location, while the administration of self-interest, based on the purpose element, does not only require the local but also determines the essence of technical specialization.
- The local administration is organically linked to the principles of democracy and political freedom, while no connection between self-interest and the administration of these concepts because its emergence is for technical reasons in order to achieve optimal management of public facilities.

The present confusion with the concept of local government is caused by their participation in the decentralization and despite the dispute between the scholars of one who said that there is no difference between them, others said that one of prelude to

²⁻ First Arab Forum, the local administration systems in the Arab world, Salalah – Oman August 18-20th 2003- local management systems (concept, philosophy and goals), Dr. Mohamed Mahmoud Taamnh.

another, to who find that there is a difference, anyway; the latter is the most likely because there are two guarantors to make them heterogeneous: ³

Local Administration established in accordance with the administrative laws that often do not require complicated procedures for amendment or repeal, also the powers of the administrative units in the local administration system is delegated powers, not acquired, and the independence they are purely administrative and not political.

2-The local government system arises according to constitutional law or in accordance with the constitutions that normally require complicated procedures for review, so that the authorities granted to the management units in the system of local government authorities are acquired and accompanied by a real political autonomy.

3- Ibid

The Concept of Local Administration

Fouad Attar defined it in his book "Principles of Administrative Law" as the distribution of administrative functions between the central government and the local elected bodies undertake its tasks under the supervision of the government and control⁴

While defined by British writer Aram Moody (Modie Grame) as "elected council in which local unity concentrated and be vulnerable to political responsibility in front of the local unit's population of voters and is complementary to state bodies.⁵

And another researcher defined it, as:

Style of the administrative organization of the state methods, based on the idea of the distribution of activities and responsibilities among the central and local organs, for the first devoting to draw the public policy of the state, in addition to management of national facilities in the country, and that the local devices be able to run their facilities efficiently, and achieve its legitimate objectives ", what distinguishes this definition that it shows the importance and the role of local administration in the management of local public facilities within the community⁶

⁴⁻ Fouad Attar, the principles of administrative law, 1955, Cairo, p. 176

⁵⁻ Modie Grame C. The Government of Great Britain Methuen, 1965

⁶⁻ Abdel Razek al-Sheikhli, The Relationship between the Central Government and Local Administrations-comparative study, Seminar

The Relationship between the Central Administration and Local Administration, The Arab Urban Development Institute, Beirut September 23-25th 2002.

The Foundations of the Local Administration⁷

Local administration is based on a group of foundations, including

- 1. Demonstrating a moral personality: it is the foundation on which determines its independence from the central government and indicates the decentralization of administration or not, and the intended moral personality is the legal capacity to assume their full responsibilities with regard to the exercise of its functions in accordance with the mandate given to it by the central government, and thus independent of the founders and associates and enjoy financial and independent owed, and moral personality sue third parties before the law.
- 2. Embodied in the elected local councils: the recognition of the local administration moral personality is not sufficient to carry out its functions as the local region residents cannot initiate their functions as a collective, which requires the selection of acting for them and represent them in the local authority, which is by election according to specific criteria.
- 3. Elected councils, independently and subject to the central government: the central government retains the right to supervise and observation the work of the local administration to ensure that the good work of their functions in accordance with the general objectives and according to the ruler of policies to carry out the requirements of the local affairs of the population, according lawful texts define the tasks and how to do it best.

⁷⁻ First Arab Forum, the Local Administration Systems in the Arab world, op. cit.

Local Administration Objectives⁸

There is no doubt that every state adopts a system of local administration but to resort to in order to achieve several goals, including:

Political Goals: it is the strengthening of democracy and participation through the free choice of the representatives of the population at the local level through elections, which enshrines the principle of the rule of the people themselves and the training of local people to run their own affairs, and make decisions concerning their affairs in a democratic atmosphere, which give them political experience management of public affairs, leading to the strengthening of national unity and achieve national integration and reduce the monopoly of certain political parties for political action, and the strengthening of political, economic and social the construction of the State.

Administrative Objectives: It is manifested in achieving administrative efficiency especially in the urgent economic aspects which are often on the local affairs priorities agenda and the elimination of central government departments bureaucratic, and create an atmosphere of competition between the various local groups and benefit from each other's experiences administrative efficiency.

Social Objectives: the local community contributes to link the central government to its popular base, which is reflected positively on the locals and meet economic needs, as well as contribute to the consolidation of confidence in citizens and respect their wishes to participate in the management of public affairs, and develop a sense of belonging to the homeland among citizens.

⁸⁻ Mohamed Mahmoud Taamnh and Samir Mohamed Abdel Wahab "Local Governance in the Arab World and the Trends of Development", the Arab Organization for Administrative Development, Research and Studies, Jordan, 2005, p. 9.

The Key Stages in the History of the Local Councils in Syria before the Revolution⁹

- The Feisal-based period in which the country was divided into the districts of local government an experience that ended with the start of the French Mandate
- At the French Mandate period, there was issued a law state the creation of local councils in the provinces centers, districts and villages continued until the issuance of administrative regulations Act of 1957. The latter law has been applied in Syria after independence and continued work by the end of the unity reign.
- At the end of the reign of unity it was supposed to implement Law No. 152, which was issued in 1961 but did not emerge in Syria because of the separation that has to return to the previous law.

In 1971, Law No. 15, which divided administrative units into:

- -Province
- -City
- Town
- Rural Unit
- A village with a population of more than five thousand people

The units do not have a legal personality are:

- -Area
- District

⁹⁻ Local Administration in Syria, Mustafa Ismail, Nasser al-Muthana, Makarim Fathi, supervised by Bassam Quatli, a study conducted with support of the Norwegian People's Aid organization.

- -Neighborhood
- -Farm
- Village does not exceed the number of five thousand people population

Law No. 15 remained in force until the enactment of Law No. 107 of 2011 with the beginning of the Syrian revolution, which stated the decentralization of authority and responsibility, yet it stated to simplify standards by reducing the number since become:

- Governorate
- City
- Village
- Municipality

Local Councils after the Revolution

Probably the gap between the time of the revolution and of the daily life of the people be expanded to the extent drive people away from the revolution as its time becomes too long and their participation become overburden and hurt the course of their lives, yet requires them to pay a high price vary in their ability to pay.

Syrian rebels actually just after a few months were aware of the need to integrate date ranges: the time of the revolution and the time of daily life, and they have resorted to think about the establishment of flexible structures bridges this gap and working to bring about this merger, so local councils were formed, which its mentioned objective implementation entails mechanisms of implementation and procedural detailed targets represented in the following¹⁰:

- Administering of civilian life aspects, and that the council fully represents individuals working in the civil service area and in all the province; to follow up and monitors all acts and ensures quality and good implementation.
- Distributing of all aid reaching the province whether from individuals, groups or states, through specialized networks in all areas of the local council offices, within the standards of fairness and transparency.
- Providing services according to the required needs in various regions and among them relief services, medical, media, civil defense, legal, reconstruction, administrative and professional development ... etc.

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¹⁰⁻ http://www.etilaf.org/%D8%A7%D9%84%D9

- Forming the cores of the future municipalities, which would relate to the interim government, and then the elected one.
- Building and empowering of national cohesion in the community, through the civil action far from any partisanship, ideological or political dimension.

The formation of these councils in some areas, out-regime controlled actually made people of these areas realize the urgent need to organize their regions after an absence of regime institutions, and carrying out service tasks that were entrusted to the work of those institutions.

It was not carrying the same current name in the beginning, but later and after the institutionalization of this structure at the initiative of National Coalition of Syrian Revolution and Opposition Forces has placed a regulation by a panel selected, and asked the various provinces of Syria send delegates to participate in the launch of the process of forming these councils. One of the tributary of this regulation was Law No. 107 for the formation of local councils, issued in 2011, which regime claimed that it aims through it to go to decentralization, but due to linked it to the National Plan to move to decentralization, which put its broad lines without approving the details, was enough to disrupt the law and make it mere ink on paper.

In fact, it was expected from the local council, which was formed to be - except for its mentioned role - the seed of the hoped democracy after demise of regime and work to solve the old networks trust-based on the traditional structures of the range and clan, tribe, region, locality and the craft, whose existence hinders the democratic transition.

Because it forms a barrier between the citizen and the political system by providing the individual with what he need of protect be a substitute of resorting to the law, pushing of authoritarian regimes, to strengthen its presence due to its deliberately looting of the individual's sense of safety, and urging them to search for networks of trust seeking their missing security.

Because the resolving of these traditional networks or integrating them into a wider horizon structure are guarantor means to prevent obstruction of democratic transition, the formation of local councils has been promising dialectical bypass of the trust networks by developing it without repeal.

There has been an issued implementing regulation governing the work of local councils, which was agreed in the coalition the necessity of setting it up in the liberated areas, set forth by activists working in what was called the unity of the local councils.¹¹

This regulation was developed by the Local Authority Act No. 107, issued in 2011 and developed the law again in 2014 when the unity team moved to the Syrian interim government.

¹¹⁻ The institution that supervises the work of the local councils in Syria.

Local Councils in Deir Ezzor

Deir Ezzor province, located in eastern Syria, a region rich in oil, agricultural and livestock wealth. The city experienced a great shock that rocked its social structure following its participation in the revolution against Hafiz Assad's regime in the early eighties which outspread to cover all Syrian provinces. The Assad regime then punished the city severely and tortured its people and was successful to a great extent in breaking their will to mutiny.

The province is characterized by its tribal construction especially the countryside; however, this tribal bond weakens the closer we get to the province centre, Deir Ezzor city¹².

This tribal nature of the area helped the regime and its establishments to exploit this traditional structure to penetrate and control all aspects of life and consequently seize its wealth.

The regime maintained that through luring the leaders of the tribes and in presenting itself as if it had been the only available means of protecting people against the tribal bigotry. Thus its security systems became the only power that would prevent tribal prejudice.

On the other hand, the regime drove the educated youth of the children of the province (in both city and countryside) to seek their living abroad, the thing that had its negative effects on the regime later.

Moreover, the regime exaggerated in applying the policy of ruralizing the cities throughout Syria, a policy that took a firmer

¹²⁻ There are three major tribes that those peasants subsumed, as peasants belong on the banks of the Euphrates and the Near Habur of the Syrian-Iraqi border into Albasiera to Alakedaat tribe, while peasants belong on the banks of the Habur top to the Jabour tribe and on the left bank of the Euphrates is positioned peasants of Baggara tribe.

shape in Deir Ezzor for a variety of reasons that we cannot cover here.

The Regime did not do enough to bring about a breakthrough in terms of accumulative production associated normally with the creation of political and economic awareness that would guarantee the develop of the social structure to a more qualitative level to bring the civil state out of its self-closure to more open diverse influences¹³.

Once the Baath Party seized power, the coup leaders worked on more dedication of this structure and isolating it from all influences except the open channels to the regime and its security systems. This has become a more officially adopted approach after the so-called Corrective Movement in 1970.

When the Syrian revolution broke out, the youth- who wanted to simulate their counterparts in Tunisia and Egypt- did not witness the brutality of the regime in the eighties i.e. they did not experience the feeling of exaggerated fear of those who belonged to the older generations.

The young people of this province whether from the city or the country, whom the regime policies had driven way to seek living away from their homeland, developed an awareness that led to their participation in the revolution. They saw a huge gap between the living conditions of their towns and village with all the resources they have and the living conditions of those enjoyed by the citizens of the Gulf States where most of them settled down. Their awareness of the prejudice and corruption of the regime was much larger than making a comparison between their country and those states.

On 22/06/2012, following the liberation of some areas as Mayadin, Mohassan, and Al-Quriyah of the regime's control, some entities came into existence as revolutionary gatherings in

¹³⁻The Traditional Structures and Mechanisms of Change, Manaf Al Hamad, Al Hayat newspaper-November 26th, 2013. http://www.alhayat.com/Opinion/Letter ...

the mentioned cities as well as some towns and villages: "Bukros, Albulel, Almrieih, Jdeed Ekidat, Jdeed Bkkarah, Altabiah", were formed at the beginning of August 2012. The urgent need for the management of life in these cities, villages and towns called for forming councils to address this task, the organizers of these councils quickly realized the gravity of their task and their lack of the adequate tools to carry it out¹⁴.

As a result of the development of awareness of the need to work and the obstacles in the way, another attempt developed and led to the formation of the Revolutionary Council in the Eastern Province, whose birth was announced on 23-10-2012. It had both military and civil wings and a framework under which the revolutionary councils in cities, towns and villages came.

Moreover, the formation of this council was not isolated from the attempts made by the National Coalition of Syrian Revolution and Syrian Opposition whose news was reported continually. Still, this Revolutionary Council remained restricted to limited areas for many reasons, not least of which is the activists' lack of conviction in its legitimacy or the faith of those running the council that the support will continue.

Simultaneous attempts together with those made by the Coalition were doomed to fail as well; Syrian residents in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia tried to form a local council of the city of Deir Ezzor in the Kingdom, which was rejected by both the activists inside and the Coalition¹⁵.

It is noteworthy that the idea of local councils was initially suggested by the French Ambassador Chovaliee in 2012. Chovaliee invited each province to send five of its citizens to visit Paris to discuss the matter and allocated an amount of one hundred thousand dollars for Deir Ezzor of which \$49,000 was intended for the purpose of purchasing of bulldozers to remove

¹⁴⁻ Local Councils in Deir Ezzor, Faissal Dahmoush, research presented to the Unit of the studies of Supreme Council for Local Administration.

¹⁵⁻ A dialogue via Skype with Hossam Al Hamidi a member of provincial council of Deir Ezzor province on 11/12/2015.

rubble in Deir Ezzor and 51 thousand dollars to support establishing a local government. However, contemporary witnesses declared that Chovaliee was not satisfied with the conduct of the two people who received the money so he gave up the whole idea and this was the cause of the reluctance of the Europeans to provide any later support.

Some activists borrowed the idea of the local councils from Chovaliee and actually started attempting to establish them but these attempts changed direction with the entry of Mustafa Sabbagh¹⁶ on the line. Sabbagh succeeded in persuading these activists to be part of his project and be representatives of the provinces councils in the National Coalition, the thing that took place eventually¹⁷.

Another station that has to be mentioned is that the person who was nominated to be a representative of the local council of the province of Deir Ezzor in the beginning was Dr. Ahmad Toma¹⁸ who later became president of the Syrian interim government. Toma was nominated by dissident Syrian Prime Minister Riad Hijab. Since Toma resigned, Sheikh Riad Hassan was nominated instead. Hassan had been considered the head of Salafi orientation in the town of Deir Ezzor. Riad Hassan new position in the Council which was called "rebels Deir Ezzor¹⁹," which he had been one of his members, enabled great influence on the work of the local councils in the province²⁰.

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¹⁶- A Syrian businessman who occupied the position of Secretary General of the Syrian Opposition Coalition during the presidency of Muaz Al Khateeb

¹⁷⁻ A dialogue with Ahmad Tome the President of the Syrian interim government on 20.12.2015.

¹⁸ Political activist and one of Damascus Declaration's founders

¹⁹⁻ A body that was established in September 2012 as a result of communications among activists for including as much as possible of revolutionary and media gatherings. It had representatives inside and outside Syria. It provided relief support as well as military one. It had representation in the Syrian National Council and the Syrian Opposition Coalition.

²⁰⁻ A dialogue with member of Deir Ezzor City Council preferred not to mention his name on 20/12/2015.

The Beginning of the Formation of Local Councils

After many meetings in Istanbul, a committee emerged to communicate with the Syrian interior and work on the formation of local councils, and to develop an internal system of local councils in the liberated areas and gave the committee a month to accomplish the task.

The committee comprised (Judge Ramadan Zhman, Dr. Badie Alshwen, and Ahmed Al Hammadi) and tasked to work on the formation of local councils of the province of Deir Ezzor headed to Syrian interior in November 2012 and met activists and revolutionary society's as well military forces in different regions, each region separately. During this period, it was agreed with everybody on the nomination of a representative from each village, town and city recommended by the activists and revolutionaries dignitaries to hold a meeting in the city Al-Mayadin to review and discuss the ways and mechanisms of the formation of the provincial council of Deir Ezzor in accordance with the vision reached by the Syrian Coalition after six meetings.

The work of this committee was faced by an obstacle represented in the existence of another group that affiliated to the coalition. This group had already begun to work in Deir Ezzor after a conference held in Ankara. It was believed by contemporaries of the events²¹ that this group was related to a man of religion; a Syrian resident in Saudi Arabia, Adnan al-

²¹⁻ A dialogue via Skype with Hossam Hamidi, a member of the provincial council of Deir Ezzor on 12/12/2015.

Aroor^{22.} Likewise, others attributed this parallel activity to a Syrian with Turkish nationality, who had hoped by this step to become the Minister of Local Administration in the would-be government. This could be fairly interpreted in the light of the reality of competition in the coalition and the multi-polarization centers around which these groups revolve.

However, this obstacle was quickly removed because the support for that group was distributed randomly, and the people of the region did not need further insight to distinguish wheat from chaff.

The first group invited figures from dignitaries, activists and revolutionaries to form a local council in every village, city and district.

On 25/11/2012 a meeting was held in the city of "Al-Mayadin" in the presence of all the activists and representatives of the villages and towns, with the exception of the representatives of the city, of "Deir Ezzor. This meeting came out with a decision to form a provincial council third of which to represent the city and two thirds to represent the countryside. Ramadan Zhman was elected president and Dr. Muammar Al Hassoun, who missed the meeting, was appointed as his deputy.

The Council had already begun work on forming sub-councils aiming at establishing a council in every city, town and village in the municipality, as for the villages, where there is no municipalities, "service organizations were formed" to be administratively subordinate to the nearest local council in the district.

After four meetings to appoint the members of the local council of the province, a council was formed with a representative of each demographical area, two representatives from both Al Bukamal and Al-Mayadin and four representatives

²²⁻ A Syrian cleric resident in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia who had a significant role in mobilizing the revolutionary movement in the beginning of the revolution and in providing support for activists relying on his relations in the Kingdom.

from the city of Deir Ezzor who were nominated but their seats remained unoccupied. Thus the number the provincial council's members of Deir Ezzor reached up to (22) member. Furthermore, the head of each sub-council was appointed as a member of the general electing committee that would meet once a month in the Province Council to follow up the Council's agenda.

Thus, each representative on his part worked on assembling activists, dignitaries and professionals of his village or town to form local councils through appointing, selecting or agreement and linking these councils directly to the local council of the province by appointing the head of each sub-council as a member of the electing general body and through representative of each area being a member of the executive office²³.

As for the local councils in the villages, they were formed by their representatives in the provincial council through inviting a village activists and its notable revolutionaries. The conferees there formed electoral bodies to pick up the members of the councils on the grounds of their competence, revolutionary role and tribal rank. However, these councils were not in accordance with the structure agreed on.

At the beginning of January 2013"Judge Ramadan Zhman" resigned as the president of the provincial Council of Deir Ezzor for unknown reasons, and engineer "Maqel Al-Khalidi²⁴" was assigned in his post to run the council until new president would be elected. There appeared some competition between the members over the position but this was resolved in 01.12.2013 with a consensus on holding elections on the level of members and lawyer "Hamza Al-Berry," was elected president of the provincial council²⁵.

Each council comprised the following offices:

Service office

²³⁻ A dialogue with member of the provincial council of Deir Ezzor who preferred anonymity on 28/12/2015.

²⁴⁻ Revolutionary activist with Salafi tendency from Al Mayadin city.

²⁵⁻ Local councils in Deir Ezzor, Faissal Dahmoush, op.

Financial office Relief office Educational office Security office Health office

Each district and town was asked to name one representative for it in the council knowing that the total number of districts was eleven, and the number of towns was three.

The president of the provincial council and his deputy were elected in addition to electing a head for each aforementioned office.

The most prominent work during the four months that followed was the relief work. In the second session a new president for the provincial council was elected, who was in turn asked to were call for the election of a public body from the heads of sub-councils that reached up then to 135 sub-council.

It is worth mentioning that the town of Al Bukamal had witnessed the formation of a civil management that was quite mature in terms of its being free from any acute disputes and due to the agreement mechanism adopted²⁶.

Activists in the city, called on 10/06/2012 to a meeting that was attended by about forty people. By the end of that meeting they agreed on the formation of an executive office composed of seven people and the election of president and vice president for that office by a general assembly that is composed of forty members. The office first term would last for three months after which new elections would take place. An agreement of honor²⁷ was approved which is very much like the rules of procedure for the work of an executive office that define the powers and divide the labor.

It was notable that the selection criteria of the general

27- See Appendix 3.

²⁶⁻ A dialogue with Khalil Aljaleed a member of Al Bukamal local council

authority and the executive office did not include any tribal consideration. This distinguished Al Bukamal from Al-Mayadin and the rest of the province, with the exception of the city of Deir Ezzor. The maturity of the local council in the town of Al Bukamal could be attributed to the heterogeneity that exists between the demographic components of society in the city who mostly belonged originally to the Iraqi cities of Anah and Rawah, in addition to the absence of rural penetration in the activities of daily life in the city save as costumers.

Al-Mayadin city has also formed local councils that remained working in secret despite the liberation of the city. Once the president of the council paid the city²⁸- the council was self-financed by citizens of the city, especially from a group resident in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia calling itself "The Free Al-Mayadin Gathering- "the purpose of the visit was to buy a mill from Turkey desperately needed by the city. During that visit the president was offered to form a local council that would be financed by one hundred thousand dollars. The president however demanded sometime to consult the citizens of the city. Indeed, he called for a meeting in a mosque in the city and the offer was accepted due to the need to support, and then the formation of the council was announced and Mr. Maqel Al-Khalidi was elected president. The council comprised several offices:

- Relief office
- Health Office
- Public Relations Office
- Security Office
- Media Office

After two months of work a preparatory committee was formed. The committee divided the city into three major areas. The job of this committee was to nominate members for the public body.

²⁸⁻ A phone call with one member of Al Mayadin local council Dated: 10/11/2015.

The second term which lasted for 8 months witnessed increasing objections about not considering the criterion of revolutionary activity as a priority in the selection of the council members²⁹. This was imposed by the tribal nature of the city which made the selection on tribal considerations a major criterion to which all other considerations like revolutionary activity and the division of the city to east centre and west came second. Then, a committee was formed to discuss the council formation mechanism and to take into account what had been overlooked. The most prominent change was the representation of the civil society organizations which exceeded thirty organizations where each organization was represented by one member. The same procedure was applied to the military battalions. The General Body elected a new executive office.

There was a dilemma in the province³⁰ of Deir Ezzor that only one month and a half after the formation of the local council which was headed by Dr. Muammar Al Hassoun. The council suffered a sharp disagreement that almost toppled the council. The disagreement revolved around what was considered by relief representatives and activists an exclusion of them in the formation of the council and also accusations of the President of the Council of being dictatorial in decision-making the thing that pushed them to protest against the Council and refuse to acknowledge it sheltered by some military battalions. This dispute drove the coalition to make the decision of stopping the support of the city council.

Several attempts to settle the dispute were made including the election of a new President for the Council, architect Zakaria al-Alwan who announced the formation of his offices on 19.03.2013. However, all these attempts came to nothing because many relief parties such as "Rawafed³¹", and revolutionary

²⁹⁻ A dialogue with Zakaria al-Ani, a member of the local council of Al Mayadin city Dated: 12/07/2015.

³⁰⁻ A dialogue with one of Deir Ezzor provincial council members on: 01/11/2016.

³¹⁻ A Relief organization founded by a group of civilians on 18/02/2012 and focused on work in the eastern area.

parties mainly the Council of Deir Ezzor Rebels insisted on the illegitimacy of this council and its exclusion of such parties. Despite the repeated attempts to resolve the dilemma, nothing worked out and the council remained disabled for a period of two and a half months though it remained present in the provincial council nominally without any actual representatives.

The harsh objective conditions marked by the need for support in the first place and which was suspended due to disputes and the prolonged suspension of this support, a final attempt was made by members of the Executive Office and members of the Control Board of the provincial council. This attempt resulted in the formation of new offices that affiliate to the office of implementation and there was an election of a new president, Eng. Hussein Hayje and thus the council went back to work again.

No problems have been reported about the formation of the local councils in villages, especially the problem of local councils in the western rural villages. Village councils were not subjected to any re-formation or re-election, but rather an extension of these councils by the provincial council after the village activists agree, and there was only replacement of dropouts or dismissed members.

Disputes of the Local Council in the Province

The differences within the provincial council broke out for several reasons. First and foremost was the rural and urban polarization that the regime had enshrined in the former years turning it into a chronic insoluble problem. Some people's optimism at the beginning of the revolution that this polarization was overstepped proved to be excess of hopefulness as it soon came to existence in the views of most city dwellers of the former due to involvement of the tribes in the countryside in controlling and exploiting the oil wells³².

This gave the citizens of the city an objective excuse to accuse them of trading in blood and profiting from the revolution, and we should refer here that the destruction of the city's had been a factor that cannot be underestimated in increasing resentment over the countryside which had not suffered a similar destruction in addition to the behavior of certain countryside citizens who made fortunes from oil trade.

Differences were manifested in the demands of certain towns especially Deir Ezzor City to increase their share of support granted to the provincial council while rural councils deemed themselves more deserving of such increase of share because it is burdened by the displaced from the province's towns³³.

The differences had also ideological doctrinal nature between Salafists and secularists though such differences were as significant as earlier mentioned factor. Moreover, the differing allegiances to different blocks in the coalition added to the escalation of differences within the council.

Another point of disagreement was over the representation

³²⁻ https://www.voutube.com/watch?v=rcDYiShwNBU&hd=1

³³⁻ Former dialogue mentioned.

ratio in the Executive Office. This point was solved by the addition of five members.

The local councils unit demanded that the Executive Office should not exceed (10) members of the council to be registered in the Syrian Opposition Coalition. The differences emerged again about the representation of members of the Executive Office especially with the city insistence on the number of its representatives in the Executive Office. It also demanded to be represented by a third of the members of the local council.

Five members were added to the local council representatives of the city so the total number of the members reached up to 27 members. The Executive Office was finally formed by adopting (4) representatives from the city and (6) representatives from the countryside where it was agreed that each two districts were represented by one member. Some subdistricts however accepted to be represented by the city members. Thus, the province of Deir Ezzor local council has finally stabilized³⁴.

Local Councils after ISIS Control of Most of the Province

After ISIS controlled most of Deir Ezzor province in the second half of 2014, it initially summoned the important members of local councils and subjected some of them to a religious course asking them to repent. Later however it was shown that the organization followed a well-considered strategy that began with a short period of convalescence followed by confiscation of funds of the local councils. Shortly after ISIS started a security pursuit of the prominent members of the local councils on the ready charges of blasphemy and being loyal to infidels i.e. e actually the abroad opposition organizations, particularly the Coalition.

Those steps taken by the ISIS against the local councils ended up with draining the above-mentioned councils' resources, breaking them up, and finally their total disappearance³⁵.

Contemporaries to ISIS control over the region confirm the existence of a plan supported by information via secret agents for ISIS who had been providing the organization with the detailed information about the reality of situation in the region long time before their control of the province.

ISIS had already crystallized a thorough picture of its primary interest, namely the locations of the oil, its distribution and those who were exploiting it by those belonging to the organization of infiltrators and collaborators from the province. In addition, ISIS benefitted from the expertise of one of the oil companies whose employees stayed in the region after ISIS control.

³⁵⁻ A telephone conversation with a member of the local council in Al Mayadin on 10/03/2016.

In parallel with its interest in oil, ISIS showed a similar interest in archaeological excavations which also constituted a very important funding resource for the organization³⁶.

This complex planning together with ISIS ability to control resources and its military force that the other forces can by no means confront as well as its strategy in dealing with the local councils were sufficient reasons for the demise of this promising experience despite the shortcomings and weaknesses it suffered from.

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³⁶⁻ Telephone conversation with member of the local council of Al Bukamal in 10/03/2016

Practical Section

The Questionnaire

The Demographic Variations

	Age	Gender	Education Level	Work	Affiliation (Urban – Rural)
ľ					

Question1	Question	Yes	No
Question2	Local councils succeeded in Deir Ezzor		
	in achieving their tasks		
Question3	The reasons for its failure:		
	A-the control of the coalition group on		
	its work		
	(B) administrative and financial		
	corruption		
	C-poor communication with the		
	community		
	D-Inefficiency		
	E-absence of a regular technicians' team		
	And-the disputes between the cities and		
	the countryside		
Question4	Varying performance in Deir Ezzor by		
	area		
Question5	Within the same region, the services are		
	not on one level of efficiency		
Question6	The best office in terms of achievement:		
	A-Health		
	B-Relief		
	C-Education		
	D-Service		
	E-Security		
	F-Financial		
	J-Media		

Question7	Local councils were able to establish	
	good relations with the armed factions	
Question8	The relationship with oil extractors	
	among tribal was strained relationship	
Question9	The relationship with the opposition	
	bodies was good	
Question10	The best components in terms of the	
	degree of cooperation with local	
	councils in Deir Ezzor	
	-Interim Government	
	- Coalition	
	- ACU	
	- Syrian Business Forum ³⁷	
Question11	Councils exercised the selection of its	
	members in a democratic way	
Question12	Councils managed to devote the culture	
	of local councils with the community	
Question13	support the revival of local councils	
	after the liberation of the province	
Question14	Think it can come back under the	
	Coalition authority	
Question15	prefer these councils to develop in Deir	
	Ezzor to a local government of a	
	political independence	
Question16	If be revived it possible to re-control the	
	resources of the province and the self-	
	financing	

37- An independent body founded by a group of Syrian businessmen chaired by Mustafa Al Sabagh, for supporting the Syrian revolution on 06/06/2012

Findings Analysis of the Deir Ezzor Local Councils` Questionnaire

The surveying questionnaire was designed to explore the views of the locals in Deir Ezzor which witnessed the experience of the local councils in there. Hence, the questionnaire was based on single questions relating directly to the objective of the study; it was divided into two major sections:

-The demographic factors: They contained three variables used for the purpose of comparison, two of which are descriptive variables: (Educational level, Affiliation) and one quantitative that is (Age).

-The domains of study: They represent 15 questions, three of them are multiple-choice questions.

<u>First: The method of statistical analysis used in the</u> research:

This research adopts the method of descriptive statistics: It implies the measures of centralization trend, measures of dispersion and Column charts. In addition to, Deductive statistics: The test of Kai square, and Pearson's Simple correlation coefficient.

Second: Analyzing the questionnaire's findings

Analyzing the findings of the research depended on SPSS V23.

1-Reliability Coefficient

For the purpose of measuring the reliability of the data, we calculated the coefficient (Cronbach's Alpha) in order to detect the amount of internal harmony among the questions.

Reliability Statistics

Cronbach's Alpha	N of Items
.559	29

Validity coefficient	Reliability coefficient		
0.747	0.559		

As shown above, the reliability coefficient was (0.559) which means it is safe to say that the questionnaire has an average reliability, meaning that the scale (questions) is stable and does not contradict itself; which also states clearly that the questions tend to yield the same findings at an average probability when they are repeated.

Therefore, based on the value of validity³⁸ (0.747) it means that the questionnaire represents the community it was taken from, and that the questions do really answer the points they are investigating.


- 1-The Measures of Centralization Trend and Dispersion
- The measures of centralization trend and dispersion for the responders' age, their educational level, and their affiliation:

Variable	Amou nt	Arithmet ic mean	Standar d error	Standar d Deviati on	Coefficie nt of torsion	coefficie nt of kurtosis
Education al level	314	1.73	0.057	1.005	1.115	0.318
affiliation	312	1.20	0.022	0.397	1.543	0.383
age	314	31.03	0.490	8.688	1.166	2.306

³⁸⁻ The validity coefficient is square root of the reliability one.


We notice that the standard error is minor to all other axes which means that the value of the arithmetic mean represents the studied community and the value of the mean is limited if we ask another sample the same questions. We also notice that the value of the questions' standard deviation from its mean is reasonable, and this indicate the lack of data dispersion.

- The chart of histogram and flattening curve: for describing the data distribution and the focus location.



We notice throughout the value of convolution coefficient that the distribution is curved rightwards, and the data is concentrated in the left side of distribution. Whereas, the value of the flattening coefficient indicates that the flattening is slightly increased and the data are concentrated moderately according to education level and affiliation, and it is majorly concentrated according to age.

2- Data bars



3- Calculating the means and deviations: in order to identify the answers in the questionnaire for understanding the trends of the responders' opinions:

- Single axes:

Local	Yes	No					
Councils	Amount	Amount	Arithmetic	Standard	Standard	Trend	
Assessment domains	%	%	Mean Error		Deviation		
Local Councils	140	174					
Succeeded In Deir Ezzor In Achieving the requested tasks	44.6	55.4	0.45	0.028	0.498	No	
Varying Performance	259	55	0.82	0.021	0.381	Yes	
By Region	82.5	17.5	0.82	0.021	0.361	res	
The Services	267	47					
Are Not On One Level Of Efficiency	85	15	0.85	0.020	0.357	Yes	
Establishing Good	164	150					
Relations With The Armed Factions	52.2	47.8	0.52	0.028	0.500	Yes	
Strained Relationship	233	81					
With Oil Extractors	74.2	25.8	0.74	0.025	0.438	Yes	
The Relationship	233	81					
With The Opposition Bodies Was Good	74.2	25.8	0.74	0.025	0.438	Yes	
Selecting Its Members In A	105	209					
Democratic Way	33.4	66.6	0.33	0.027	0.473	No	

Devoting The Culture Of	82	232				
Local Councils With The Community	26.1	73.9	0.76	0.025	0.440	No
Supporting The Revival	252	62				
Of Local Councils After The Liberation Of The Province	80.3	19.7	0.80	0.023	0.399	Yes
Can It Come	98	216				
Back Under The Coalition Authority	31.2	68.8	0.31	0.026	0.464	No
Developing To A Local	160	154				
Government Of an Independent rule	51	49	0.51	0.028	0.501	Yes
Control The	220	94				
Resources Of The Province And The Self- Financing	70.1	29.9	0.70	0.026	0.459	Yes

Multiple answers axes

Reasons of		Percentage %				G. 1 1	
Local Councils' Failure	numbe r	For Responder s number	For Answer s number	Arithmeti c Mean	Standar d Error	Standard Deviatio n	
The dominance of one party in the coalition over the entire coalition	127	40.7	14.3	0.40	0.028	0.492	
Administrativ e and Financial Corruption	121	38.8	13.6	0.39	0.028	0.487	
Poor communicatio n with community	187	59.9	21	0.60	0.028	0.492	
Inefficiency	172	55.1	19.3	0.55	0.028	0.499	
Unavailability of regular technicians' team	180	57.7	20.2	0.57	0.028	0.495	
Disputes between cities and countryside	102	32.7	11.5	0.32	0.026	0.469	

Where all responders tend to relate the most important reasons for the failure of the local councils to :

1- Poor communication with the community. 2- Absence of a regular technicians' team . 3 – Weak efficiency for the personnel of the local councils.

terms		Percei	ntage %			Standar
Best office in terms of achievement	number	For Responders number	For Answers number	Arithmet ic Mean	Standar d Error	d Deviati on
Health office	19 8	64.3	32.2	0.63	0.027	0.483
Relief office	11 2	36.4	18.2	0.36	0.027	0.480
Education al office	95	30.8	15.5	0.30	0.026	0.460
Service office	13 2	42.9	21.5	0.42	0.028	0.494
Security office	42	13.6	6.8	0.13	0.019	0.341
Financial office	13	4.2	2.1	0.04	0.011	0.200
Media Office	22	7.1	3.6	0.07	0.014	0.256

All responders tend to the fact that best offices in the local councils in terms of achievement are as following respectively:

1- Health office. 2- Service office. 3- Relief office

on ms of		Percentage %		an	or	tion	
Best oppositic component in ter cooperation	Best opposition component in terms of cooperation	For Responders amount	For Answers amount	Arithmetic Mean	Standard Error	Standard Deviation	
Syrian Interim Government	155	51.8	32.4	0.49	0.028	0.501	
Syrian Opposition Coalition	128	42.8	26.7	0.41	0.028	0.492	
ACU	146	48.8	30.5	0.46	0.028	0.500	
Syrian Business Forum	50	16.7	10.4	0.16	0.021	0.366	

The responders tend to the fact that the best opposition components that are cooperative with the local councils are respectively as follows:

¹⁻ Syrian Interim Government. 2- Assistance Coordination Unit.

³⁻ Syrian National Coalition Of Syrian Revolution and Opposition Forces

- Interrelations for the multiple answers axes:

The answers of the asked questions indicate in details for each variable:

1- Education Level:

	Illiterate	University degree	Institute degree	High school	Secondary school	Elementary school	total
The dominance of one party in the coalition over the entire coalition	1	66	28	21	9	2	127
Administrative and Financial Corruption	1	48	30	27	12	3	121
Poor communication with community	1	108	29	38	8	3	187
Weak efficiency	1	92	31	35	10	3	172
Unavailability of regular technicians' team	1	112	26	31	6	4	180
Disputes between cities and countryside	0	55	18	16	9	4	102
Total	1	181	52	60	14	4	312
Health office	1	113	37	36	10	1	198
Relief office	0	81	11	19	1	0	112
Educational office	0	61	18	13	3	0	95
Service office	0	86	19	24	3	0	132

Security office	0	33	4	5	0	0	42
Financial office	0	11	1	1	0	0	13
Media Office	0	8	4	6	3	1	22
Total	1	182	51	58	14	2	308
Syrian Interim Government	0	101	26	23	5	0	155
Syrian Opposition Coalition	0	70	16	33	8	1	128
ACU	1	97	25	22	1	0	146
Syrian Business Forum	0	31	13	5	1	0	50
Total	1	178	49	58	12	1	299

The table indicates that the university degree's holders see that the most important reason for the failure of the local councils is the unavailability of regular technicians' team. As for the institute degree's holders, they see the most important reason is the Inefficiency. Whereas, the high school graduates see the Poor communication with community is the most important reason. The elementary school graduates see that the Administrative and Financial Corruption as the most important reason. As for the primary school graduates, they see the unavailability of regular technicians' team and Disputes between cities and countryside are the most important reasons.

The degree's holders agree that the health and service offices are the best ones in the local councils that played their role. likewise, the degree's holders and graduates (university, high school, elementary and primary one) graded the performance of the relief office as the third best one, but the institute degree's holders see that the education office was better.

Moreover, the university and institute degree's holders agree that the Syrian Interim government is the best opposition body in terms of cooperation with the local councils. Also, the high and elementary school's graduates see the Syrian Opposition Coalition is the best one in this matter.

2- Affiliation

	Urban	Rural	Total
The dominance of one party in the coalition over the entire coalition	97	30	127
Administrative and Financial Corruption	87	33	120
Poor communication with community	153	34	187
efficiency	133	39	172
Unavailability of regular technicians' team	155	25	180
Disputes between cities and countryside	75	27	102
Total	250	61	311
Health office	161	39	197
Relief office	93	19	112
Educational office	79	15	94
Service office	112	19	131
Security office	41	1	42
Financial office	11	2	13
Media Office	17	5	22
Total	247	59	306
Syrian Interim Government	133	22	155
Syrian Opposition Coalition	105	23	128
ACU	123	22	145
Syrian Business Forum	40	10	50
Total	241	57	298

The urbans and the rurals disagreed about the most important reasons for the local councils' failure; the urbans believe that the reasons behind the failure are primarily the absence of a regular technicians' team. Whereas, the rurals believe see that the primary reason is inefficiency of the local councils staff. Rurals and urbans agree that the Poor communication with community is considered as a secondary reason. Urbans see the dominance of one party in the coalition over

the entire coalition is a third-grade reason for the failure, whereas the rurals see Administrative and Financial Corruption is the third-grade one.

Both urbans and rurals agree that the best offices that provided services in the local councils are respectively:

1- Health office. 2- Service office. 3- Relief office.

3- Statistical Tests


- Chi-Square Test: to identify the independency among the demographic axes.


Annihilation Assumption: there are no variations of statistical nature among the answers according to education level, affiliation, and age.


Domains	Chi-square Value	Probability Value
Educational Level & Affiliation	13.917 ^a	0.016
Educational Level & Age	256.986 ^a	0.002
Affiliation & Age	57.677 ^a	0.027

Throughout this table, we notice that a squared Chi-value between two axes of the studied ones. The probability value for all comparisons is less than 0.05, which means that there is not independency among the axes i.e. There are variations of statistical nature. Each axis(education level, affiliation, and age) influences on the answers of the two other ones.

The bar chart indicates the relation among the axes.







Correlations

1- Axes correlations:

	Evaluating councils	Failure reasons	Best offices	Opposition bodies
Evaluating	1	-0.411-**	0.509**	0.444**
councils		0.000	0.000	0.000
Failure	-0.411-**	1	-0.203**	-0.154**
reasons	0.000	1	0.000	0.006
Dogt offices	0.509**	-0.203**	1	0.485**
Best offices	0.000	0.000	1	0.000
Opposition	0.444**	-0.154**	0.485**	1
bodies	0.000	0.006	0.000	1

The correlations table indicates that there is a covariant relation with high statistical nature between the evaluation of the local councils and best offices in terms of performance and the relation with the cooperative opposition bodies. Their correlations were respectively R = (0.444, 0.509). Whereas the correlation of the evaluation of the local councils with their failure reasons is diverse relation with high statistical nature as the correlation reaches R = (-0.411).

This means that the evaluation of the local councils is improving with the performance of the offices along with the increase of cooperation and support provided by the opposition bodies to these councils. In other words, whenever that reasons of the failure take place, the evaluation of the councils decreased.

Throughout the table of the correlations for all axes and variables, it is clear that most of the correlations value is less than 0.3, consequently there are no correlations among the axes, apart from some weak and intermediate correlations as shown below:

	Relation with armed factions	Democratic Selection	The Revival Of Local Councils
Success in Achieving the required tasks	0.524** 0.000	0.410** 0.000	0.397** 0.000
Devoting The Culture Of Local Councils		0.332** 0.000	

We notice that there is a covariant relation with high statistical nature among those axes, and the *Success in Achieving the Required Tasks* is more tied with *Relation with armed factions*, followed by *Democratic Selection*, then *Revival of Local Councils*. This means that the more good relation between the local councils with the armed factions with democratically selected members, the more success in performing its work and achieving the required tasks. Likewise, the culture of local councils is devoted if their members were selected democratically.

By calculating the identification coefficients³⁹, the table will be as follows:

³⁹⁻ Identification coefficient = squared correlation coefficient

	Relation with armed factions	Democratic Selection	The Revival Of Local Councils
Success in Achieving the required tasks	0.274	0.168	0.157
Devoting The Culture Of Local Councils		0.110	

This means that the improving of the relations between the local councils with the armed factions explains 27.4% of the success of the local councils in achieving the required tasks and vice versa. The democratic selection for the local councils' members explains 16.8% of their success. The revival of local councils explains 15.7% of their success in achieving their required tasks. Finally, the democratic selection for the members explains 11% of devoting the culture of the local councils in the community and vice versa.

The test of two means variance: for each total axis of the studying ones to the affiliation.

- Annihilation Assumption: there are no variations of statistical nature among the answers' means according to affiliation.

The table of means and deviations according to affiliation

		Amount	M	S.D	S.E
Evaluating the councils	Urban	251	0.6033	0.22593	0.01426
	Rural	61	0.5178	0.18949	0.02426
Failure	Urban	251	0.4648	0.25859	0.01632
reasons	Rural	61	0.5137	0.22422	0.02871
Best offices	Urban	251	0.2925	0.15634	0.00987
Dest offices	Rural	61	0.2272	0.14137	0.01810
Opposition bodies	Urban	251	0.3994	0.22269	0.01406
	Rural	61	0.3156	0.15746	0.02016

The table of testing the independent samples

	Homogeneity Test		Comparing the means by T Tests			
	F	Sig	T	df	Sig	
Evaluating	4.260 0.040	0.040	2.730	310	0.007	
the councils	4.260	0.040	3.038	105.597	0.003	
Failure	2.502	2.502 0.050	-1.356-	310	0.176	
reasons	3.593	0.059	-1.479-	102.489	0.142	
Best offices	0.717	0.398	2.983	310	0.003	
Dest offices	0.717	0.398	3.171	98.874	0.002	
Opposition	15.500	5.580 0.000	2.775	310	0.006	
bodies 15.5	13.380		3.411	125.391	0.001	

Throughout the table of the Homogeneity Test, it is clear that: the answers are heterogeneous for evaluating the local councils and the opposition bodies according to affiliation i.e. the probable value for the homogeneity is respectively (0.000, 0.040) which are less that (0.05). Whereas, there is homogeneity in the answers for the reasons of the local councils' failure and the best offices in the local councils according to affiliation i.e. the probable value is respectively (0.717, 0.059) which are more than (0.05).

As for T Test we find: there are variations among the answers' means for the evaluating the local councils, the best offices, and the opposition bodies according affiliation i.e. the probable value of T test is respectively (0.006, 0.003, 0.007). Whereas, there are no variations among the answers' means for the reasons of local councils' failure according to affiliation i.e. the probable value of T test is (0.176).

Consequently, we refute the annihilation assumption for the axes of evaluating the local councils, reasons of failure, and the

opposition bodies, while we accept it in best offices.

One-way ANOVA Test: for all study axes according to education level.

Annihilation Assumption: there are no variations of statistical nature among the answers' means according to education level.


ANOVA


		Total of squares	df	Average of squares	F	Sig
D 1 4	Between groups	0.783	5	0.157	3.322	0.006
Evaluating the councils	Within groups	14.524	308	0.047		
	Total	15.308	313			
Failure reasons	Between groups	1.276	5	0.255	4.304	0.001
	Within groups	18.892	308	0.023		
	Total	20.168	313			
	Between groups	0.492	5	0.098	4.304	0.001
Best offices	Within groups	7.046	308	0.023		
	Total	7.538	313			
Opposition bodies	Between groups	0.815	5	0.163	3.693	0.003
	Within groups	13.578	308	0.044		
	Total	14.394	313			


The table indicates that the probability value for F test according to the study axes is (0.003, 0.001, 0.001, 0.006) and all of them are less than (0.05).

Consequently, we refute the annihilation assumption where there are variations of statistical nature among the axes answers' means.

The charts for the axes means:







Third: Discussing the study assumptions:

Throughout the analysis results, it is clear and almost unanimously that there is variation between the performance of the local councils according to the areas and offices. This could be explained for the absence of balance in selecting the members of these offices along with the absence of a neutral scientific tool for selecting them depending on competence, in addition to the

offices' linkage with a not equally leveled references in terms of ability to support and desire to provision in a serious manner. Furthermore, the tension with the oil extractors was a prominent phenomenon which is normal since those oil extractors reject any entity that may influence their interest from the fortune.

As for the relationship with the armed factions, it was good. This evaluation may not express solid ties but, it may express the independency of the councils and the status of non-intervention.

However, there was a near consensus on the failure of the local councils in terms of achieving their objectives, which was ascribed by the responders to three main reasons, at the forefront of which is the poor communication with the community, then the absence of a regular technicians' team, then in the third grade for explaining the failure is the inefficiency of the technical staff.

The local councils did not practice a democratic manner during its work and did not devote the culture of local councils, which is considered as normal thing since practicing democracy needs knowledge and practice along with refining the awareness of democracy value and by its own tools. Similarly for the devotion of the culture of local councils which was prevented by objective conditions such as the short period that local councils worked along with the prolonged decades of tyranny that was deeply settled down on the Syrians burden.

This poor devotion of the culture of local councils appears in the variation of some answers in terms of affiliation, age, and education level.

The analysis results indicate that the opposition bodies were not negative in dealing with the local councils. The first grade, in terms of positive collaboration, came the Syrian interim government, then the opposition coalition, and finally the Syrian Business Forum.

It may be explained that the territory-based allocation that characterized the opposition institutions, which devote the prevailing convection of poor institutionalizing of these components.

The majority of the responders support the transformation of local councils into local governance which explains the ignorance for the concept of local governance, that we demonstrated its essence in the theoretical part, and the disability to imagine the consequences that may be resulted by such transformation.

The desire of the majority of the sample for the revival of local councils is clear and characterized by optimism and trust in their ability to control the resources along with the ability to self-funding.

The desire for self-funding cannot be separated from the convection, that most of sample individuals have, of futility of work under the authority of the opposition coalition again. This can be explained by the prevailing atmosphere of all Syrians for the failure of the coalition in terms of achieving its tasks, and the fact that most of its members were detached from the suffering of the Syrians.

Recommendations

The eastern area is in dire need for revival of local councils and this what is supported by the majority since providing services is not limited to health, relief, service work but, the essential issue is need for safety that was lost for five years, and now it is demanded by everyone.

The needed safety factor:

People are in dire need for the safety factor, which could be compensated for in terms of providing tangible different services in the educational sector, whose analyzed findings show a deterioration in the performance of its personnel. Thus, the revival of the LC won't be just a covered need, but it will also be an issue whose terms of success will be provided by the social hub.

We should learn our lesson from the previous mistake that led to the failure of the local councils and the most important reason was the poor communication with the community. This need a new mechanism for building the bridges to the community by setting forth a mechanism for selecting the heads of local councils by figures who enjoy acceptance near to consensus in their areas, and the selection should not be limited to revolutionary legitimacy that was clearly not enough to maintain that acceptance.

Benefitting from the previous experience requires solving the second reason for failure which is the stability of regular technicians' team, decreasing its fast cycle, and depending on regular technicians' team with required competence for work field in order to solve the third reason for the failure which is the inefficiency.

The local councils cannot perform their work effectively unless they are backed by an armed wing that provides them with the reasons of power; the independency of the local councils from the armed factions is not enough since controlling the ground and providing a good environment for work cannot be exited without a power that extends security prevents any obstacles especially in a tribal environment where no one can speculate the amount of absorbed norms and conventions during the past period.

This military force is the one that ensures to control the most important resource which is the oil. This could be conducted after the targeting and destroying the oil wells by the US-led coalition in a manner that the previous oil extractors cannot use these well by their primitive and humble abilities but, reinvestment requires a institutionalized and scientific work that is supported by a power to protect it.

The local councils need to maintain balance in providing services as it was clear in the analysis results that the health office was superior, and this indicates that there was no balanced work plans and studied implementation mechanisms.

The local councils do not fulfill its objectives by only providing services such as health and relief support since its essence is represented by its ability to devote the culture of democracy, and this requires a democratic nature in terms of democratic practice in selecting its members, making decisions, and implementing them.

The military force, that is represented by the US-backed Syria's New Army, could establish, with what remained form the free Syrian army's groups, the military force that can secure the process of revival of local councils along with securing the safe and disciplined environment that these forces enjoy an international support since it is the contemporary force for the desired revival process that supposes to have a clear target represented by liberating the area and injecting the spirit of life again.

As for the issue of borders, the problem is linked with the stability of the situation in Iraq. This means that there is not ability to control this issue since there is a factor that is out of the control of the local councils or its armed wing.

However, the developments in Iraq indicate that ISIS forces are going to be defeated which can be a promising indicator for the potential probability for maintaining the borders control. We should take into account that these promising indicators are supported by what we mentioned in the theoretical part for the remarkable success for the experience of the local councils in Al Bukamal, the adjacent city to Iraq. The experience leaders in the city enjoyed a high sense of responsibility and high ability to maintain harmony among them, the factors that were not on the same level in the other experiences of the province.

The Annexes

Annex 1 : Correlations tables

	Reasons of Failure	f Failure	
Z	Sig. (2-tailed)	Pearson Correlation	
314		1	Reasons of Failure
314	000	203-**	Best Offices
314	900.	154-**	Opposition Committees
314	000	402-**	Success in Achieving their tasks
314	000	343-**	Varying Level of Performance
314	700.	152-**	Level of Services
314	000	207-**	Quality of Relations with the Armed Factions
314	200	152-**	The Tension of Relations with the Oil Extractors
314	.593	.030	Relationship with the opposition bodies
314	000	281-**	Democratic Selection
314	173	077	Devote the Culture of Local Councils
314	000	234-**	Support the Revival of Local Councils
314	000	278-**	The Coalition Authority
314	000	260-**	Support the Local Government
314	.263	-:063-	The Possibility of Re-control the Resources

) ncc	ess in Achievi	Success in Achieving their tasks		Opposition Committees	mmittees		Best Offices	ices
Z	Sig. (2-tailed)	Pearson Correlation	Z	Sig. (2-tailed)	Pearson Correlation	Z	Sig. (2-tailed)	Pearson Correlation
314	000	-,402-**	314	900	154-**	314	000	203-**
314	000	.586**	314	000.	**85**	314		1
314	000	**764.	314		1	314	000.	.485**
314		1	314	000.	**404.	314	000.	.586**
314	000	.279**	314	.016	.136*	314	.115	680°
314	850	.107	314	000.	.216**	314	.570	.032
314	000	.524**	314	000.	.363**	314	000.	.443**
314	000	.207**	314	650.	.107	314	.021	$.130^*$
314	000	.265**	314	000	.302**	314	000	**857
314	000	.410**	314	000	.235**	314	000	.371**
314	100	.181**	314	.074	.101	314	.001	**581.
314	000	.397**	314	000	.239**	314	000	.334**
314	000	.267**	314	.001	.189**	314	.001	**081.
314	000	.265**	314	680°	960°	314	.002	.177**
314	.007	.153**	314	.038	.117*	314	.018	.133*
						_		

\circ	Quality of relations with the armed factions	ions with the ctions		Level of Services	vices		Varying Level of Performance	evel of lance
Z	Sig. (2-tailed)	Pearson Correlation	Z	Sig. (2-tailed)	Pearson Correlation	Z	Sig. (2-tailed)	Pearson Correlation
314	000	207-**	314	.007	152-**	314	000.	343-**
314	000	.443**	314	.570	.032	314	.115	680.
314	000	.363**	314	000.	.216**	314	.016	.136*
314	000	.524**	314	.058	.107	314	000.	.279**
314	600°	.146**	314	.001	.182**	314		1
314	151.	.081	314		1	314	.001	.182**
314		1	314	.151	.081	314	600.	.146**
314	.268	.063	314	.300	.059	314	.003	.169**
314	000	.252**	314	820.	660°	314	.281	061
314	000	$.299^{**}$	314	.364	.051	314	.168	820.
314	.001	$.191^{**}$	314	.328	055-	314	.220	-690*-
314	000	.278**	314	.281	.061	314	000	.277**
314	.000	$.218^{**}$	314	.364	.051	314	860.	.093
314	500°	.159**	314	.118	.088	314	700.	.151**
314	.046	.113*	314	.041	.116*	314	.142	.083

	Democratic Selection	Selection	B	Relationship with the	with the	TI	The Tension of Relations	f Relations
				Opposition Bodies	1 Bodies	*	with the Oil Extractors	extractors
Z	Sig.	Pearson	Z	Sig.	Pearson	Z	Sig.	Pearson
• 1	(2-tailed)	Correlation		(2-tailed)	Correlation		(2-tailed)	Correlation
314	000.	281-**	314	.593	.030	314	.007	152-**
314	000	.371**	314	000.	.258**	314	.021	.130*
314	000	.235**	314	000.	.302**	314	650.	.107
314	000	$.410^{**}$	314	000	$.265^{**}$	314	000	.207**
314	.168	.078	314	.281	061-	314	.003	.169**
314	364	.051	314	.078	660°	314	.300	650.
314	000	**662.	314	000.	.252**	314	.268	.063
314	000	.217**	314	.020	131-*	314		1
314	.002	.171**	314		1	314	.020	131-*
314		1	314	.002	$.171^{**}$	314	000	.217**
314	.000	.332**	314	.131	.085	314	.589	031-
314	000	.233**	314	600.	$.146^{**}$	314	000	$.256^{**}$
314	.000	.368**	314	.043	.114*	314	000	$.209^{**}$
314	000	.290**	314	.272	.062	314	.001	.193**
314	.052	.110	314	.182	9200	314	.002	.171**

The Coalition Authority	Author	ity	Supp	Support the Revival of Local Councils	al of Local	Dev	vote the Culture Councils	Devote the Culture of Local Councils
Sig. Pearson (2-tailed) Correlation N		Z		Sig. (2-tailed)	Pearson Correlation	Z	Sig. (2-tailed)	Pearson Correlation
.000278-** 314		314		000	-,234	314	£21°	077-
.001 .180** 314		314		000	**285.	314	100	.185**
.189** 314		314		.000	**682	314	740	.101
.000 314		314		000	**L6E*	314	100	.181**
314		314		.000	**LLZ	314	077	069-
364 .051 314		314		.281	190°	314	328	055-
.000 314		314		.000	**812	314	100	.191**
.000 314		314		.000	$.256^{**}$	314	685.	031-
.043 .114* 314		314		.009	*146**	314	.131	.085
.000 368** 314		314		.000	.233**	314	000	.332**
.009 314		314		.046	.113*	314		1
.011 .144* 314		314			1	314	.046	$.113^{*}$
1 314	1 314	314		.011	.144*	314	.009	.147**
.001 .193** 314		314		000	.282**	314	.018	.134*
.013 .140* 314		314		000	** 444 **	314	.003	.167**
			1					

Government	Pearson Correlation	260-**	.177**	960.	.265**	.151**	880.	**651.	**861*	790°	.290**	.134*	.282**	.193**	1	.305**
Support the Local Government	Sig. (2-tailed)	000	.002	680.	000	200.	.118	500.	.001	.272	000	.018	000	.001		000
Suppo	Z	314	314	314	314	314	314	314	314	314	314	314	314	314	314	314
ity of Re-	Pearson Correlation	063-	.133*	.117*	.153**	.083	.116*	.113*	.171**	920.	.110	.167**	**444	.140*	.305**	1
The Possibility of Recontrol the Resources	Sig. (2-tailed)	.263	.018	.038	700.	.142	.041	.046	.002	.182	.052	.003	000.	.013	000.	
T	Z	314	314	314	314	314	314	314	314	314	314	314	314	314	314	314
	Co	rrel	atio	n is	sign	ifica	ant a	at th	e 0.0	01 le	evel	(2-ta	ailed	*. (f	*	

Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed) .*

Annex 2: (Projects supported by the Syrian Interim Government)



نموذج الموازنة المالية نمشروع دعم الفرن والمطبخ الخيري

الكلفة التأسيسية "الكلفة لمرة واحدة":

	مراتها وأسعارها	ن وجدت)، ک	ع مواصفات محددة إ	ميزائية الاحتياجات (
المنع الإجمالم	السعر الإفرادي.	الكمية	وحدة القياس	وصف المادة	رقم
8250000	55000	150	طن	طحين	12
1440000	16000	90	برميل	مازوت للفرن	2
540000	6000	90	طرد	خميرة للفرن	3
300000	2000	150	کیلو غرام	رز	- 4
84000	2800	30	152	زيت للمطبخ	3 5
180000	120	1500	کیلو غرام	برغل خشن	6
140000	140	1000	کغ	عدس حب (مجدرة)	7
195000	130	1500	کغ	عدس مجروش	
96000	3200	30	كرتونة	فروج مجمد	
72000	120	600	ليتر	كاز للطبخ	
150000	3000	50	علبة	ديس يندورة	
20000	250	80	طرد	معكرونة	
275000	27500	10	برمول ا	بنزين مولدات المطبخ	
320000	16000	20	برميل	مازوت لمبيارات المجلس	10-

Syrian Interim Government





الحكومة السورية المؤقتة

وزارة الإدارة المحلية والإغاثة وشؤون اللاجئين

تحديد الاستفادة من المشروع:

تامین سلل ومیاه ل 3200 عائلة

ما هي الجهود الحالية لمواجهة المشكلة؟

اجراء مسح للعللات المتضررة من الاشتباكات الأخيرة والنازحة وتامين الغذاء والمياه لهم

وصف	1- سلات غذائية تف	صيلها:			
وصف شروع	المادة	الوحدة	الكمية	السعر	الاجمالي
	سكر	كغ	9600	110	1.056.000
	رز	كغ	9600	190	1.824.000
	سعنة	كغ	3200	285	912.000
	عدس مجروش	كغ	6400	165	1.056.000
	برغل	كغ	6400	110	704.000
	شاي	كغ	1600	1000	1.600.000
	ديس يندورة	كغ	3200	215	688.000
	زیت نبقی	ليتر	6400	215	1.376.000
	حليب أطفال	عبوة 900 غ	2400	1050	2.520.000
	طحين	کپس 25 کغ	3200	1400	4.480.000
	المجموع				16.216.000

Syrian Interim Government



Ministery of Local Administration Relief, and Refugees

مشروع	Page 1	1			الإغاثية للنازحين		
سلة غذ	سلة غذانية عدد	.) 7	٨٣٥) تحتوي السلة الو	راحدة على مو	د غذائية تموينية ا	لنازحين بقيمة (٠٠٠٠) ليرة سورية:
روع م	•	10000	المادة	الوحدة	الكمية	السعر الإفرادي	السعر الإجمالي
1	1		رز ا	كغ	- 1	10.	A
Y	Y	1	برغل	كغ	17	4.	٧٧٠
۲	٣	1	زيت دوار الشمس	لتر	100	170	170
É	· £	-	معكرونة	كغ	T.	7	1
0	٥	1	حمص	علبة	۲	10.	٤٥.
٦	٦	+	مرتديلا	علبة	- 7	10.	٤٥.
Y	. Y	ï	فول	علبة	۲.	10.	٤٥٠
^	٨	H	سكر	كغ		170	770
٩	. 9	1	ورق شاي	كغ	4/1	1111	٥٨٠
1.	1.	-	زيت زيتون	لتر	3		0
المجه	المجموع	0.1	10		1 1 1 1		
سعر ه	سعر صرف الد	الدولاه	ر ۱۲۷ ليرة سورية	1.00	17	-	+ #
١الأ	١ ــالتغير في	ي عدد	. الأسر النازحة ومكان	إقامتهم نتيجة	عدم الاستقرار.	in .	7 1
لة عند الت	٢-ارتفاع أسعار	مار الم	مواد وتغير سعر صرف	ب الدولار		1	
وطرق الحلوا	الحلول:	7		· A		W.4	- 1
رزها التو	١-التواصل وال	التنسي	يق مع المجالس المحلية	الفرعية في ا	لمحافظة		- 1
٢-التو	٢-التوثيق والإ	لإحصا	ماء الدقيق للعائلات المم	ستهدفة بالإغاث	ة والإشراف على	عملية التوزيع	1 1
ا تشد	٣-تشكيل لجنة	ة شر	اء واستقدام عروض اس	سعان		0	18

Annex 3: (Charter of honor of Al Bukamal Local Council)

وثيقة شرف للمجلس المحلى لمدينة البوكمال

(ستور المجلس)

- 1- تعريف المجلس المجلس: هو مجلس خدمي متباق من الحراك الثوري ولا يقوم على ال اساس حزيي او عشائري ولا يقبل اي إملاء من الغارج.
 - ٢ الهيكل التنظيمي للمجلس:
- أ حرثيس المجلس ، ب تقيه رئيس المجلس ، ج أمين سر المجلس ، د مكتب تنفيذي يضم سيعة أشخاص منتفيين من المجلس الحومي من بيتهم رئيس المجلس وثالب رئيس المجلس ، هـ ـ عدد أعضاء المجلس مكون من ستين عضواً (٢٠) يقسمون إلى عشرة لجان على الشكل
 - ١. لجنة مائية : تصب فيه جميع الموارد المائية القادمة للبلد وتنظم الأمور المائية لجميع اللجان.
 - 1. اللجنة الاغتلية : تضم جميع اللجان لقرعية للموارد الاغتلية في البلد وتقوم ينستلام المواد الاغتلية الميتية والاشراف على توزيمها بالتعاون مع لجنة الإحصاء والتوثيق.
- ٣. لجنة الإحصاء والتوثيق: تقوم بإحصاء التهاكات حقوق الإنسان بالمدينة ورصد الإضرار التنتجة من تصرفات النظام وإحصاء العوالل الفقيرة والمتعققة في العدينة وتقوم يتقديم إحصائية للشهداء والمعتقلين والجرحي والمققودين ورصد الغارات الجوية والقصف بالهنون
 - اللينة الأمنية: الاتصال بالكتالب العقلة على الأرض والإشراف على عمل الشرطة ومتابعة اوضاع المعود.
 - الجنة البلدية: تقوم بالشراف على آليات البلدية ومتابعة أمور النظافة وتقديم يرتامج عمل لتنظافة ومتابعة أمور الصرف الصحى.
 - 1- لجنة القدمات (كهرياء -مياه هنف) الإشراف على عمل النوائر وتنظيم سير عمل هذه اللجنة ومنابعة منطلباتها .
- ٧- اللجنة الطبية: أستادم المساعدات الطبية وإعادة تهيئة الأمور الطبية من جميع النواهي بما قبها المصافي والمركز الصحية.
 ٨- اللجنة الشرعية واقضائية: تتكون من مجموعة من اهل العام تشرف على أمور الشريعة وتكون لها سلطة المراقبة على جميع الأمور الشرعية في المديلة بما فيها المجلس
 - ٩. لبقة التربية والإرشاد : الإشراف على العمل التربوي ومتابعة عمَّل المدارس والمجمع التربوي
 - ١٠ ـ لجنة الإعلام : تقوم بالدعاية والإعلان عن جميع تشاطات المجلس وترتيب الأمور الفنية لاجتماعات المجلس .
 - ٣. صلاحيات المكتب التنفيذي:
- ١ عَقَسِمِ المجلسِ فِي لَجِأْنَ ٢ ـ التواقق على أشخاص بمثلون المجلس بالخارج ويتم ذلك بنُخذ اطلب أحضاء المكتب التنفيذي إي (٤ فما فوق) ٣- استبعاد اي عضو في المجلس بتوافق (٤ فما فوق) ٤ ـ مراقبة عمل اللجان وتقيم عمل كل لجنة ٥ ـ الدعوة إلى اجتمأعات المجلس الطارلة أو الدورية ٧- لا يحق لرئيس المجلس اتخاذ أي قرار بدون العودة للمكتب التنفيذي والتوافق عليه .
 - الية اختيار المكتب التتقيدي:
 - أ. الانتخاب المياشر عند حضور أكثر من (٨٠ %) من أعضاء المجلس
 - ب. الأسماء التي تقل اكبر عدد من الأصوات هي الممثلة للمكتب التنفيذي
 - الرئيس: الكثر اصواتا
 - التقب: الترتيب الثقى
- ج. امين السر المجلس : يعين من خارج المكتب التنفيذي ويقرم بتحضير محاضر الاجتماعات الأميوعية والنورية ويقوم بالتنسيق مع رئيس المجلس بكتاية جدول الإعمال وتعوين ما يطرحه الأعضاء وتسليم نسخة من المحضر إلى جميع أحضاء المكتب التنفيذي ويقوم أمين السر بالتعلون مع لجنة الإعلام لتهيئة الاجتماعات العمومية
 - مدة صلاحيات المكتب التنفيذي ثلاثة أشهر تبدأ متذ لحظة انتخاب المكتب

Charter of Honor in the Local Council of Al Bukamal City (The Constitution of the Council)

I. The Definition of the Council:

It is a service board that that has emerged from the revolutionary movement and is not based on either party or tribal grounds nor allows any dictation from abroad.

- II. Framework of the Council
- a. Head of the Council
- b. Deputy
- c. Secretary of the Council
- d. Executive Office: comprises of 7 members elected by the general Council, among them is the head of the Office.
- e. The number of the council members shall be 60 members divided into 10 committees as follows:
- 1. Financial Committee: it is in charge of the financial support offered to the city, and it is also responsible for organizing financial matters for all other committees.
- 2. Relief Committee: it includes all secondary relief committees in city and is responsible for receiving in kind relief materials and monitoring the process of distribution in coordination with the Statistics and Documentation Committee.
- 3. Statistics and Documentation Committee: it is responsible for counting human rights violations in the area and spotting the damages caused by the Syrian Regime, in addition to preparing statistical lists of the martyrs, detainees, the injured and the missing. Furthermore, it is supposed to spot the air raids and the mortar bombardment and the like.
- 4. Security Committee: it is responsible for contacting the battalions active on the ground and supervising police work and the conditions on the borders.

- 5. Municipal Committee: it is responsible for supervising municipal issues and hygiene and sanitation providing programmes for sanitary work and sewage.
- 6. Service Committee (electricity, water-supply, telephone service): it supervises the many directorates in charge of the above services organizing their work and providing them with what they need.
- 7. Medical Committee: in charge of receiving medical aid and recreating all medical centers including hospitals and health centers.
- 8. Legal and Religious Committee: it consists of a group of religious scholars whose job is to supervise matters related to sharia (legislation). It has the authority to monitor all religious matters in city even those of the council.
- 9. Education and Guidance Committee: it is responsible for supervising the educational process and the work at schools and the educational complex.
- 10. Media Committee: it is responsible for propaganda and promoting all the activities of the council in addition to organizing all technical aid and other social issues related to the Council.
 - III. Authorities of the Executive Office
 - 1. Dividing the Council into committees
- 2. Agreeing on the person who is to represent the Council abroad; this is done through the agreement of most of the members of the Council.
- 3. Expelling any member of the Council has to be done through the agreement of 4 or more members.
- 4. Monitoring the work of the committees and evaluating the performance of each committee.
 - 5. Calling for the regular and the pop meetings of the council
- 6. The head of the Council is not allowed to make any decision without going back to the Executive Office

- IV. The Mechanism of Choosing the Executive Office Members.
- 1. Direct election: this is done with the attendance of 80% of the Council members
- 2. The candidates that get the highest votes are to represent the Executive Office. The one who gets the highest voting is elected president; the one who gets the second highest voting is elected deputy
- 3. The Council's Secretary: he is appointed from outside the executive Office. His job is to prepare the reports of the weekly and periodic meetings of the office coordinating with the head of the Council in writing the Council's agenda and the members' suggestions, handing a copy of these reports to each member in the Executive Office. Moreover, he coordinates with the Media Committee in preparing for general meetings.
- V. The period of the validity of the Council is 3 months starting with the time of the election of the Council.