المجتمع والسُلطة

في مناطق تنظيم "الدولة الإسلامية" في سوريا

Society and Authority

In the Syrian Areas held by the "Islamic State" Group

Implementation and supervision:

Justice for life Observatory in Deir EzZor

Preparation:

Faisal Dahmoush Almashhoor

Syrian for Democracy Group

Prelude:

The entire control of the "Islamic State" over Dier Ezzor, Al Raqqa, and the eastern countryside of Aleppo in mid-July 2014 has formed a fundamental shift, not only in the traditional strategies that are adopted by the Jihadist/Salafist groups, but also in the status of the organization itself as it gained vast territories including resources and communities. This formulated a historical turning point by announcing the state of "Islamic Caliphate" in those areas in Syria and Iraq.

The "Islamic State" group has imposed its theocratic authority on the local communities in its held areas. It controlled the destinies of the locals along with their livelihoods. It worked gradually and systematically on establishing governance institutions and apparatuses in those communities. It worked hard to solidify its social and political authority by compulsion and intimidation. It saved no chance to terrorizing them and ruling them with fire and steel. Despite the fact the "Islamic State" has been established in the Iraqi environment, and has been influenced by the nature of the political and sectarian conflict, has experienced the Iraqi social structure including strength and weakness points, in addition to the fact that most of its leader are not Syrians, thus, after more than two years in Syria, the group is still facing challenges in terms of rooting its authority. This issue depends on its ability to penetrate into the social structure in its held areas in Syria. This challenge, according to the group and its project, is very important matter, especially that the group very clever and has the ability to read the reality and plan for it in order to benefit from its contradictions. This is not related only to the fact that the populations of its areas are Sunni Arabs, but also related to how much it can convince the locals with feasibility of its political and religious project, and how much its project can fit their aspirations. It is also related to their options, as they are rebels who rose up against the totalitarian regime of Assad.

Place and time of the study:

The study is focusing on the local community and the ruling authority in the "Islamic State" group held areas in Syria in general, and particularly in Deir Ezzor, Al Raqqa, and Eastern countryside of Aleppo. The study is covering the period since the group has seized and the area until July 2016.

Sources and Objective:

The study depended on the information that are based on the interviews, live or via skype, with individuals and families who live in the group held areas over four months along with "Islamic State" fighters who defected from the group, from Deir Ezzor and Al Raqqa governorates. In addition, information from the locals who are still living in the group held areas.

This study attempts to observe the nature of the group authority and its relation with the local community. It attempts to detect the changes in the social structure after being controlled by the group. It also attempts to figure out how much the local community is related to the group authority in Syria.

First: Conceptual and Theoretical Approach to the Study

1- The Concept of Society:

The concept of society is considered as one of the most mysterious concepts due its meanings and connotations that change according to the identified domains such as law, psychology, and sociology. Eventually, its definition is changed according to the meanings that are ignored by each domain in its perception of the society. In the basics of sociology, there are various definitions for the society, which are close to each other in some faces, and far from each other in other faces. It is defined as the network of social relationships that are formed among the individuals that aim to meet their needs and achieve their aspirations along with their long-term and short-term targets[1]. It is also defined as a group of individuals that reside a specific geographic area that are ruled by group of principles, concepts, values, relations, and mutual objectives, that differentiate them from other groups, and derived from its specificities in terms of language, history, religion, and feeling of mutual destiny. Whereas, the concept of community refers to group of individuals who unites throughout mutual interests[2].

Sociologists' points of view concerning the society and the ruling relations differ; Marx differentiates between the societies according to their class formations i.e. feudalist, capitalist, and communist.

Whereas, Durkheim understands the society throughout studying its organic solidarity. He differentiates between the societies that depend on mechanical solidarity and that who

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[1] The Society, Arabic Encyclopedia
[2] Hasan, Ibrahim, The Concept of the Group and the Society, Al Hiwar Al Mutamaddin, 4063, 15-04-2013.

depend on the organic solidarity of its components. Durkheim's theory of social solidarity is considered as the foundation stone that built the studying of social phenomenon on it. Max Weber sees the society as system of values that specifies the interaction faces among the individuals and the forms of human behavior that are practiced by the doers, which is the purposeful behavior.

However, Parsons sees the society throughout the concept of structure where Personality, Cultural, Social, and economic systems integrate in a functional pattern, and form the foundation which the social action is built on[3].

2- The Concept of Authority:
The meaning of authority is power, ability to do, and dominion. We have two meanings;

Psychological authority: which means the ability of human being to impose his/her determination on others due to his/her strong character, courage, or eloquent speech. Legitimate authority: which is the acknowledged authority such as the authority of the governor, father, and the leader.

There is also the theocratic authority, which came as the revelation that sent by God to messengers and prophets, decisions of holy junctions and Imams' discretions. The plural of authority is authorities which are the social apparatuses that practice power such as political, education and judicial authorities[4].

The authority is defined as seizing power for directing and forcing towards specific orientation of social behavior. This indicates, in the political domain, to subjecting that leads to forming inequivalent relations between who rules and who are ruled. The authority is considered one of the direct inputs of the public conscious.

Political thinkers argued about the nature of authority, according to their trends; for Althusser, authority is represented by the possession of state for all apparatuses and institutions by which it practices its power in superior manner. He divides the state apparatuses into two big superior apparatuses: the oppressive apparatus and the ideological apparatuses. Whereas, Montesquieu in his book *The Spirit of the Laws* talked about the necessity of separating the state's apparatuses as follows: Legislative, Executive, and Judicial authority. He specified limits and responsibilities for each of them.

Max Weber distinguishes three types of authority; the Legal-Rational authority which derives its legitimacy from law. The charismatic one, which is ruled by a supernatural individual who has delusional characteristics. Lastly, the traditional authority which is based on believing in inherited tradition.

Michel Foucault rejects the authority of the apparatuses and institutions that subdues the citizens. He stands against the subjection that is practiced by the state throughout violence with the dress of law; the authority, according to him, means the relations among various powers where the it is neutral. In other words, distributed authority in parallel inside the

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[3] Ibid
[4] Saleeba, Jamil, The Philosophical Glossary, First Edition, Dar of Lebanese Book, Beirut, 1981.

society. In general, the role of the authority is organizing the ruled society and achieving justice among its individuals. However, it is subjected to convictions, competition, and absolute control. This fear was expressed by Montesquieu: "whoever has unrestrained power, will abuse it".

Second: The Nature of Society in the Study Area

The society of the study is a traditional and tribal one. The family is the mediator institution between the individuals and their social environment, and it transfers the patterns of the social behavior to them, where most locals in these areas descend from tribal backgrounds. Likewise, considerable percentage of the population who live in the big cities – Deir Ezzor, Al Mayadin, Al Boukmal, Al Raqqa, Al Tabqa, Manbij, Al Bab, Jarabulus – descend from tribal backgrounds. They migrated to the cities and they still keep their tribal linkages. The local society in the "Islamic State$" held areas in Syria includes the locals in Deir Ezzor and Al Raqqa, which are populated by 1.692.000 and 1.000.008 people respectively[5], and the areas of Aleppo eastern countryside ; Jarabulus, Manbij, and Al Bab that are populated by 862513 people.

The UNDP's report of *Poverty in Syria* [6]indicates that the areas of northeast in Syria ; Deir Ezzor, Al Hasakeh, Al Raqqa, and Aleppo countryside have the highest rates of poverty, in terms of extent, intensity, and depth. The poverty degree in these areas ranges between 11.2 to 17.9 %. The rate of poor is 35.8% of the populations. Similarly, ignorance has high rates in these areas as well; the rate of people who know reading and writing – aged 15-24- in 2004 is 78.3-78.1% respectively. Whereas the national rate is 92.5%.[7]

Third: The "Islamic State" and Its Community
- The Group/ Authority / "State":

The Syrian war paved the way for an extensive emergence of the group of the "Islamic State in Iraq" by Jabhat Al Nosra Liahl Al Sham[8], which entered the conflict against the mother-group after Abu Bakr Al Baghdadi declared, after liberating Al Raqqa, that it is a part of the "Islamic State in Iraq and Syria", in April 2013.

It did not take long time for the "Islamic State in Iraq and Syria" to be the defacto power in the areas on the eastern countryside of Aleppo, Deir Ezzor and Al Raqqa after defeating its

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[5] All censuses are based on the Central Office for Census, 2011.
[6] Poverty in Syria (1996-2004), UNDP, June 2011.
[7] Second National Report for the Development Objectives in the Syrian Arabic Republic, Committee of State Planning, May 2005.
[8] It was announced in 2011 by " Abu Mohammad Al Jolani" who was sent by "Abu Bakr Al Baghdadi", Ameer of Islamic State in Iraq, along with a group of fighters. The group captured the oil resources in Deir Ezzor governorate.

opponents; Jabhat Al Nosra, Harakat Ahrar Al Sham, and the FSA factions[9]. Following the defeat of those opponents, it was the declaration of "Islamic Caliphates State" in June 29th, 2014[10]. Then, the group transformed into the "state" status in concurrence with seizing the entire power in those areas.

This declaration is the first step that was taken by the group towards practicing the new authority, and ensuring its continuity by giving it a religious superior legitimacy that is uncriticizable, and this what Al Baghdadi said in his first speech after the declaration[11].

The state has started practicing its authority by a set of apparatuses and institutions; the group made use of the service-based institutions such as electricity, water, irrigation, telecommunications, and bakeries[12]. It ran and oversaw these institutions. The group has established new apparatuses and institutions such as army, police, Al Hisbah, Shareea courts, and prisons. These are the oppressing apparatuses of the "Islamic State", by which it practices surveillance and pressure on the local community by using the legitimate oppression and violence, as per the logic of the state. Similarly, it established its own media institutions such as Amaq Agency, Al Bayan Radio Station, Dabiq Magazine, and Al Naba'a Magazine. The group has reorganized the education institution and utilized the houses of worship in order to serve its ideology. These institutions became as the ideological apparatuses for the "Islamic State" which work on reforming the ideological and intellectual frame for the local community in order to create a sort of awareness.

The "Islamic State" group exercises its authority throughout the apparatuses and institutions as per organizational structure, which we have classified it in a previous study[13], into four layers/levels;

The first two levels form the core of the group that controls the process of setting its strategies and policies, determining its objectives, and making its decisions. These two levels include the Caliphate and his deputies, Al Shura council, Ahl Al hal wa Aqid council, Shareea committee, and the top leaders of the security apparatuses, the governors, top shareea officers, and top military officers. The other levels form the executive apparatus; the members of the military, judicial, security, media, and service apparatuses. The Iraqis control entirely the authority of the group and the decision-making positions.

The group is differentiated from the rest of the fundamental-Islamic groups by its possession, and the awareness of its leaders, of the foundation stones of the state[14] such as the authority of charisma, which is derived from the character of the Caliphate, ideology, which is the

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[9] Fierce battles took place for four months, ended by the control of the group in July 15, 2014.
[10] https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=JwIZS0Wa6DM

[11] Al Baghdadi started his speech with" Oh people, the religion of God cannot be achieved unless we apply Sharia, and applying the Hudood, this has to be by force and power"
[12] Some employees kept attending their jobs even after the group control.
[13] Dahmoush, Faisal, Defections in Islamic State Group, Justice for Life Observatory in Deir Ezzor, October 2015.
[14] Some of the group leaders are former officials in the Bathist Iraqi Army have played a pivotal role in the structure of the group such as Abdul Nasser Al Janabi (Abo Ayman Al Iraqi), and Samir Al Khlaifawi (Hajji Bakr), and others.

religious ideology that is based on establishing the Caliphates state and divine dominion, in addition to the apparatuses and institutions that practice media and oppression, along with resources and geographical space.

Regardless of the effectiveness of the practical aspect of such state in the exceptional reality, however, according to the international law, the criteria of the state are simple and not complicated. The international recognition is not an essential condition for describing an ideological entity that controls geographical space, rules its residents and manages its resources, as a state. This is stated in Montevideo convention in 1933. Accordingly, the "Islamic State" is a state that lacks external ties, regional or international.

The Community of the Group

Which means the individuals of the group and the families of the foreigners, in addition to the locals and their families. The individuals of this community form the corner stone of the executive apparatuses; they occupy top positions in its structure. It is a war community as well. The policy, according to the group ideology, is a war against others in order to subject them, internally and externally. Thus, each individual of the group, whether working as an administrative member or a fighter, are considered as soldiers in the war as needed. This was clear, recently, in the wars that were launched by the group in the Syrian Jazeera areas and the eastern countryside of Aleppo when it had shortage of its human resources.

Two categories of the groups are differentiated here;

1- The foreign fighters:
   despite the fact that it is arduous to count them accurately, some reports and studies indicate that the group of the "Islamic State" has nearly five thousand foreign fighters from 81 countries[15].
   We have no chance to estimate the numbers of the foreign fighters in the group held areas in Syria due to their sustained movement. However, the foreign fighters control the authority and the war leadership, alike. Part of them brought their families to the group held areas, including foreign women. Based on the interviews that were made with the individuals and families who fled the group held areas, and the defected fighters, we can divide the community of the foreign fighters based on their cultural backgrounds, functional roles, and the nature of their relations with the locals into two parts; Arabs and non-Arabs.
   - Non-Arabs: they occupy leadership positions, administrative and military, and the group make use of their professional experience, in media at the firs level, and in oil at the second level. Some of them have got married to the local women.

They are totally isolated, especially from the locals, as the families of the migrants reside in independent residential clusters[16]. The local are not allowed to enter these clusters.

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[15] The International Centre of Study of Political extremism and violence
[16] The migrants reside in separate buildings that are allocated to the families of the public institutions' employees.

There are no social relations between them and the locals, and sometimes the relation has the nature of tensions[17], as informed by individuals and families who reside in the group held areas.[18]

This is not due to the policy of the group, but it is related to the language obstacles. They try to contact with the locals only within the frame of shopping, going in mosques, cyber cafes, and female coffer salons[19].

It is not known for the nature of the relations among the non-Arab migrants. It seems to be limited to implementing different tasks in work places and fighting front or meetings[20]. As for their residential places, the contact is limited within each nationality. The group uses the variety of nationalities in its propaganda for the mosaic in Caliphate state.

Arab Emigrants

- The Arab emigrants are mostly Saudi and Tunisian nationals[21]. Those emigrants contact more with the locals since they speak Arabic and form an essential part of the organization's system who are in charge of monitoring inhabitants, organizing activities and passing judgments. These emigrants comprise: Hisba leaders and agents, judges of religious courts, heads of security offices and heads of other offices. Moreover, many of them have got married to local girls. Yet, their relation with the locals is restricted to their in-laws, and in many cases an emigrants husband prevents his wife from contacting her family and acquaintances.22

- The Arab emigrants' ways of treating locals vary. Most testimonies have agreed that the Tunisian, Egyptian, Algerian together with the Iraqi emigrants have been the cruelest in dealing with the locals. That is why the locals often try to avoid them. The emigrants from Arabia (normally called Jazrawis) especially the Saudi ones are nicer and more tolerant. That is why they are generally accepted by the locals and consequently have mingled more and many of them have got married to local girls.

- Arab emigrants, especially those from Egypt and Tunisia, are in charge of top positions in Hisba system and Islamic police: they interrogate detainees and supervise their torture.

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[17] Some fights took place in some cities, one of them ended by the death of a local by Albanian migrant.
[18] Interviews that made by JFL with families and individuals who still reside in the group held areas in Al Mayadin, Al Raqqa, and Al Boukmal.
[19] Some lady who owns a salon in Manbij that she has foreign clients with nationality of Tunis, France, Chechnya.
[20] As said by defectors from Deir Ezzor.
[21] Ibid
[22] Most of *Hisba* system members are Saudi nationals whereas most of the religious judges are Libyans and Tunisians.

23 They also compete with each other to occupy posts in the organization hierarchy using locals to collect information about each other and drive them to inform on some of their fellows at the security office of the organization. 24

− These Arab emigrants and their families dwell in buildings confiscated by the organization25 forming thus a gathering of inhabitants near and around the organization centers. Sometimes one or two local families live among them. Moreover, those emigrants compete with each other over power and positions and gather on national grounds.

− Despite the fact that the community of the emigrants is seemingly unifies by the Salafist ideology, yet in actuality it is culturally discordant; the emigrants come from diverse countries and regions and speak different languages. Moreover, they compete over roles in power and are always on the move, the thing that limits largely the possibility of establishing social relations between its members. This diversity might have been the reason behind the formation of cultural fronts inside the organization. Broadly speaking, little is known about this community from inside especially of the community of non-Arab emigrants.

− 2. The Local Agents

− Here the reference is to the Syrians loyal to IS whether those who embrace the Salafist-jihadi ideology, the members of the local clans or those whose interests have met with those of IS. The latter form the largest number.

− Those agents' motives to join IS are diverse. Those who embrace the Salafist-jihadi ideology had earlier participated in the war in Iraq in 2003 or released from Sednaya Prison during the Syrian Revolution.26 The members of the clans who allied with IS are mostly poor people with weak bond to their families and clans; IS for them has been a sanctuary from the frustration and despair and a chance to practice the power they have never enjoyed in their community. Concerning those whose interests drove them to ally

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[23]Information obtained by Justice for Life Watch in Deir Ezzour from former detainees by ISIS in Deir Ezzour and Raqqa's prisons.

[24]Some dissidents from ISIS reported that they had been constantly questioned by emigrants from the above-mentioned nationalities about their fellows' actions whether on the fronts or in the organizations institutions.

[25]In the cities and towns that have no separate housing estates like Mayadeen, Deir Ezzour, Albab, Manbij, Jarablus and Abu Kamal.

[26]The Syrian Regime released a number of former Salafist detainees from Sednaya Prison in June 2011

with IS, they are just opportunists to whom IS ideology was not the basic ground upon which they made that alliance.

- Al-Ansar (the supporters) form most of IS fighting and executive agents with the exception of few individuals like Abu Loqman, ruler off Raqqa and Amer Alrafdan, ruler of Deir Ezzor and Abu Mohammed Al-Adnani, the mouthpiece of the organization. Those individuals joined IS with its advent to Syria or had relation with IS leaders during the period of secret action in their regions at the beginning of the Syrian Revolution.

- The local agents are divided into two groups: the first group comprises the local inhabitants loyal to IS in Deir Ezzour and Raqqa governorates, Alhasaka countryside and Aleppo's northern countryside whereas the second group comprises those agents who moved with IS from Aleppo's southern countryside and Idlib.27 Although they are Syrians, yet their relation with each other is by no means good because the local agents from Deir Ezzour, Raqqa and Aleppo's northern countryside do not accept those who come from Idlib as leaders and men of power in their regions. Moreover, the local agents compete with each other to maintain good posts by bonding with the emigrants, the thing that has facilitated using them as spies on local people and on each other. 28

- The local agents play two main roles: the first is providing information and spying on others, the thing that serves the authorities and IS agents directly. This stems from their knowledge of their local community, the relations within it and the weak and the strong sides of that community, in addition to identifying the perils on the organization and its agents. The second role they serve is their being mediators between the locals and the authorities since people often resort to them to facilitate their issues, supply them with their needs or learn about their detained children in accordance with what the security system in the organization allows. IS gives some of these agents the privilege to recommend those locals who wish to join the organization or those who plead for repentance.

- This gave the local agents the opportunity to take advantage of the detainees' families or those who seek to go beyond the organization's control, charging money individually or with collaboration with other IS agents especially security agents who grant permits or

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[27]They moved with the organization after its defeat in Aleppo and Idlib countryside. The most prominent is Dawood's Brigade which mainly comprises fighters from Idlib.
[28]According to the testimonies of some dissidents' families that left the areas under ISIS control in Deir Ezzour and Aleppo's eastern countryside

medical reports that allow people to get beyond IS control29, the thing that made the locals nurse a grudge against these agents.

− The level of living standards varies between the emigrants and local agents; the emigrant agents in general get higher salaries than those of the local agents and are privileged with the security, protection and power positions whereas the local agents form the majority of the fighting members, the thing that led to confrontations on several occasions; some of which were crowned with actual fight inside that community because of the increasing number of the mortalities among the local agents in IS battles. Furthermore, both local and emigrant agents are always on the move between fronts and their tasks are constantly changing in the same institution they work in or transferring them to other institutions in the organization. This is determined by IS security office.

− Thus, authority in IS is just restricted to a religious, ideological, political and economic elite unified by various motives and interests that often look contradictory. Moreover, authority in the organization is typically divided into three categories or classes with a hierarchy characterized by general jobs and tasks that are liable to change or exchanging the roles of its executive agents and not disciplined by the organization institutions. This elite, due to its diversity and novel formation30 on the one hand, and due to its lack of stability in place or tasks, has no horizontal interaction that might lead to the dedication of social relations that would eventually up a community in its sociological sense. Conversely, it is ruled by vertical relations with its employees. The relation is determined by the nature and hierarchy of that authority itself and nourished by the agents' desire to occupy positions and takes roles in that authority through proving loyalty by carrying out the tasks assigned to them and fulfilling the diverse functional roles they are asked to do.

− Fourthly: The Local Community

− No exact statistics is available of the population in the areas controlled by IS because of the constant displacement and emigration brought by the going on war, the strict rule of IS and the recurrent bombing of the Russian and the international allied forces. Still, we can estimate the population of the remaining inhabitant in those areas at a percentage of 65 to 70 per cent of the official statistics i.e. between 2100 to 2450 thousand people. This estimation is taken from local inhabitants and some media activists who constantly keep their eyes on these areas.

29Interviews with families that left some areas under ISIS control: Mayadeen, Manbij, Albab and Abu Kamal have shown that they bribed some ISIS agents to obtain exit permits.
30With the exception of the hard core of the organization before 2011.

–   After the Free Syrian Army battalions seized large areas of Assad Regime's lands and after running the resources of these areas (the oil fields in Deir Ezzour and the trade route in Aleppo's northern countryside in particular), the community there started to enjoy a large state of independence than that it had known under Assad Regime's rule. The community reproduced itself and its social economic conditions apart from any external institutional interference. This distinguishes the society of the countryside in general because its social and economic structure allows that. It has been noticed that economic activities in these areas have changed; the basis for this was the work related to the activities to war, oil refinery and trade in addition to import, the thing that had a negative impact on the agricultural and pastoral activities which are characteristic of these areas. This resulted in decrease of the farming lands and the attrition of livestock.

–   These areas are characterized by a tribal structure that was fragile before the crisis. The hierarchy of the traditional authority of these tribes has been violated, and individuals started to interfere in this structure. New influential, social military individuals emerged and sought to establish new legitimacy, the thing that made them confront each other within the same tribe, along with the contradiction that resulted from their external alliances. Some of those influential individuals belonged to the old tribal hierarchy, but most of them were from outside that hierarchy: a few of them belonged to the lower classes in the tribes. This change in the tribal structure was not accompanied by the required experience and ability to reshape and reorganize the old structure according to a definite social and moral code. Thus, it started to reshape into tribal, economic, military and class constructions, the thing that brought about huge diversity and competition between individuals and groups in the same tribe and consequently led to enlarging the clash that echoed a crisis of lack of balance within these tribes. Still, the concept of the one tribe existed in such turbulent military surroundings that struggled over resources. The tribe, as a self-aware entity in the absence of law and state, was consolidated at least superficially with these influential individuals against the other tribes. Even Al-Nosra, which recruited some of the locals, was colored with that tribal aspect in its areas.31

–   In the first few months of the war against Assad regime forces, the Free Army battalions and other tribal military formations started to grow independent from their social environment due to the influence of external funding resources and controlling the trade

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[31]Shihail in Deir Ezzour eastern countryside was considered the headquarters of Al-Nosra in Syria that time. Members of Bu Kamil tribe were quite influential there that many people used to call Al-Nosra Front Bu Kamil Front.

routes and oil resources in their areas. These groups began to run their own business and fight their wars (clashing with each other sometimes) in accordance with the instructions of these funding resources, departing so from the goals for which they were formed in the first place. This created different social grudges against them in their social milieus since these groups left the people to face their miserable human conditions.

-   After IS seized the area and kept the authority to itself, people of the are thought that IS had ended that state of chaos by dominating the area, the thing that provided a relative stability during which people restored the conditions of their previous life. This was assured by a great number of people especially when the organization promised not to interfere with people's personal affairs.32 This was obviously an essential need to the locals to stabilize after the prolonged political vacuum the area suffered under the rule of the many conflicting tribal military authorities. IS did what the military and political opposition could not do, especially when it harped on the religious feelings of the locals. A great number of people there welcomed the domination of IS because of the grudge they had against Al-Nosra and its monopoly of the resources of the area.

IS in these areas inherited a social reality marked by various degrees of splits according to each area. Deir Ezzour governorate and Aleppo's northern countryside suffered a great social breakdown due to its being exposed to violent pressures and divisions brought about by the revolution and the consequent war. However, the social structure in Raqqa governorate was less divided and bruised due its compromise before the reality of situation that succeeded in the area. Alhasaka's countryside suffered many political, social and economic splits along with the vertical split between the Arabs and the Kurds[33]. This reality of situation was largely manipulated by IS through making alliances every now and then and holding meetings with the prominent figures of the tribes to promote and impose its dominance[34] together with maintaining the so-called temporary and fragile social balances.

Shifts of religion in the community pattern:

Religion forms a social and cultural dimension to the community in general, and described as a general community religiosity, it is various in pattern, far from extremism and excessiveness,

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[32]Information obtained from two members of the delegation that met leaders in ISIS during Deir Ezzour siege.
[33] Dahmous, Faisal, Civil Life in Islamic State Held Areas, Orient Center for Studies, May 2015.
[34] The group established an office for tribes in order to organize the relations with the tribes.

as the agricultural style and the nature of rural social relations play a big role in this specification. in addition to the Sufi religious pattern that is mainly common in the local cities as there is another pattern called the Salafi, which is not that common, its appearance increased after the occupation of Iraq 2003.

It has emerged that the locals stuck to religion in general and the pattern of the religiosity, especially Salafi, and took the escalating manner in these areas regarding to the progress of war age. With a contribution of two arguing self-directed factors played this role. Another objective:

First, the need to stick to a religion as a believe combat leads to sacrifice themselves as a value and concept of religion. As it is a great deal of willingness to keep the fighters ready to offer and sacrifice. As an unlimited reaction of brutal repression and violence of Assad Regime and its army groups with a sectarian nature, which led the angry reaction to rise leaned on the cultural reservoir of the community, which forms- based religion ideological wide base[35].

Second, as a psychological need as religion gives man granted metaphysical tranquility to face the daily death, and is considered as a shelter grants him a full explanation of life in front of the local prevailing culture of giving convincing justifications of accelerated events in the real life. Where common Salafist is a defensive priority about the challenges that human can't afford. And clearly stands out as a means to protect through the lean-reliance and return to the past[36].

Third, contributed the escalation of the Salafi-Jihadi Style, the presence of Al Nosra rebels for the people of Syria' In the region, as the Salafi- Jihadi tension increased though its usage by the military factions in the area as a tool to bid with '' front victory'' in this regard. To gain legitimacy in the control and management of the area and invest its sources, also the interference and support of the Salafist, local and regional[37] networks led to intensify the Jihadi Salafi Manner as an extension of those destinations. Resorted on the majority of the military formations tribal took this style or religion even if it was superficially. George Tarabichi'' The thinker in this context '' says: the absence of Bourgeois alternative the popular opposition to these dictatorships. Should take a form of rise to inevitable and extend fundamentalism. Particularly in the Arab world conditions. Which its quotes the employment of its cultural Islamic fundamentalism.

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[35] Mohammad Mustafa, Faisal, "Escalation of Nosra Front and disability of the Revolution", Al Jumhureyt, February 2013.

[36] Hijazi, Mustafa, Social Underdevelopment, Introduction to the Psychology of the Overwhelmed Human Being, Arabic Cultural Center, 9th Edition, 2005.

[37] Muslim Brothers, Organization of Preserving the Islamic Heritage, Gulf-based Salafist organizations.

As previously mentioned, the presence of religion with its specifically Salafi appearance, the main problem in the intellectual and cognitive identity of these local communities, which was previously targeted and suffered several attacks hit the social structure, and in the absence of intellectual support or political legacy, in addition to the lack of the cognitive tools to form a national identity, Religion become the best expression of those selves, and in the collective consciousness of these communities as a shattered result identity. As the community in crises changes its prevailing value in front of problems and violent tremors. Stands out on the surface the back movement to the consciousness with all its various meanings with the name of religion, tradition, legacy in the past as legendary image.

Fifth: the policy of '' Islamic State''

The vision of the ''Islamic state'' carries out a political project aims to undermine the community,'' The individual'' the adaption of a resulted strict and militant religion. And here what is important that the political demands presented with the name of religion, which stems of the religious authority to impose its vision of life and society. Which is the ''Divine law superior to human law. And seeks to control the individual and community and state with the name of the Holy, as it follows regulations and fundamentalism Islamism in general, which Islamic state is one of them to follow two methods for this purpose[38].

The first one: is the (conquest from the top) where the use of fundamentalist Islamism religion for political ideology in order to create harmony between the state and society in one hand, and the Islamic massage from the other hand. Citing the privacy of the text and originally as an ideal politician and the second is (the conquest of the down side) through advocacy campaigns and forcing the social pattern derived from the religious vision of life, without taking in consideration the local and personal freedom and the scope of each.

1- Socially:

The ''Islamic State'' Policy: After the suppression of the ''Islamic State '' the rebels' points in its controlled areas[39], started gradually impose its policy in the area in the middle of a troubled society, as it gave up its promises and regulations on some tribal groups. And withdrawal its privilege from the military collections, also this organization made sure that

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[38] Day of Allah, the Contemporary Fundamental Movements in the Three Religions, Kepel, Gilles, translated by Naseer Marwa, 1st Edition, 1992.
[39] The rebelling of Al Shitat tribe in the eastern countryside of Deir Ezzor.

no group or class appears which might make entity on its authority[40], thus imposing regulation of a new reality ignoring the role of the sole tribal groups as a mediator between the authority and the individual. This way became the clan, in addition to distributing its social order and cracks it, totally losing its role, and the relation between the individual and the society became direct and personal, dependent and subordinate relationship.

The state adopted the principles of loyalty and disavowal of the distinction between loyalists and opponents, building on this began to purging through arbitrary arrest, absenteeism, and the expansion of murder and executions, which led to another splitting in the social structure that are already divided by tribal and class. This policy let to withdrawal most of activists, civilians, journalists and those who work in the civil organization society, and the '' Free Syrian Army'' out of the whole scene, which paralyzed the social structure, and lost its ability to put pressure on the new authority, these policies led the local community to decline their sympathy with the state.

The Parallel social-religious style:

The Islamic state kicks off through its very superior ideological and morally religious vision, and monopoly the virtue, and built on trust, as the state elements looks up to the locals as they are adulterers, with a deviant doctrine, consequently, like the old model with symmetrical and harmonious fabric of the nation state, the Islamic state began to impose its Salafi Jihadi pattern in its controlled areas through two methods:

First: subjecting the vast majority of the local population to the legitimacy courses teaching them the fundamentals of Islam according to Salafi Jihadi ideology (Ideology of monotheism) and the second that imposed the behavioral pattern of Salafism in a coercive way. In term of women and men legitimate wearing, timeliness of prey and closing the shops, preventing smoke and alcohol, preventing the gender mix in public places, and elimination of several social norms[41], beginning the Al Hisbah apparatus Supervising the locals in public places, especially in cities, and arresting the offenders, in addition to establishing the Al Hisbah Apparatus for women to monitor the women and inspect them, and issued harsh penalties on the violators ranging from prison to slay to fine and hard labor, in addition to murder.

The Majority of these families who left the state area, that the majority of the population following theses course avoiding the penalty, and most participants in these courses are under

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[40] The group dissolved the social network of "Amer Al Rafdan" after being killed, " Saddam Al Jamal" and "Ali Matar" by redistributing their groups into fighting fronts in Iraq and Syria.
[41] The group prevent condolences and joy events along with the way of salute in these areas.

educated people, who lost their income sources, in general their numbers is small, as well as part of this population practice these patterns because of fear and punishment, not convinced with the state methods, especially in public places, either in their homes, or surrounding community, they practice their own habits and customs, as the nature and structure of these areas and rural helps to hide from those Al Hisbah Apparatus same thing happened in the suburbs of the cities.

Also, the majority of the individuals and families, agreed to minimize their visits, and women's movement became very rare, and started to remain at their homes for long times avoiding the Al Hisbah Apparatus. As locals avoiding to pass the main streets, and avoid socializing with the state elements, fearing their violent behavior and being scared of the legitimate fines, as there is no clear law for the state that allows the population recognize what is allowed and what is forbidden, as things are related to the state elements judgments.

That caused moving the religious pattern from personal manner to general one by force, and issued penalties over the violators in a criminal manner, and used the local elements for these penalties illogically (most of the times) for personal revenge, such as luring some young men to take religion superficially as a reaction on these practices.

Relation normalization with the local community.

The second method that followed by the Islamic state is to penetrate the social structure in the controlled areas, through trying normalize its presence within the social structure of the area, and through the establishment of social relations and activities with the local population, such as solving out some disputes outside the judicial foundation, to solve serious differences and formed a social councils and advocacy for those who are noticeable of social workers, In addition to holding affinity relationships with the population, since the affinity relationships take a distinctive social status, but at the same time take in consideration the origin and reputation, and this is what formed an obstacle for the Islamic State's elements' marrying women and daughters of the people of the under controlled areas.

The group leaders encourage the members to marry Syrian women and girls, where it provides them with all marriage requirements such as dowry, house, and allowances for wife and children. Moreover, the group assigns the female members in "Al Khansaa" battalion to track the single girls or widows.

By collecting the data of marriage cases in the group held areas, we could find out that the cases for Syrian women and girls who married group members with foreign nationals[42]. Most of these cases are in Aleppo eastern countryside cases in Al Bab and the towns of Maskaneh and Tadef. In addition to Deir Ezzor governorate cases in the eastern countryside of the governorate.

By analyzing the motivating reasons for accepting the marriage, we could find the following;

1- Most of the girls or women who married to the group members have relation with the local members.

2- There was a sort of pressure on the girls or the women by their family due to the financial need, or for the sake of getting patronage. One girl committed suicide[43].

3- The feeling of desperation that girls have in the shed of unavailability of other choices, then they surrender to the reality. There are some cases that girls insisted to marry to the group members despite the refusal of their family.

Despite the fact that the marriage is made according to the norms and traditions of the area, the foreign husband imposes the condition of not to have children. Let alone the marriage is not stable, due to the nature of the husbands work and their continuous movement as required by the conditions of war. Many locals have discarded the families who married their daughters to the group members.

Socialization:

This kind of policy which is adopted by the group is considered as the most dangerous and effective on the social structure in the held communities. The group seeks, by using such policy, to raise a supportive generation where the Salafist-Jihadist ideology is the main compass for their behavior as they carry it. Therefore, the group controlled the educational operation as the first step in this context. The group forced the teachers to follow Shareea courses. It started to teach its own curriculum in the Shareea institutes[44] and mosques that their main task to conduct the process of socialization. Most of children who attend these institutes and mosques are sons of the group members, locals and foreigners, and little of local community sons who are forced to attend.

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[42] There are numbers that some estimations of families and individuals, and some researchers may find more accurate numbers.

[43] A girl from Al Raqqa who was forced by her family to marry from a Tunisian fighter.

[44] Al Ayed, Ali, " Teaching under the Rule of Daesh", Democratic Republic Studies Center, June 2015.

Many locals noticed the effect of the group propaganda on their children as they started to behave in different manner with their families. Sometimes those children rebelled their families. Some populations talked about many cases where the children snitch about their fathers and brothers[45]. The populations, in their turn, prevented their children to attend. However, they were faced by rejection and threat by Al Hisba apparatuses, the Islamic police, and the security office.[46]

The group could success partially in such policy, where the group members played on the string of satisfying the needs of the children and the teenagers by tempting them with power and money. The disintegrated social structure helped them to practice such policy in the held areas.

The group could attract many children and teenagers by submitting them to intensive ideological courses and training camps for fighting arts. Then, the group put these children on the fighting fronts. The group names the children who graduate from those camps as "Ashbal Al Khilafa" – the cubs of Caliphates. The estimated number of those children   in these areas is 1400[47].

2- Economically

After the group captured the area, it took the oil waters from the tribes and the factions. The group started to invest in these wells. It prevented a wide scale of society who were working in the domain of refining oil and selling its derivatives. This kind of privatization on many sectors led to terminate the economic cycle in the group held areas. In the shade of unavailability of work market which has alternative job opportunities, some populations started to work in farming and pastoral works. As for the former oil traders, some of them were subjected to the conditions of the group. Others started to work in trading with their savings. Recently, the wells there were destroyed by the coalition and Russian warplanes. Then, the group offered the oil wells to local investment by local auction[48].

The group worked to control the trading movement in its held areas. It imposed taxes on the shops and importers. It imposed the mandatory pricing. this type of control allowed

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[45] Interview with two families from Al Bab and Al Raqqa; a 22-year-old man was threatened by his younger brother (17-year-old) who is member of the group.
[46] Interview with a family from Al Mansourah, a family where their son joined the group, 14-year-old, when the family was asking the group about his destiny, they were threatened.
[47] 250 reported cases in Deir Ezzo, documented by JFL, the remaining number is the result of the estimations of the interviewed families. The number is confirmed.
[48] Khattab, Ali, "Office of Oil Investment in Al Tayyana Village", Ain Al Madeena Magazine, (71), April 27th 2016.

some members to make partnerships with some local traders in order to neglect the violations. Some members made deals with traders to supply commodities and medical items, or to export some items. All of these operations are made out of the group's authority. It is likely that the group leave such margin for its members.

The group established an office for recruitment in order to register the people of professions as it will employee them, as needed, in service-based sector. It benefitted from the state of poverty and need that prevailed in the local communities. In the shade of falling down of job opportunities market in these areas after the group loss of trading routes, many populations had to be involved in the institutions of the group due to need and loss of their living sources. They had to work in the domain of oil and its related services, without being affiliated to the group[49].

Nevertheless, the group could not make change in terms of agriculture and pastoral work, either by organizing or by managing. The local community remained isolated in such sector. The group imposed Zakat on farmers and cattlemen.

The group's economy is basically depending on the high benefit from collecting the available resources and sources in the held areas. It is oriented to serve the military, media, and ideological actions. It leaves a space of freedoms to its members in order to benefit from private deals. The group seems that it had no ability to prevent or control such deals. The group did not allocate part of its budget to provide the local communities with services. Rarely, it distributes some financial support to some poor families from the revenues of Zakat.

Sixth: the relationship between the local community and the group:

As it is shown by the context of conflict along with its results, the group is an external power which is added to the local community. The majority of this community did not produce such group and has no influence on it. This majority had a negative reaction for the violence of the group. This reaction was focused on the local members of the group

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[49] The group if " Islamic State" does not impose the Baia (loyalty) on the civilians who are involved in its service institutions.

and some of these reactions developed to the level of secret rebellion against the group members[50]. Such actions made a restriction of the movement of joining the group.

Some Free Syrian Army faction continued fighting the Assad regime under the authority of the group without making Bayaa[51] to it.

Conclusion:

There is no doubt that the group of Islamic State caused a huge damage to the social environment in its controlled areas by working on collapsing and restricting it. It worked on disabling the environment's effectiveness, neutralizing its ability to reforming and influencing. Moreover, it negatively influenced on the social structure, on functional and class-based levels, on the patterns of relations among its components, on the values and criteria that impact on the individual, their position and role, along with adding a big split which is led by revenge.

We can say that the group could penetrate into the social structure, partially, benefitting from the economic situations for some classes. However, it could not build social relations with the Syrian local communities. It could not achieve a fundamental change in this social structure for the benefit of its religious ideology at the expense of the tribal bias. This confirms the Iraqi special nature of the group i.e. the political, economic, social conditions that produced such group. Furthermore, the group could stab the social structure from the fragile side by attracting children and teenagers. This constitutes a threat on the social

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[50] The group of " Al Kafan Al Abyadh", or" The White Shroud", is unknown group , conducted assassinations against the group members in Deir Ezzor.
[51] Mhaidi, Ahmad, " Supporters in Deir Ezzor", (75), July 27th 2016.

structure in future and raise the severe need for tackling the effects that may result from the deformed generation.

Finally, there is a shorthand prevails in cultural and political contexts that adopts orientalist view towards the local communities in the group held areas as an incubator for radicalism and terrorism. This gives a justification for shelling these communities regardless of the civilians who reside these areas, and the necessity of protecting them. Besides, the irresponsible manner of judging them in a subjective way. Such view ignores already many issues; the multi-layer fractions of the social community in the group held areas, violence practiced on this community by Assad regime and the group, the social, political and economic situations of the locals, along with the conflict dynamics in Syria and the sectarian tension that influences negatively on the choices of the populations of these communities.

This raises the question concerning the effectiveness and fairness of the parallels and available solutions for a complicated situation, politically, socially, and economically, in a country that suffers from an increasing violence due to the intervention of international and regional parts, who adopt abstract military solutions, biased and contradictory, and eventually enforce the emergence of sectarian and national groups that may prolong the conflict and make it more extreme. These parts ignore deliberately the action of disabling the real maker of the violence who practices violence on those communities, Assad regime, who is the root of violence and the generator of sectarianism. This requires a re-consideration for the parallels and solutions that are based on the international and regional balances regardless of the reality and the necessity of analyzing it in order to create solutions that fit to its results, solutions that take into account the suffering of the Syrians and the justice of their case and demands for freedom and liberation from the political and sectarian tyranny, as they made every effort for it.

مرصـد العدالـة مـن أجـل الحيـاة فـي ديـر الـزور
Justice for Life Observatory in Deir EzZor