

TRIBES' MEMBERS IN DEIR EZZOR

FROM STABILITY TO REVOLUTION
DYNAMICS OF CONFLICT AND FACTORS OF CIVIL PEACE



by PETE WILLIAMS and THE ASSOCIATED PRESS

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Prepared by :

Faisal Dahmouh Al Mashhour

Supervised and Executed by :

Justice for Life Organization JFL.ngo

Incollaboration with:

Jdairta Center for Researches

Introduction

The pre-state subsidiary identities; doctrinal, ethnic and tribal became more pronounced during phases of the Syrian revolution in conjunction with the upsurge in violence of the current war between Assad regime and Free Army factions. Many tribal strife emerged in eastern Syria and particularly in Deir Ezzor as the consequent conflicts demonstrated that the clan is one of the social dynamics and standards in the east. Even though some observers attribute the resoration of tribal identities in the frame of the Syrian revolution to the consequences of the policies of the authoritarian state. However, others see that the Jihadist trends nearby the tribal areas led to the emergence of those identities as they expanded outside the frame of the state. Nevertheless, those identities were not absent from the local communities, and especially in Deir Ezzor, even though it was not prominent on media. Those identities were existing in different images and levels throughout the economic and social activities within a coalition frame with the current regime which did not recognize them officially, but it manipulated it in accordance with contradictory policies. The maximum level those identities reached is the emergence during a weak and erosion of the state power. This led them to be a social, political and military dynamic in a prominent manners. This make us think about the reasons and dynamics of this scattered emergence and to reconsider the policies of the successive regimes that ruled the country, along with the establishment of the Syrian state, especially during the era of Assad regime, and excluding the tribal areas from development projects.

Deir Ezzor Province

Geographical Location and Climate

The province of Deir Ezzor is located in the eastern Syria. It is divided into two parts by Euphrates River; the southern part extended to "Al Hammad" desert and this part is called "Al Shameyya". The northern part relates to the Syrian "Jazeera" area. It is the second largest Syrian province in terms of space as it is about 33k km². Most of the province locals reside in the banks of the Euphrates and Khabour rivers. The province has a desert environment and climate with high temperatures in summer and low in winter. It has low rainfall. much of human activities are concentrated on the Euphrates valley.

The Demographic and Administrative Divisions

The province of Deir Ezzor is a home of 1690k people as stated by the census of the Central Office of Statistics in 2011. 1,237,413 people live in the province until the late 2012. 454,587 live outside the province¹. The locals are divided into cities; Deir Ezzor, Al Mayadin, and Al Boukmal as these cities are resided by 367,965 people. The province is divided into three districts;

1. Deir Ezzor District; is divided into six sub-districts; Al Bsaira, Al Kasra, Al Tibni, Khsham, Mouhasan, and Al Suwar along with the district center in Deir Ezzor, eight towns, twenty one municipalities, and forty eight villages.
2. Al Mayadin District; is divided into two sub-districts; A; Ishara and Theeban along with the district center in Al Mayadin city, seven towns, fourteen municipalities, and ten villages.
3. Al Boukmal District; is divided into three sub-districts; Hajeen Al Sousa, and al Jala'a along with the district center in Al Boukmal and Hajeen city, ten towns, five municipalities, and eighteen villages.

Research Objective

This research aims at exploring the image of the tribal reality in Deir Ezzor province, excluding the cities, in order to understand the structure of the tribes and observing the changes on the tribal social structure in the province during the phases of the Syrian revolution, along with the dynamics and the impact of the Jihadist groups (Jabhat Al Nusra and "Islamic State") that existed in the tribal areas on the options and alliances of the areas' sons. It also aims at determining the map of tribal revenge that was resulted by the conflict which took place among the tribes along with specifying the reasons and consequences. It also seeks to search the factors of community peace in the area.

During the preparation of this research, we depended on many interviews with the tribes' sons and notables who reside in Deir Ezzor and those who are currently living in Idleb, Aleppo and Hama countrysides, and Turkey. In the second part of this research, we depended on a survey that targeted them in order to see their opinions about the revenge cases that were resulted by the tribal conflict along with the preferred methods of solving them.

¹ All statistics in this study depend on the census of the Central Office of Statistics in 2011

The Following map demonstrates the distribution of tribes in Deir Ezzor; :
https://www.google.com/maps/d/edit?mid=1w2cjfD5FoMpjEdKXOTA6iDh9_o

The Tribal Structure of Deir Ezzor Province

- The civil society in Deir Ezzor countryside is a tribal and traditional one where the prolonged family is the mediator social institution between the individuals and their environment. The majority of the locals in those areas descend from tribal backgrounds. Likewise, a part of the locals of the cities of Deir Ezzor, Al Mayadin, and Al Boukmal descend from tribal origins as they moved to those cities due to availability of job opportunities and services. Those people still have a kind of social tribal relations with their towns and villages.
- The province of Deir Ezzor is resided by many urbanized-countryside tribes including tribes with large number such as *Al Ogaydat* that is divided mainly into three sub-tribes; *Al Abo Kamal*, *Al Abo Kamel*, and *Al Shouaytat*. These three sub-tribes link with each other and each one has its own leadership. The tribe of *Al Baggara* is divided into three sub-tribes; *Al Abed*, and *Al Obied*, and *Dhana Sultan*. Additionally, there are the tribes of *Al Busaraya* and *Al Bukhabour*. There are secondary tribes such as *Al Abulail*, *Al Juhaish*, and *Al Mashahda* along with a part of *Al Dlaim*, *Al Majawda*, *Al Buhardan*, *Al Baga'an*, *Al Marashda*, *Al Marasma*, *Al Gaghayfa*, and *Al Bubadran*. In the desert of Deir Ezzor, there is a part of *Al Fada'an* tribe, which is a part of *Iniza* tribe.

The leadership inside each tribe is limited to one family which is called “Bait Al Mashiakah” (Family of Leadership), and the sons of this family inherit the leadership as there is no a specific inheritance system to exchange the leadership. The leadership could be changed as per vertical lines inside the family, or in a horizontal manner in accordance with considerations and balances inside the “Bait Al Mashiakah”. A brother, son, nephew, uncle, or a cousin can inherit the tribe leader and the gain the title of the “Shaikh”. This usually cause competition inside the tribes to gain such title. The successive authorities that ruled the province made use of this fracture to implement their policies and instil their power. The tribal affiliations are reflected in accordance with verbal narratives about the history of each tribe and the political and national attitudes of the tribes' leaders along with the glories and courage. Consequently, pride and criticism are made to classify the tribes according to a preferential scale that differentiate each tribe.

It should be mentioned that we can not consider a tribe in Deir Ezzor as a cohesive structure depended on stereotyped and traditional perceptions as this structure was exposed to change politically, socially, and economically.

I- Historical Overview

Structure Transformations of Deir Ezzor Tribes;

The current form of Deir Ezzor tribes has been made over decades of transformations of their political, social, and economic structure starting from the attempts of settlement of the tribes that were fighting on the lands and ragelands in Euphrates valley since the Ottoman era, that aimed at transforming them to stablized agriculture tribes. During the second procces of organizing the state of Ottoman in 1856², Deir Ezzor was transformed from “Qadha’a” to “Sanjaq”, and then to “Mutasarefeyya” that is affiliated directly to the central government in Istana³. The government distributed land to the tribes and gave the rank of “Pasha” to “Abdulkareem Al Nijris”⁴ from *Al Abo Kamel* tribe and “Ramadan Shalsh” from *Bousaraya* tribe⁵. Likewise, the governement exempted the farmers from military service, taxes, reduced the marektdues, and granted them interest-free loans. The Ottoman authorities established an apparatus to protect the farmers from the invasion of nomads. Moreover, the government established a registry of lands. This made the farmers evade taxes, then the tribes’ leaders made use of this evasion and register the lands under the names of the latter⁶.

These policies resulted in emergence of the class of agriculture lands owners of tribes leaders in Deir Ezzor city who controlled the area’ economy and connected with the local Ottoman auhtorities.

These procedures causeda relative stability for some tribes in Deir Ezzor province; *Al Ogaydat* and the allied tribals settled on the banks of Euphrates River, in the east and north of Deir Ezzor city. The tribe of *Al Abo Kamal* settled in Al Aboukamal city, nearby the Iraqi-Syrian border. *Al Shouaytat* tibes settled on the left bank of Euphrates River. *Al Abo Kamal* tribe settled from Al Ishara to Al Suwar on the banks of Euphrates and Al Khabour, exept for Al Bousaraya tribe which settled in Bouqrus town, nearby Al Mayadin city, then major part moved to the right bank of Euphrates River in the western side of Deir Ezzor city, as it became a neighbor of Al Bokhabour tribe in

² This is the second attaept by the Othoman State during the rule of Sultan Abdulhameed II to settle the tribes of Euphrates island for economic purposes. The first attempt was by Sultan Saleem I , which failed due to political and climate reasons.

³ Barout, Mohammad Jamal, A Contemporary History of the Syrian Jazeerah : Challenges of Urban Transition for Nomadic Communities, Arab Center for Research and Policy Studies, P:68-68

⁴ An Officer in the Othoman Army.

⁵ He was born in Al Shumaytia in 1897 and graduated from Military School in 1907. He was elected as a member of tribes council of Othaman State and then was assigned as military ruler of the Jabal Al Akhdar. He joined the group of Free Arab Officials while he was in Al Mosul. During the Greater Arab Revolution, he was a leader of the 5th Platoon. Then, he was assigned by Amir Faissal bin Al Hussien as Army leader in the northern area. Then he was assigned by the Arab government as military ruler on Euphrates, Raqqa, and Al Khabour.

⁶ Slaibi, Omar, Al Zour Liwa during Othoman Era, Dar Al Ilm, Damascus, 1997, P19-P114

Muhasan. As for Al Baqaara tribe, it settled in the west of Deir Ezzor city, on the left bank of the river.

The tribes started in cultivating the lands on the banks of Euphrates and Al Khabour. This slow transformations' dynamics strengthened the economic recovery in Deir Ezzor as it became the complex of the roads that link Al Musul and Baghdad with Palmyra, Damascus, and Aleppo. This led to the flourishing of sheep trading at that time. This relative stability did not reach the nomad tribes who continued fighting against the tribes that resided on the Euphrates valley. Those tribes made alliance to defend themselves. At the same time, there were conflicts among them to gain lands. The Ottoman authorities was working on promoting this kind of conflict by supporting one side. Tribal alliances emerged to confront stronger tribal alliances such as Al Thuluth alliance⁷ (between Al Abo Hasan, Al Gouran, Al Abo Rahma with leadership of Abdulkareem Pasha Al Nijris) to confront the domination of Al Abo Kamel on the mutual grazing lands⁸.

Following the control of France in Deir Ezzor city, the tribes of Al Busaraya, Al Bagara, Al Boukhabour, Al Anabza, and Al Bkair refused paying taxes to the French authorities, and this led to the shelling of their areas by heavy weapons and war jets. The French authorities, after dominating them, worked on penetrating the tribal structures in Deir Ezzor throughout the policy of establishing private agricultural processings in Euphrates valley.

This increased the conflicts among tribes and branches. Despite the fact that the French authorities worked on rooten the conflict, sometimes worked on holding conciliations among the tribes and giving aid to the tribes' leaders⁹.

However, the tribes did not surrender to the power of the French authorities as Al Shouaytat, Al Hassoun, Al Bkair, Al Dmair, and Al Boukhabour refused again to pay taxes. The French authorities was using, in addition to its forces, fighters from Al Amarat/Iniza, and Shammar to combat the rebels¹⁰. The last one was the rebeeling of some of Al Bousaraya to attacked a patrol in Ain Al Boujuma and killed two French officers. The French authorities executed the rebels and took the leadership from Hammoud Al Shlash and gave it to Fayyadh Al Nasser, who deliver¹¹ the attackers to the French authorities.

The members of the tribes were not separate from what was happening in the rest of Syria, and continued to rebel and reject the rule of the French authorities to their areas, tribal and tribal sheikhs participated in the Great Syrian Revolution of 1925, the uprising

⁷ It was called as Al Thuluth (Third) as the allied tribes were equal to the third of the total number of Al Bokamel tribe members.

⁸ Al Jundi, Adham, A Forgotten Paper of Deir Ezzor Sons' Glories, Omran Magazine, Damascus, 1971, P988

⁹ Various hands, Verbal History, Frist Chapter, Arab Center for Research and Policy Studies 2015.

¹⁰ Zakaerya, Ahmad Wasfi, Al Sham Tribes, Dar Al Fikr, P576.

¹¹ Hawash, Mohammad, Syrian and the Mandate, 2005.

against the French, In 1941, many tribal leaders and their leaders met to coordinate with the rebels of Deir EZ- Zour City for the revolution against the French, including:

"Kassar Al-Dandal ... Sharaf Al-Dandal, Raja Al-Dandal and Daham Al-Dandal (Al-Hassoun clan) Turki bek Najras (The Bu- hasan clan) , Ragheb al-Bashir and As'ad al-Bashir (al-Bakara clan)and Suleiman Dawood Al Hamada (Al Bakeer clan) , Jadaan Al-Hafel (Bukamil clan) , Faris Al-Jarrah and Kassar Al-Jarrah (Al -Damim clan) , Ramadan Pasha Shlash (Al Busraia) Some of them were members of the National Bloc, such as Sheikh Suleiman al-Hamadeh,

And some of them supported the rebels of their own funds, such as Sheikh "Ragheb Hamoud al-Bashir / Al- Bakara clan . But the failure of some clan elders and their complicity with the French authorities led to exile both of "Musharraf and Daham al-Dandal / clan of Hassoun /" to Iraq And "Sulaiman Dawood Hamada / Al-Bakeer, Ragheb Al-Bashir / Bakara" "Sarakib" in the Idleb province.

Many changes occurred in tribal structure during these periods and events, The Ottoman and French policies contributed greatly to the emergence of feudalism. The tribal sheikhs became a feudal class linked to economic and political relations with the urban dignitaries and senior officials of the state, based on agricultural and livestock production and payment of taxes¹². The influence of elders and dignitaries is determined in relation to the local authorities, Ottoman and French, where these traditional leaders control and control the local community in what it grants them. The authorities have advantages and power in return for their role in controlling these communities on the one hand, and the degree of their loyalty to the authorities on the other hand. On this basis, the relationship between tribal sheikhs and clan members has changed radically, by controlling the farmers and their families through the distribution of Food resources and quotas, and by the alliance with the emerging commercial feudalism in the region, which created an indignation among the farmer's clans against some of the sheikhs, dignitaries and Mukhtars in their clans¹³. On the structural level, the spread of tribes over large geographical areas and the large number of its members and their employment in agriculture and sheep breeding, in addition to the security in the areas of the Middle Euphrates Valley, led to the disintegration of the tribal federations in the region because of the need to adopt some of each other in the protection of their areas, Many clans and thighs according to the degree of kinship often associated with the fifth or sixth generation, which led to the emergence of

¹² Barout, Mohammad Jamal, A Contemporary History of the Syrian Jazeerah : Challenges of Urban Transition for Nomadic Communities, Arab Center for Research and Policy Studies, P:82-83

¹³ Various hands, Verbal History, Frist Chapter, Arab Center for Research and Policy Studies 2015

leaders and tribal leaders of these clans and thighs compete among themselves for status and proximity to power. The clan-clan level is governed by the kinship factor in the geographical area of the tribe's or clan's spread and the way they care for its interests. This was reflected as sub-tribal tendencies during tribal and sub-clan conflicts on the borders of pasture lands; Alikedat tribe start to be independent. new tribes start to immerge ' Within the clan in "Al-bokamel" as Adamim tribe headed by Fares AL jarrah, AL Hassoun headed by Mushref Al-dandal , Albomreej headed by Hersa Alarab, and "Albkair / headed by Suleiman Hamada within Albokamel tribe , And Al-Buhasen (headed by Turki Bek Al-Najrs)¹⁴ "Alkaran headed by Munadi Alkhalil and and Sarai Almohammad, Albo Rahma headed by Koan Aljabbara, Alshweet headed by Naser Hamoud Aljajan, Albokamel just meant Alzاهر,Saleh Alhamad,Shehab Alhamad , Altala'a Alhamad and many other teams.", all headed by Jadaan Alhafal who headed "Al-Akeidat tribe ", which continued to be heading the tribe symbolically because the tribal sheikhs did not accept the Al-Hafl tribe in the leadership of the Al-Akeidat tribe in general. Moreover, the expansion of the Akidat tribes on the banks of the Euphrates River and the banks of the Khabur River in the northern suburb of Deir Ezzor led to a weakening of the central command of the tribal leadership, which lead each tribe to take its own plan compatible with their interests¹⁵.

Two sections of the Bosraia are geographically distinct:

"Al-AboMuhammad d" in "Bqaras village in the east, and the "Buzam" in the village of "Shula in the south, but the tribe remained headed by "Fayyad al-Nasser.

Al-Bakara tribe is contained from "Abed, Abeed and Dana Sultan tribes, but also remained headed by Sheikh "Asaad al-Bashir." The tribes' relationships with each other is determined according to two levels: the first is a general clan in the case of an external enemy (the Bedouin - the British and French occupation) where the tribes unite and the coordination between tribal sheikhs and their leaders exceeds tribal sensitivities among them, And the other is tribes between themselves and divisions according to clans, groups and groups within and between clans. Tribes move and clan's clans and clans according to their size, strength, degree and nature of relationship with local authorities.

After the independence and the emergence of the Syrian state, the tribes moved to the rural lifestyle and settled in towns and villages along the banks of the Euphrates along

¹⁴ A graduate of Military Faculty with a rank of "Gul Aghasi". He was the first member of Syrian Parliament of Al Okaidat tribe since 1923 until 1949.

¹⁵ Zakaerya, Ahmad Wasfi, Al Sham Tribes, Dar Al Fikr, P569

the lines of lineage and kinship. Tribal groups in their geographical area began to grow up in an independent tribal clan, each with a sheikh, a sheikh family, Each with its own subjugation and nerve. Each clan spread in several neighboring villages, some overlapping with other neighboring tribes. Administrative and security functions and the welfare of some economic interests began to move to the emerging state, which could not implement agricultural reforms at the time because of its bourgeois structure¹⁶. Although the political history of Syria after independence marked by fluctuation and military coups, it witnessed few periods of political life in which the tribes had a political presence through the parliamentary elections through tribal sheikhs. The tribes of Deir Ezzor had three deputies/reportative in the parliament: Sheikh Rageb Hamoud al-Bashir from Al-bakara tribe, Sheikh Abood Jadan al-Hafel from Al-Akidat, Sheikh Daham Raja Dandal from Alhuson "in the Syrian Parliament since 1947, as their tribal weight in their regions is a key role in their success in the parliamentary elections.

During this period, the peasantry suffered from the injustice and tyranny of some tribal sheikhs and their leaders and the great feudalists. The local and central authorities did not compensate the peasants for their claims to recover their rights from tribal sheikhs and city dignitaries. The authorities often sided with feudalists. And sheep breeders from the clans of the lack of financial resources and the difficulty of securing the requirements of production, where they fell under the control of trade fiefdom, which seized some of the lands of farmers through loans that could not be paid by peasants, in addition to the control of feudalists of the state land through contracts with local authorities, and subsequently Al-Muhasan peasants from Abukabour tribe was able to managed their town by exploiting the disputes between the tribal leadership in their town and commercial feudalism in the province, and were able to organize themselves under the leadership of communists teachers by comparting Muhammad Saleh and Said al-Heneidi¹⁷ aggression and attacks on the communal lands of the town and managed to establish their first agricultural cooperative department in Deir Ezzor in 1953¹⁸.

At the time of the unification between Syria and Egypt in 1958, President Gamal Abdel Nasser dissolved all the laws pertaining to nomadic tribes, leaving only their seats in the People's Assembly. In September 1958, he issued the agricultural Reform Law and

¹⁶ Due to the influence of senior owners on the state apparatuses and the political instability of the country due to the multiple military coups.

¹⁷ Abdulrahman Hnaidi, one the family members, was the Ministry of Agriculture.

¹⁸ Various hands, Verbal History, Frist Chapter, Arab Center for Research and Policy Studies 2015

The Law No. 317 of cooperative Societies, and the law (129) regulating the work of the agricultural chambers, the state has established the agricultural and agricultural cooperative societies, and all the farmers benefiting from the lands of agricultural reform have become members of this cooperative societies. And began work on agricultural reforms that undermined the powers of tribal sheikhs and senior owners. The last political role played by tribal sheikhs in Syria in general was to stand by the separation from Egypt in 1961 because Gamal Abdel Nasser canceled the clan law in 1959. Aboud Jadan al-Hafel" Sheikh of Al-Akidat tribe, who was a member of the National Assembly in 1960 emerged in that period Sheikh ", and Sheikh "Daham Aldendal from Alhuson tribe¹⁹ representative of Al –Boukmal region, both were members of the House of Representatives in the era of unity in addition to Sheikh "Ahmed Al-Jajan from Shuit tribe who was a member of the National Assembly during that period.

The Socialist Arab Baath Party came to power in Syria in the coup of March 1963, the most attractive party for peasants due to its socialist ideology based on liberating the economy from feudal power and supporting the rights of peasants and workers. Except for a breakthrough achieved by the "Communist Party" by polarizing some members of the "Bukhabur tribe" in the town of "Muhasan"²⁰. The Arab Socialist Baath party continued the socialist transformation" which began in the era of the "unity" state through the reform of agricultural property and the implementation of the Agriculture Reform Law²¹. This was done by undermining the authority of tribal sheikhs, Land reform and distribution to the sons of the poorest peasant clans, and organizing them in agricultural associations to pay the price of land to the state in annual installments, which were subsequently exempted, As a result of this transformation, most tribal sheikhs lost parts of their lands to the benefit of the peasants of their clans, thus losing part of their political power, which was transformed into an ethical and social authority. This led them to seek positions in state institutions to ensure their continued authority and status. Deir Ezzor gradually lost its jobs and its effectiveness, and the tribesmen gradually adapted to the changes that result from the policies of the state, while tribal sheikhs and their leaders became more seeking to build a relationship with the state and its organs.

Although these reforms have contributed to reducing the influence of centers of power within the tribes and thus the independence of some of their members from the traditional clan hierarchy, the nature of these reforms is based on expropriation,

¹⁹ Al Shaikh Dahham Al Dandal joined SAB party throughout Jalal Al Saed.

²⁰ Batato, Hanna, Syria Farmers, Arab Center for Research and Policy Studies 2014.

²¹ Agriculture Reform Law which was issued in September 27th 1958

compensation and redistribution. On the one hand, the lands were not distributed entirely to the peasants. The process is only a kind of transfer of real estate from one layer to another, and thus reshaping the class composition in the region in which the farmers from the tribes of the politically weaker party, where the law remained unable to protect the members of the tribes benefiting from the law of agrarian reform of Exploitation of senior investors from the city's elders and some tribal sheikhs and their leaders in the province, as the law did not specify a ceiling for land holdings allowed to invest.

Secondly: The most prominent tribes in Deir EZ-Zour and distribution areas:

-**Al-Akidat tribe:** the largest tribe in Deir EZ-Zour governorate, located in the eastern suburb of Deir Ezzoron the banks of the Euphrates River to the city of Al-bukamal, Shamia and Jazeera, and the northern suburb of Deir Ezzor from the town of al-Basayra to the north. They are divided into three clans: "Bokamel, Albuqmal, Zamil / Shu'aytat", and later joined by other tribes in the region, who are alienated from them by virtue of their oath of allegiance: "The Bukhabur, the Bosraia, the Buhardan, the Bubdaran, Almushahada, the Albaka'an, Polyols, marshals, Gehish, Almarasmah and Al Feleeta"²². "Alkaidat is divided into three large tribes: **Al Bokamel:**

The traditional leadership of the Al-Akeidat tribe is confined to the Al-Hafl family of the Al-Zaher clan²³. The Al-Zaher clan, with the subdivisions of Al-Shahab Al-Hamad²⁴, Al-Tala 'Al-Hamad, Al-Mousa Al-Hamad, In comparison to other clans of "Bu Chamel".

Ja'adan al-Hafel is considered to be the eldest of the tribe's elders. However, since the time of Sheikh Jadan al-Hafl, the tribe lacks the unified leadership, because tribal sheikhs do not accept Al-Hafl's leadership²⁵. Sheikh Khalil Abboud al-Hafal is the leader of the tribe, his brother Hammoud al-Hafel and his sons, Mutashar and Munir, and his cousin Jameel al-Rashid al-Hafel in the village of Muweileh. After the death of Sheikh "Khalil," his son, "Musab" led the tribe in the state of "Qatar" with the presence of many members of "Akidat tribe, " residing in the Arab Gulf States²⁶ during a ceremony considered by the elders of the clans "Albokml" Members of the clan "Al-Zaher / Albokamil" and "Hafl" to accept his appetites through the ceremony because of the conditions of the province of Deir Ezzor. Among the most prominent tribes in Albogamel are:

²² Zakaerya, Ahmad Wasfi, Al Sham Tribes, Dar Al Fikr, P569

²³ They reside in Theeban, nearby Al Mayadin in the eastern countryside Deir Ezzor, Muyaleh village, nearby Al Suar.

²⁴ They reside in Al Shhail town and Al Hariji village.

²⁵ Zakaerya, Ahmad Wasfi, op.cit

²⁶ <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=-7rIOiZgG4>

A-Al-Bakkir: They are a large and widespread clan, their Shiekh by inheritance, Abdul Aziz Daoud Sulaiman Al-Hamada from the branch of the "Al-Qubaisah" that succeeded his father "Dawood Sulaiman Al-Hamada" from its thighs are: "Al-Muhamayd, Al Anabzeh, Al-Rekewat Alkhdier, Alied. Some of their high-class families are: "Henidi, Aljeban, Alsaleh, Alshalal and Albsees.

B – Al Bou Hassan: of the clans of the "third" alliance²⁷ within the tribe of "Akaidat", their Sheikh is "Abdul Karim Pasha Najrs ", which was succeeded by his brother, "Turki Bek Al Najrs²⁸ and then "Ismail Najrs ", until the Sheikh moved to "Faisal Al-Najrs "member of the" Baath Party ", which has been in several positions, and has won the membership of the People's Assembly for many sessions, the most prominent of which was nominated independent of the party and is separated after, and had wide relations within the organs of the ruling power, and receives support from multiple centers, To receive support from Gulf countries, notably Saudi Arabia, which was the main factor in the continuation of his appetite during the abdication of power, he died in 2008, then succeeded him his brother Sofok".

C-Alkaraan: one of the clans of the "third" alliance, they have many sheikhs, in Tayanna village Turki munadi Alkhalil who is the judge of the Akeidat tribe, Sheikh Hamad al-Faraj, and in the town of Qouriya, Sheikh Turki. Haj al-Hajji "and Sheikh" Sarai al-Abd al-Muhammad ".

D - Albo Rahma: from the clans of the "third" alliance and their sheikh "Kwan al-Jabara", and was succeeded by his son "Rahaiman".

E - Shuwaite: Their sheikhs from "Aljijan" family and have no differences/disputes with other clans, both within the tribe of Al - Akidat tribe or outside, "Shamlan and Oqaa" are considered high class families within the tribe.

2-Albu Kamal: from the clans of the basic Alkaidat tribe, they are the cousins of Albokaml, Shuaiteh tribes, and from its branches that turned into independent clans:" Dimim, Alhasson, Boumerih. Competition within the clan is between Dimaim& Alsson "on social status and possession of the role in Sheikh of the Boukmal region.

A-Al Dmaem: The traditional Leadership is concentrated in the family of Aljarrah and their chief Sheikh, Kassar al-Jarrah, who was succeeded by his son Faris and then Abboud Faris al-Jarrah. After his death, the clan entered into a division and disputes for Leadership between Kamal Naji al-Jarrah and his uncle Naif Aboud al-Jarrah, the dispute was resolved by Nawaf Abboud Faris Al-Jarrah's intervention in favor of Kamal Naji Al-Jarrah. Nawaf is a prominent clan member of the Asad regime and took many

²⁷ Tribal alliance inside Al Akidat tribe

²⁸ He graduated from the Tribes School in Istana and was assigned as an official in the Othoman Army.

administrative and security branches of the state²⁹. Some members of the wealthy Shiha family, Khamees and Hamid al-Shehan, compete against Al-Jarrah for their integrity within the Daimim clan.

B - AlHassoun: a clan with a large social weight in the region, and the traditional Leadership is concentrated in the family of "Dandall" and the great Sheikh "Musharraf al-Muhammad al-Dandal", the Leadership moved during his life to his nephew, "Daham Raja al-Dandal," member of the "Baath Party, he had also broad Political and social relations³⁰, then the Leadership moved to his son, "Ayman Daham al-Dandal." There is a dispute within the house of the Leadership between Mahjam Raja Aldandal, his sons, and the sons of Azal Aldandal about the representation of the sheikh clan.

C – Al-Boumerih: Their traditional Leadership is limited to the "Alkhalil" "Harsa Al Arab" family, and they have family elders: "Al Fendi, Al Aliwi". They are closer to the Al-Hasun clan than the Al-Daimim clan.

3-AlShuaitat: The most common tribe of Al-Akeidat, they are the largest and most in numbers and money. They do not have a single sheikh. They are divided into three subdivisions: Al-Jadou, Al-Alian, and Khafnoor, Their high class families from Aljaza'a, AlAlian, Aloukla, there are also members of the clan are expatriates in the Gulf States.

1- Al Bakara tribe: The areas of their residence in the western suburb of Deir Ezzor , from the city of "Deir Ezzor" to the "Kasra district, and the eastern suburb of Deir al-Zor from the city of "Deir Ezzor" to Absura town, this tribe divided into three clans: Alabed, Alabeed and Boslatan, the Leadership is concentrated to the family of " Bashir / Alburab branch / Alabed clan, "where the Leadership moved from Sheikh" Asaad al-Bashir "to his nephew" Rageb al-Bashir "and then to his son," Nawaf Rageb al-Bashir, who his brothers," Saleh and Jassim Rageb Bashir, "compete with Sheikh Nawaf Rageb Al-Bashir to the presidency of the tribe, the tribe high class families: Al-Mozar Al-Abd Al-Salem, Al-Bashar, Al-Mohammad Al-Ibrahim, Al-Ajil, Al-Shallal, Alsalman who is considered from the tribal house of legalism within the tribe and their chief Sheikh," Najm Abdullah Salman, Bakara tribe are famous with their tendency to peaceful solutions more than others, and their mixed relationships through trade relations with the people of Deir Ezzor.

"-Al Busraia" tribe: their areas of residence in the western suburb of Deir Ezzor/(Shameya), from the town of Deir Ezzorto Altebni district in addition to Poqros town in the eastern suburb, Alshola village in Albadiea south west Dier Ezzor"Leadership moved from Hamoud al-Shalash to Fayyad al-Nasser, one of the clan leaders during the

²⁹ He graduated from faculty of law and occupied the positions of head of political security apparatus in 1994, head of branch of Baath Party in Deir Ezzor, Governor of Latakia in 1998, governor of Idlib in 2000, governor of Qunaitera in 2002, and Syria ambassador to Iraq in 2008.

³⁰ Including the late Egyptian president Jamal Abdunnasser, the late Iraqi president Saddam Hussien, and a number of kings and princes of the gulf states.

French mandate³¹, and continued between them, then it moved from Fayyad al-Nasser to his son Ahmed and then to his son, Faisal, a member of the People's Assembly for several sessions. , And then his son, "Muhanna Faisal al-Fayadh" in the presence of "Mahmoud al-Abrash," the president of the People's Assembly at the time, despite the opposition of some of the tribe of the family, "Fayadh" on his inauguration, Al-Bosraia has relations with the sheikhs and sons of the majority of the tribes in the province, such as "al-Bakara, al-Buhasan, al-Qubaisah / al-Bakir," where they are considered their uncles.

Al Bukhabur clan: They are from the families of Deir Ezzor, they are medium in numbers and have no traditional sheikhs. They are divided into subdivisions: Al-Buammar, Al-Buhalihal and Al-Boumayt. The clan's interest in education is considerable. Some of them are also involved in the Syrian army,

Tribes Distribution Areas:

tribe	clan	subdivision	Administrative areas of their main locations	Areas shared with other clans
Al-Akidat	Al-Jamel bu	Albokamil (apparent)	The "Zeban" area of Al-Mayadeen area, the village of "Sheheer" of Al-Basira, and the village of "Moyleh" in the area of pictures.	Villages of : Gharibah, al-Hreiki "in the area of the pictures.
		Al-Bkaiyer	Towns: Khasham, Al-Basira, Ruwaishid and villages: Bariha, Tayeb Al-Fal, Kassar, Helwa, Mashikh, Akeidat, Jasmi,	Villages: "Horeiki, Hreiki, Saalou, Dablan, photos"
		Al-Kuraan	The village of Qouriya on the right bank of the Euphrates / Shamiya, and my village: Tiwana, Al Shanan on the left bank of the Euphrates River	
		Bu rahma	Village: "East / West Jerzy" Island, and village "Duir" Shamia	
		Bu hasan	Villages: "Swidan Shamia / Isle of Man, Darren"	The town of "Al-Ashara"
		Shouet	Towns and Villages: "Subikhan, Al-Kushma, Abu Hardoub"	Village "Deblan, strange"
	Al-kamal bu	Hassoun	Villages: "Sousse, Ghobrah, Hasrat, Suwayyah"	Villages: "Al-Sayyal, Al-Shifa"

³¹ Against a backdrop of delivering seven revolutionarists to the French authorities by Fayad Al Nasser.

		Damim	Villages: "Abbas, Salhia, Galaa" on the right bank of the Euphrates River / Shamia, and the village of "Bahra" on the left bank of the Euphrates / Island.	
		Bu marieh	The village of "Sayal"	
	Sheetat		Villages: "Al-Kashkiya, Granij, Abu Hamam" belonging to the "hybrid" in the area of Albuqamal	
Bakkara	Abed		The area of the "Kasra" and the villages: "Zghair Island, Al Ali, Ambassador, Al-Buhameed carrot, Hawayj Diab, Hawayj Al-Baramsa, Al-Sa'wa, Husseiniya, Muhaydah". And villages: "new continent, Mrat, Mazloun, Tabiya, Dahla" East rural of Deir Az Zor.	
	Oubeid			
	Dana Sultan			
	Al-Bu saraya		Villages: Ayyash, Baghiliya, Map, Shamitiyya, Musaber, Anaba, Bouyatiyeh, Tarif, and the western suburb of Deir Ezzor. And the town: "Bqrc" rural Deir Ezzor Oriental. And the village of "Shula" in the south-western suburb of Deir Ezzor.	Tebbni area
	Bu Khabour	Bu khalil	Mohsin" town	
		Bu Maiet	Marbaia town	
		Bu Omar	The village of "Abd"	
	Bu leil		Villages of (Toub and katia)	
For the map of the most prominent tribes in Deir Ezzor, please follow the following link: https://www.google.com/maps/d/edit?mid=1w2cjfD5FoMpziEdKXOTA6iDh9_o				

Thirdly: Assad regime policies towards the tribes:

Since its accession to power in a coup in 1970, the policy of mobilizing clan members within Ba'ath party, trade unions and professional associations supervised by its security authorities. In 1974, the Assad regime suspended the implementation of the Agricultural Reform Law and established the General Union of Peasants and the General Union of Workers, and worked to encircle all political and social activities in

Syria in general, individual and partisan, until it was finally eliminated during the eighties of the last century³².

Although the regime did not recognize the tribal structures and considered them an obstacle to the policies of "socialist transformation" and state-building during his official speeches, he began by weaving a new relationship with tribal sheikhs and investing in tribal structures and employing them to consolidate his emerging power by distributing roles and jobs based on This unannounced policy has become one of the characteristics of the regime in the tribal region of the east of the country, and the policies of the Assad regime regarding the tribes in Deir Ezzor can be distinguished according to three levels:

The first: was to divide the roles and assimilate some symbols of the traditional sheikhs of the great clans as members of the People's Assembly, and to work to strengthen the cracks of the houses of the sheikh from the inside. The Assad regime allocated the seats of the Progressive National Front³³ to all the members of Deir Ezzor, Seats of some members of the clans and Sheikhs, while the seats of independent representatives from the sectors of workers and peasants and the rest of the people, always occupied by Sheikhs and tribal leaders alternately.

The Assad regime benefited from the internal competition within the houses of the sheikhs in some tribes, and strengthened them by attracting one of the competing parties to the other, and the temptation of other individuals to play limited roles at the local level. For example, the regime granted Abboud Jadaan Alhafal from Alboukamel tribe a permanent member of the People's Assembly until his death in 1987. He was succeeded by his son Sheikh Khalil Abboud Al-Hafel in the People's Assembly permanently until his death in June 2016. In return, he gave less local roles to Sheikh Jamil Rashid Al-Hafel and his brother Abdel Aziz Rashid Al- Without granting them membership in the People's Assembly. In the Al-Buqamal clan, after the death of Sheikh Daham al-Dandal, member of parliament and the Syrian People's Assembly, the Assad regime attracted some members of the traditional sheikhs of the al-Hassoun clan, alternating in the People's Assembly: Mujman al-Dandal, Ayman al-Dandal, Sheikh Naji Faris Al-Jarrah has been granted membership of the People's Assembly for two legislative sessions and a greater role for his brother, Brigadier Nawaf Faris Al-Jarrah, in the various organs of the state, where the two tribes seek the leadership of the Albuqmal clan, As for Albomreh clan, they did not have any representative in the Council, despite the nomination/candidate of Sheikh "Tarfa al-Harasa for The People's Assembly several times.

In the so-called "third-party alliance," the regime granted Sheikh Faisal al-Najrs / Al-Buhssan the People's Assembly membership to successive legislative roles, and had wide relations within the various institutions of the state, Supported him in this context when the ruling Saudi family had good relations with the Assad regime; in one of the

³² Following the events of 1982 with Muslim Brotherhood Group

³³ An alliance of many political parties with leadership of Baath party, was established in 1972.

legislative roles, the intervention of the Saudi government decided to compete with: "Nawaf Ragheb al-Bashir / Bakara, Faisal Al-Najrs / "Sheikh Faisal Al-Najrs used this Uncle and two great position to devote his power by seeking to my clan sheikh: "Alborhnmh, the Goran", sparking the ire of the elders of the tribes. In the Bakara tribe, the regime granted the membership of the People's Assembly to Salih Ragheb Al-Bashir independent for one legislative role and Jassim As'ad Al-Bashir for three legislative roles, including two through the National Progressive Front and Nawaf Ragheb Al- And the Sheikh "Najem Abdullah Al-Salman / Al-Obaid clan /" was appointed to the Legislative Council of the National Progressive Front, He took the podium "for three legislative roles, two of them through the National Progressive Front. In the Al-Busraia clan, the Assad regime gave the People's Assembly membership to Sheikh Faisal Ahmad al-Fayyad for two legislative terms until his death in 2010. His son, Muhanna, was also elected to the People's Assembly. And this has strengthened competition within the houses of elders and dignitaries in each clan to obtain the status and role of the Authority to serve the aspirations of individuals to be alone in the leadership and leadership of the clan in accordance with the circumstances and developments.

The Second, Assad regime adopted a policy of social discrimination against the clans. The Assad regime ignored the traditional Leadership and the great clans of Shu'aytat, al-Bolil, Shuwayt, Bu Rahma, Qar'an and al-Bukhair³⁴, the most numerous in its tribal environment. These tribes have played a prominent role in state institutions, weakening the traditional leadership of some of these clans and vanishing others. In turn, they have given roles to the sons of less powerful clans in the province, such as appointing Mohammed al-Husayn from Al-Juhaish tribe as minister of finance in the government. It is noteworthy that the policy of social discrimination that affected the majority of the members of these tribes and the neglect of their elders and leaders is likely due to political reasons related to the affiliation of many of the sons of towns and villages: "Koryah, Shehail, Strange, Bolih, Muhsin, And their participation in the events of the eighties of the last century against the Assad

Thirdly: To strengthen the influence of the authority of the regime within the social structure in the tribal area in order to control and weaken the ability of the traditional sheikh within each clan to mobilizing by absorbing the members of the tribes within the ranks of Baath Party, this was the main condition to be employed in the state administrative establishments and departments and the administrative hierarchy within it, as well as linking farmers, and workers with unions, directorates and banks that supervise the implementation and financing of economic activities in the country³⁵, and control of the councils of agricultural chambers representing the private agricultural sector from during the appointment of members and control of nominations and elections by the branch of the Baath Party and the security services in the province in coordination with the leadership of the party.

³⁴ Except for Abdulaziz Al Hummada as he was a member for one time in 1990

³⁵ Hafez Al assad established the general union of farmers in 1974.

This absorption, linkage and infiltration made it easy for the Assad regime through the local authorities in the governorate of Deir Ezzorto form a group of social actors outside the traditional tribal hierarchy, through the tribesmen who were given by the authorities of the local system various centers within the party groups, agricultural associations, trade unions, municipal councils, In the governorate, in addition to attracting some Mukhtars in the towns and villages, who are ready to play such roles and connect them to the local authorities through a network of security relations and socio-economic interests, and give them different features within the organs and founder The local authorities have more than some tribal sheikhs and their leaders of the first and second grades, making them rivals of the tribal sheikhs on the status and role also within the centers of power of the existing system, as the tribes used to mediate and solve problems and secure jobs and their interests in different institutions of the state.

Local authorities have dedicated this approach to isolating and weakening the influence of the traditional sheikhs through the secretaries of the party branches and the successive Governorates of Deir Ezzor, according to many testimonies of those who have knowledge of them. This was the attempt by the colonel Nawaf Al-Fares during his position as secretary of the Ba'ath party branch in Deir Ezzorprovince to head the tribe of Al-Akeidat. Some of the dignitaries and activists from Al-Akeidat tribes of the third and fourth grades, And distributed to them different roles and features, and also through his support to Sheikh "Faisal Al-Najrs" to compete with Sheikh "Khalil Aboud Al-Hafel" to the sheikh of the tribe, "Alkaidat" in general, by weakening the role of the traditional sheikhs of the tribes of Al-Akidat and prominent figures at the time, Between "Faisal al-Najrs" and "Khalil Abboud al-Hafel" inside the branch of the Baath Party in Deir Ezzorin the presence of "Nawaf al-Faris" and almost led to a clash between "Buhsin and Albokamel clans

However, this employment has been met by interaction and convergence in some cases, especially when the political situation in the country worsens and the need for clans arises in the foreign political crises that the regime is subjected to. The beginning of the Syrian-Iraqi differences took place. Iraqi tribes to ensure their alliance with the Baath regime in Iraq, as well as in 2005 during the political siege on Assad's son against the backdrop of the assassination of Lebanese Prime Minister "Rafiq Hariri," where Bashar al-Assad "to visit the province of Deir Ezzorin 2007 and delivered a speech in which he praised the role The National of the clans of Deir El-Zour in the resistance against French colonialism³⁶.

These policies have given the Assad regime tools to control the clans and weaken the ability of their Sheikhs to influence and mobilize significantly; and thus facilitated the Assad regime neutralize and isolate Sheikhs and traditional dignitaries whenever a clan is deviated from the submission of obedience and loyalty to him, and perhaps the most prominent example in this context what happened to Sheikh "Nawaf Ragheb Al-Bashir

³⁶ https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=6l8D9Bsl_IQ

"When he sided with the ranks of the political opposition and hosted in his office in the village of" Mahameeda "the founding meeting of the" Damascus Declaration for National Democratic Change "opposition in 2005, which made the Assad regime and its security services work to isolate him, and withdraw the features granted to him in favor of his brother Sheikh" Saleh Ragheb Al-Bahir and to a lesser extent his uncle Sheikh "Hajim Asaad al-Bashir," then Assad regime gave "Nawaf al-Bashir again some of the prevellages³⁷ after his dismissal from the Secretariat of the Damascus Declaration opposition.

Undoubtedly, the continued distribution of agricultural lands (property ownership) to clan members, and political and economic changes during the decades of Baathist and Assad rule increased dissociation of tribal structures and the transition of economic, security and administrative functions almost entirely to the regime authorities. This also led to less authority roles for Sheikhs its traditional sheikhs and henchmen who had lost the material elements necessary for the continuation of their authority. However, this did not cancel their symbolism and social status among the members of their clans, as they continued their interest in social duties and activities.

The pragmatic policies of the Assad regime have also contributed to the emergence of a group of social actors associated with local authority bodies through peasant associations and trade unions, which have assumed and played a political-security political role in favor of the existing regime on their economic role. On the one hand, and the weakest state institutions. As a result, the relationship between the Assad regime and the clans was organized through these formal and informal channels, and it is likely that the kinship in the social and economic relations produced by these policies and the nature of their employment as intermediaries among the tribes, state institutions and local authorities, The administrative, political and cultural institutions and organizations with clan members on the basis of clan identity are among the most important reasons for the continuation of tribal affiliation at the level of individuals and groups in varying degrees, according to the degree of implementation/power of some Shiekhs than others within the the country institutions.

This explains how the state apparatus and institutions expanded within the social structure of the clan in Deir Ezzor, which largely defined the model of the relationship of its institutions to the local community under the Assad regime through its adoption in its inception and composition and its continued promotion of tribal affiliations in Deir al- Power and society, but we can not be sure that the dismantling of tribal structures by the Assad regime and employment in this form was based on a political decision, but what appears through the policies of the Assad regime about the tribes in the province of Deir Ezzormakes us conclude that he was apprehensive of the threat of tuberculosis It was aided by the Assad regime in controlling, controlling and employing it to serve its policies, as facilitated by the tribal structures of successive authorities in the region, Ottoman and French , to attract and control tribes within specific functions.

³⁷ The regime gave Nawaf Al Basheer a bid loan to establish project of poultry.

Fourthly: The social and economic situation of Deir Ezzor tribes:

Deir Ezzor tribes and members were deeply affected by these policies and transformations in the structure of the tribes in the province, which resulted in many changes in their way of life and the form and nature of their neural connections with their tribes and, especially in the 1980s and 1990s; Which govern and control the way of life of their children and their political choices to a large extent, due to several reasons intertwined and linked to each other, including:

1- Rural life has changed due to the availability of some services in rural areas such as electricity, water", the creation of some social and health facilities, schools and roads.

2- Contact between the tribes in towns and cities in the region with various commercial activities and activities has increasingly spreaded, especially the tribes surrounding the cities, where the members of Al Bakara" most closely associated with the city of Deir Ezzor and the most interconnected to their families, and some neighborhoods of the city; Mainly from the Bukhapur clan, as well as al-Jawra, al-Busariya, most of them from the Bosraya clan.

3-The interest in education and educational achievement and involvement in the institutions and involving in the state departments has increased also, as it clearly noted the interest of the people of the towns of: "Korya, Al-Ashara, Muhasan, Bqrc" of the clans: "Qar'an, Albu Khabur, Buhsin, Bosraia" especially by educating their children, many members of the tribes in general and the Bukhabur clan tribe especially joined the army.

4- farmers, sheep breeders and tribal workers has joined with economic services and institutions such as (agricultural associations, guiding units, Workers unit, Fodder institution, grain foundation and cotton scutcher) led to the independence of clan members due to government sponsorship of economic activities and socio- Family-run villages away from dependence or the effects of traditional Leadership .

These changes led to cultural, political and economical changes in varying depth in the tribal areas of Deir Ezzor, affecting the lifestyle of the tribes in general to a similar form of life in the cities, and changed the nature of their relations within these social structures, between members of tribes and tribes with each other and relationship Each with its traditional hierarchy of social-class intersections that changed its social and cultural structure through the emergence of individuals and groups of different ranks, status, function and economic level. Thus, the nature of the relations between the tribes among them changed within each clan. List of political links to a multi-faceted social and economic character of relations. These structural changes, although they changed the nature and form of the relationship between the clans and their relations with their clans and traditional Shiekhdom, but - this relationship - has been governed to some extent tribal values and customs of some periods, where the tribes remained fluctuating between the concentration and independence of their clans according to phases It is the most noticeable of this concentration in the emergence of tribalism during the parliamentary elections motivated by the tribal tendencies of the majority

of the tribesmen, in their bias towards the candidates of their clans to maintain their representation before the authorities, In each clan, as well as tribal outbursts in another face through conflicts or vengeance with other clans or between the clans of one tribe and their families.

Referring to economy situation, 43% of Deir Ezzor's residents work in the agriculture sector ³⁸, and rely on their income and food security on the income of their seasonal crops and the cultivation of household needs, While the residents of Deir Ezzordo not constitute percentage of workers in the oil sector in the province.

The governmental support for agricultural sector established an economic recovery for farmers and farmers in the Middle Euphrates Valley in general. However, but determining securing and distribution of agricultural production and raising of sheep and exporting them to agricultural associations has restricted farmers with centralized policies according to imposed agricultural cycles to the main crops as wheat, cotton, sugar beet", made farmers the weakest link in the production cycle, especially during bad climatic conditions, which led them to circumvent the agricultural plans by replacing the crop type in addition to increasing planted areas according to agricultural plans, In order to provide larger incomes, in addition to the distinction in the quantities of animal fodder distributed and control of export operations for the dominant commercial class associated with the ruling authorities and the security services, and these abuses would not have been made without the consent of relatives of clans based on agricultural economic institutions of interest such as Agricultural associations, , fodder establishment "based on favoritism and bribes sometimes, which made these institutions control agricultural activities according to personal interests and degree of loyalty.

The continuation of the simple traditional production pattern, the difficulty of securing the modern production requirements, the dryness of the Khabour River in the northern countryside of Deir Ez-Zour, the depletion of agricultural land over time and the removal of parts of it from agricultural service due to spawning and salinity production have negatively affected the overall productivity of the land, And the agricultural institutions concerned did not take any action on these conditions, in addition to administrative and financial corruption and the spread of favoritism and exploitation within these institutions. The division of land into small and small-size property due to inheritance over the past three decades has led to a significant decline in the income of farmers and a number of private agricultural projects. Many of them have left their jobs in the agricultural sector. And headed to find alternative job oportunities inside and outside Deir Ezzor,

Deir Ezzorgovernorate, according to the Internal Migration in Syria report³⁹ , is considered from the provinces of expelling the population, whether at the level of migration from the province to the centers of other province, or the level of migration

³⁸ According to the Central Office of Statistics

³⁹ A Study issued by Central Offcie of Statistics.

from rural areas to the city centers in the province: "Deir Zor, Almayadeen, Al Boukamal, Where the rate of departure from the province reached to (3.39) and the net migration rate (-2.7% and -2.2%) during the 1994 and 2004 respectively. The age structure of migration is concentrated in the younger age groups (15-34) years, and to a lesser extent in the age group (35-44). The reasons for internal migration in Syria are concentrated in the absence of job opportunities in the expelling governorates, Lack of or adequate facilities and infrastructure services near the place of residence, lack of possession of agricultural land or small area and low production. While there is no accurate information on the numbers and quality of migrants out of Syria, where a large section of the general population of the tribes in Deir Ezzormigrated to the Gulf States and the State of Lebanon to work and secure networks of economic protection independent of their families.

Deir Ezzoris considered one of developed governorates in terms of education and service. The level of public services is lower than other Syrian governorates, in terms of transportation, health and education services⁴⁰. The "Poverty report ⁴¹in Syria confirms the government negligence of Eastern Region in general. It points out that the regions of northeast Syria: Deir Ezzor, Al-Hasakah, Al-Raqqa, Aleppo countryside have the highest poverty rates in terms of prevalence, Poverty in these areas ranges from 11.2-17.9%, and the percentage of the poor is 35.8% of the general population. The illiteracy rate in this region is also high. The percentage of literate people aged 15-24 years in Deir Ezzorgovernorate reached 78.3% in 2004, while the national average reached 92.5%⁴².

The economic liberalization policies adopted by the Syrian government during the ten years before the revolution and raising of government support for many sectors especially on agriculture which have contributed to the increase in fuel prices in addition to the dry seasons of 2007 to 2010 which have passed through the country in general. Which posed a threat to the food security of large sectors of the population, especially those in the agricultural sector. The government was unable to implement development projects in the agricultural sector due to the exploitation of agricultural land holdings. In general, Syria has suffered during the last years before the revolution from the rise in the unemployment rate to 34%. Economic policies have not been able to create employment opportunities for young people involved in the labor market. This has led to widening economic and social disparities within many communities and families, which led also to deterioration of the economic conditions of many classes of the population who have suffered from extreme poverty.

⁴⁰ Since there is no a medical center in the governorate for healing the patients who suffer from chronological diseases until 2006.

⁴¹ Poverty in Syria (1996-2004) a report that was issued by UNDP, June 2005.

⁴² National Second Report of Deveelopment Goals of Syrian Arab Republic, 2005

Fifthly: tribes in the Syrian revolution:

From dissolved tribal reality that is structurally dismantled, with a security breach and economically restricted and collapsed started the Syrian revolution in the countryside of Deir Ezzor, and the reasons that led the tribesmen to engage in the revolution against the Assad regime for many reasons especially the economic and social conditions which played a critic role among many of tribe's people. But these conditions alone were not enough for many of them to join the protests against the Assad regime in the province of Deir Ezzor, the sons of the educated clans, who were the main core biased to the revolution early and the engine for it, they, although do not break the social condition - They are more politically motivated than their socially neglected and economically damaged, and are more sensitive to the violence of Assad regime in the cities of Daraa, Homs and Banias. They were involved in the Syrian revolution, raising the values of national dignity and freedom as their slogan. So they prompted a number of their families with socio-economic motives more than others to participate in the Syrian revolution because they enjoy respect within their clans and thighs, and contributed to fuel the protests against the Assad regime in their areas, such as villages and towns of Qouriya, Ashara, Mouhasan, and Shuheil, additionally They were heavily involved in demonstrations in the cities of Deir Ezzor, al-Mayadeen and al-Bu Kamal.

The majority of the tribesmen took a neutral attitude toward the revolution despite their suffering from the same economic and social conditions to join their protesting colleagues, hence the neutral attitude of Nawaf Ragheb al-Bashir the Shiekh of Abakara tribe did not have a wide popular impact on this group⁴³, As a warning to the Assad regime, which rushed through the local authorities in Deir Ezzorto move tribal Shiekhs and network loyalists, in addition to some of the influential tribesmen within the organs of the Baath Party and the army, such as: "Nawaf Fares Jarrah / Aldemim clan, Hmaidan Alrosan /Alboukabour clan,Taha Khalifa⁴⁴ /AlbouOmar clan, Mohaidi Algweer⁴⁵ /Albakaan clan, Mahmoud Hassan al-Ganash, nicknamed Hadi al-Jaza'a⁴⁶/Alboukamel clan, "to try to stop the tribal uprising and to prevent others from joining the protests and by providing promises of political reforms by a condition of not participation in protest against the regime on the one hand, and organizing demonstrations with Assad regime to be against Freedom revolution on the other hand, which led to direct clashes between the opposition demonstrators and a number of members of Bakara and Bosraya tribes who are pro-regime loyal members from Baath party & peasant associations in Great Friday 22-Apr- 2011, which increased indignation among demonstrators in general.

⁴³ Protestors of Deir Ezzor city shout “ Oh Nawaf, Where is dignity ?” in the demonstration of the great Friday in April 22nd 2011.

<https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=5YMbK7BoP4I>

⁴⁴ The head of Al Baath part branch in Deir Ezzor at that time.

⁴⁵ Community leader of Al Ramadi village in Deir Ezzor countryside.

⁴⁶ One of the famous smugglers and he enjoyed a close relation with Militart Security apparatus.

At the beginning of May 2011, Bashar al-Assad met with a number of sheikhs and tribal leaders including Abdul Aziz al-Hafel, Al-Buqamil tribe, Fawaz al-Bashir, al-Bakara tribe, Muhanna al-Fayadh, al-Busariya tribe, Raja al-Dandal Alhassoun tribe⁴⁷ to grant the tribes attitude to be against the Syrian revolution or at least to take a neutral attitude, so several meetings happened between the local authorities in Deir Ezzor governorate and representatives of the presidential palace and the State leadership with tribal Sheikhs. For example Khalil Abboud al-Hafel, Sheikh of al-Akeidat tribe, Hajim As'ad al-Bashir, Muhanna Faysal al-Fayyad, Shaykh Al-Busariya, and a number of tribal leaders with the Assad regime's representatives in Al Baath Party Branch In Deir Ezzor city to organize Marches supporting Assad regime, and to prevent the demonstrators from the tribesmen to participate in the demonstrations of "Deir Ezzor, Mayadim and Albuqmal cities, Assad regime also tried to create a direct clash between the sons of clans and demonstrators in Albuqma city where an officer in the Republican Guard of the Assad regime met with the dignitaries of tribes Al-Dimim and Al-Hassoun tribes at Al-Hamdan airport in Albuqmal city. Another meeting followed by Shahnaz Fakoush Member of State Leadership in Al Baath Party with the two tribes in Albuqmal where some of the Sheikhs of the two clans were against the use of security forces the power against demonstrators, and called for the cancel article 8 of Syrian Constitution⁴⁸, headed by Raja Daham al-Dandal AlHasson tribe, but the regime forces in Al-Bukhmal ignored these demands and armed some Al Jarrah branch from Al Dameem tribe⁴⁹, who faced demonstrations against the Assad regime in the city⁵⁰ with some members of Al Mushahada tribe, Firas Aldandal from Alhasson tribe against the demonstrators also. Some protesters responded to these attempts by raising slogans during one of the demonstrations, calling on the tribesmen in general to solidarity and to forget tribal affiliations, and trying to attract many clan members and continuing to participate in the anti-regime demonstrations, ignoring the pressure exerted on them by the dignitaries not paying any attention to reforms, and they continued demonstrations beyond Shiekhs and tribal affiliations⁵¹.

The increase number of tribesmen involved in the protests, and the failure of Sheikhs and tribal elders to contain/stop the rebellion of their tribes, led to the use of the Assad regime for violence against demonstrators - which he was keen not to use in the tribal area, not to mention the torture and humiliation suffered by members of clans

⁴⁷ <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Tb0mej1phJU>

⁴⁸ The eighth article states: Al Baath Party is the leading party of the state and the society.

⁴⁹ Interview with three members and all of them confirmed this incident.

⁵⁰ Interview with two protestors from Al Boukmal city who participated in the demonstrations on February 22nd and April 14th 2011

⁵¹ <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=wmlBblYO1DQ>

detained by the authorities. The killing of the first martyr in Deir Ezzor⁵² and a number of his mourners in his funeral⁵³ with killing of a number of other demonstrators participating in his funeral had a decisive impact on changing the opinion of many members of the tribes. This direct and indirect violence is the main turning point for the involvement of many Clans sons in the Syrian revolution, and after this change, Syrian opposition forces quickly exploited it to motivate and attract tribes in Syria in general to stand against the Assad regime by calling the one demonstration in the tribes names as (Friday of the tribes) on the demonstrations on 10/06/2011, without realizing what the structural changes that these social structures, which no longer move according to the traditional perception of them.

Security forces withdrawal from confronting the demonstrations after these incidents, led to the increasing of tribesmen participation in the demonstrations against the Assad regime, and some of the clan rebels held meetings with tribal leaders and Sheikhs in Deir Ezzor province⁵⁴ to coordinate with them to address the attacks of the security services and try to attract them, to attract them to take positive attitude towards the revolution to meet rebels/people demands, contrarily meetings done by Assad loyalist and supports, such as the meeting called by "Mehdi al-Jower" to announce the support of the meeting of the Assad regime, and the last of these meetings, the meeting of "Moyleh village where the revolutionaries tried to mobilize Shiekhs and tribal elders to confront Assad army on the outskirts of Deir Ezzor in preparation for attacking the city⁵⁵.

The failure of all attempts to stop tribes coup against the Assad regime, this pushed Assad to engage the army to control the cities and the points of protest against him in the province, and to justify the military interference against the demonstrators in Deir Ezzor in front of public opinion, Assad regime army relied on some tribal leaders who appeared at official media channels demanding regime army to enter Deir Ezour city, towns and villages to end the chaos and restore security and stability there, according to their claims⁵⁶. They also promoted the Assad regime's narration that the demonstrations are only riots/disturbance and sabotage⁵⁷.

⁵² Mouaz Al Rakkadh, killed by the bullets of Syrian security in Deir Ezzor city on June 3rd 2011.

⁵³ Including Abdulmounem Al Habshan and Omar Kharaba.

⁵⁴ <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=lu7uG4QTmOQ>

⁵⁵ <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=I0LsVoGsPlc>

<https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=4GGCZjxidzY>

⁵⁶ <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=lxH7LCgse8o>

<https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=V5DginfuSLA>

⁵⁷ <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=tizYLNy0Zrs>

Sheikhs attitudes in Dier Azzour:

Since the beginning of the Syrian revolution in Deir Ezzor province, the majority of the tribal sheikhs had different attitudes by either supporting Assad regime (Pro-Assad) or supporting Syrian revolution, exceptionally the Shiekh of Bakara tribe, Nawaf Ragheb al-Bashir, and Albourahma Shiekh Rehman Kwan Aljabara⁵⁸, Albakeer sheikh Abdulaziz Sulieman Alhamada⁵⁹ who participated in some demonstrations in their areas, such as Sheikh Rahiman Kwan al-Jabara and Nawaf Ragheb al-Bashir⁵⁹, who was arrested by the security services of the Assad regime in July 2011, released in October 2011.

There were different attitudes in Shiekh's houses reflecting the internal rivalry among its members. The most prominent of these were the tribes of Al Bukamil, Al-Bakara, Al-Buhasan, Al-Hassoun and Al-Qar'an. While there are sheikhs take positive attitudes with revolution as Nawaf Ragheb Albashir/Albakara tribe leader, Fahd & Sawood Faisal Alnajrs from Albouhasan clan, Al-Amir Al-Dandal, Al-Hassoun clan, whose residence in Qatar, Daham and Dham Al-Manadi, were prominent members of the Qar'an clan.

While Safok Faisal Al-Najrs, /Albouhasan leader, "Hajim As'ad al-Bashir", "Najem Abdullah al-Salman", "Bakara" clan, "Ayman Daham al-Dandal / Shaykh al-Hasun clan" and his brother "Raja al-Dandal" "The tribes of Qar'an, took neutral attitude and maintained a balance of relations between their rebellious clans and the Assad regime, while Fawaz Ragheb al-Bashir, the Bakara tribe, Dhib al-Najrs, the Buhsin clan and Sattam the Al-Dandal / Al-Hassoun clan, support Assad regime. There were sharp disagreements between some members of Al-Busaraya and Al-Dimaem⁶⁰, who called for neutrality, refusing to take any public position on any of the parties. But Faisal al-Fayyad, the tribe sheikh Al-Busraya, and Kamal Naji al-Jarrah, Al-Daimy clan leader, who decided to stand by the Assad regime,

In Al Bokamel tribe there were different attitudes as the following: "Khalil Abboud Hafli / Sheikh Alkaidat tribe," which took a middle attitude, while "Abdul Aziz Al-Hafel / Bokamel clan" to the Assad regime clearly, and continued coordination with local authorities in Deir Ezzor until he was assassinated in mid-May 2012 on the road between Deir Ezzor-Hasaka during his return to his village, "Muileh" and Ja'far al-Tayyar forces were accused of killing him after claimed responsibility for the incident⁶¹, while

⁵⁸ https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=nTWV_CTZgpw

⁵⁹ <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=3kkUdY9W5Xc>

⁶⁰ <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=VVGQszsdX78>

⁶¹ https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Ro2d-JPQ_N8

the attitude of Jamil Alrashid Alhafal Alboukamel tribe was blurry, after appearing through a telephone conversation on I" Wesal "channel announcing the stand to revolution⁶².

He returned and met with Bashar al-Assad, accompanied by a delegation of "civil delegation of Deir Ezzor⁶³. He returned and met again with a number of dignitaries and sheikhs and Almowelh village rebels of the villages before the Assad army invading the village, while Rami Shaher al-Dush from the elders from Shahil "clan Albokamel tribe aligned to the Syrian revolution early.

These attitudes reflect the cracks within the houses of the Sheikhs, on the one hand, and the competition for the status of the members through the opposite alignments within the same house of the Sheikh and the motives of its members, noting that tribal sheikhs who sided with the Syrian revolution against the Assad regime, are marginalized by the regime authorities, but this can not be seen as their only motive for attitude towards the Syrian revolution. Some tribal sheikhs who hold middle attitude about the events, although some members of the tribes justify them as the traditional task and role of tribal sheikhs in order to serve their clan members at various parties. However, these attitudes are not without opportunism in dealing with events, waiting for the opportunity which are suitable to line up against or with the revolution according to the situation. As for the elders and tribal leaders who are aligned with the Assad regime, they are often seeking greater status, as was the case with the Assad regime during the events of the 1980s. They thought that Assad will regain control of the situation. The only thing that the rebels have benefited from the tribal sheikhs and their leaders is the release of some of the prisoners from the clans involved in the revolution in the local security services.

In general, these events have important implications, reflecting the nature of the social structure in the villages of Deir Ezzor, and the division and concentration in which tribal structures have reached, in which the socio-economic disparities and disparities have been clearly manifested at the level of individuals and groups; Traditional and social actors associated with the organs of the system and the members of their clans, and vertically between the sheikhs and tribal chiefs on the one hand, and within the clans and thighs and even families on the other, and because the tribal structure cracked and socially and economically divided the tribes have not taken a unified political attitude, either by lining up with the Syrian revolution or by supporting Assad regime, but the

⁶² . <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=R2cDZdl41tw>

⁶³ <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=4zr8SSbZHsU>

involvement of the tribesmen in the protests against the Assad regime were individual decisions that were not subject to the influence of the traditional tribal leaders. In fact, the attitude of some tribal sheikhs and their pro-Assad regime has played a role in a reaction that led to the involvement of quite a few tribesmen in the protests. Although most members of the tribes suffer from the same economic, social and political conditions, many of them waited for opportunity that would force them to make the final decision to stand up against the Assad regime, the abstract violence used against them. This explains the psychological behavior of the tribes and the conceptual role and revenge in determining their options and bias in defending their dignity. In this way, the political, and social divisions among the clans, leaders, traditional dignitaries and social actors have been divided between opposition, supporter and neutral. These political divisions have divided social ties within clans, subgroups and groups, adding a new division to the previous divisions in civil society.

- Revolutionary groups formation in rural areas:

After invading Deir Ezzor by the Assad army, especially the cities of Deir Ezzor, al-Mayadin, al-Buqamal Muhsin, Qawriyah, al-Basira and al-Ashara, committing more killings and arrests of rebellious tribesmen, led the peaceful revolutionary activity to move to Deir Azzour city and villages and attracting more members of the clans against the Assad regime. They raise the banner of protests against the Assad regime for more than 6 months, since countryside is considered an appropriate and safe environment to hide and operate more freely than cities. The demonstration areas were concentrated in towns and villages of Hajin, Qouriya, Granij, Kashkiyya, Abu Hamam, al-Jaradi, Subikhan, Abu Hardub, Bolil, Bu'ammam, Map, Muhsin, and Shuhail.

The difficulty of the Assad regime's security services reaching to the depth of the rural areas in Deir Azzour city has provided a good circumstance of protection for tribe's men who parted from Assad army, these areas also provided an appropriate atmosphere for protesting and demonstrating against the regime in their areas. The financial support from members of expatriate tribe's men and Gulf civil charities provided the necessary tools for the independence of the choices of the rebels from each region and easy movement. This led to the emergence of socio-political solidarity among the tribesmen within each village and town, forming one unity within each region. Although these groups are associated with tribal relations, but the basis of their composition is based initially on the political solidarity of the injustice of individuals. These groups have increased which were largely transformed into military actions,

facilitated the presence of small and medium⁶⁴ arms whether in confronting Asas attacks or attacking Asad military points in those areas.

The majority of the people agreed solidarity with the Free Syrian Army groups formed within their regions during military actions against the Assad army and the security centers in the rural areas, and attracted more members of the tribes in their areas and a number of dissidents from Asad army, but the absence of coordination among the Free Army groups which remained linked to their areas because of the difficulty of moving between the areas of the province has led to the enhancement of the regional character, additionally, it has contributed to the violence of the Assad army, which attacked the rebel areas in towns and villages of Mohsin, Qouriya, Bou'ammam, Ghareeb and Kharita killed a number of rebel dissidents and civilians who organized free army, these incidents by regime led to strengthening the idea of armed resistance among tribesmen, these groups took the form of military factions bearing their local regional character, then military uprising actions created another division that has hit the revolutionary groups formed within the various tribal areas because of the disagreement between the priority of military action or continuation in peaceful demonstrations.

Sixthly: Tribes men in the midst of the military / religious escalation:

Military actions began to escalate during the second half of 2012 in the face of the decline of civilian activists who were forced to deal with the consequences of the transition to military action, the most important of which is the administration of the areas, the provision of relief and some services and the establishment of medical and ambulatory points. In fact, the transition to armed resistance increased attraction among revolutionary military groups and the revolutionary civil stratum, which was subjected to subjugation and the abolition of other times by some factions. By the end of 2012, the Free Army factions took control of vast areas in Deir Ezzor governorate, and began to manage their areas separately in one time, leaving it for local councils formed of people from towns and villages in the province, The recession of state authority provided a space of freedom for tribe's men who are not involved in military actions, they increased their presence in various forms through their participation in the formation of local councils, humanitarian associations, centers and civil organizations, and carried out many social and cultural activities in their areas specifically in Muhsin, Qouriya and Al-Ashara. But on the other hand, the government recession from large areas in all Deir Ezzor governorate grew deep anxiety among

⁶⁴ It is normal that tribesmen have small arms . it is increased following the war on Iraq in 2003.

tribesmen by emerging new armed factions which is not linked to armed resistance against Assad regime, but emerged to protect themselves. These armed groups with some factions of the Free Army controlled institutions and resources especially oil wells in their regions in the province in Feb-2013, armament and competition between them increased for controlling resources, which contributed to the withdrawal of many Free Army factions to their tribal areas, hence, tribal disputes started to emerge between these factions and formations with progress in the war, as well as the multiplicity of local military authorities and competition between them, and the escalation of tribal military groups and social components that increased from their oil incomes, which led these groups to become more fanatic to sub-clan affiliations of varying intensity. They are now more involved economy and their presence in the midst of an armed clan contributed to their closure of these tribal-regional identities due to the disruption of the general framework of the tribe and clan. These tribal ideologies are not based on any ideology, but are carried within the pattern of predecessors' religiosity⁶⁵, which has escalated in the region as the war progressed. This escalation has contributed to two overlapping objectives: **the first**, the need for religion as a combat doctrine, Certification as a religious concept and value, and inspire the fighters a great deal of willingness to make sacrifices. It also grew in reaction to the brutal repression and unlimited violence of the Assad regime and the practices of its sectarian army elements, which led to an angry reaction reflected the community culture, where religion constitutes the society ideology, also rooted of revenge on broad slice⁶⁶ of society (2).

The second, considered psychologically need, where religion gives the human metaphysical reassurance in the face of daily death, a refuge that gives a full explanation of life in front of the inability of local culture to provide convincing justification for the accelerated events in the reality of the pension. Where retroactivism/Salafia doctrine is promoted as a defensive priority to challenges that man cannot bear, and clearly stands out as a means of protection through self-relinquishment and a return to the past. **The third**, contributed to the rise of retroactivism/Salafi/jihadist doctrine style⁶⁷, the presence of the Al Nusra / Al-Qaeda branch" in the region, as this doctrine became more increased through using it by the military factions in the region as a tool to compete in the control and management of the region and the investment of its resources, and the networks of local and regional retroactive doctrine

⁶⁵ Religion has cultural and social dimension in Deir Ezzor communities.

⁶⁶ Mustafa, Faissal, Mohammad, "The Escalation of Jabhat Al Nusra and Disability of the Revolution", Al Jumhureya, February 2013.

⁶⁷ Hijazi, Mustafa, Social Undevelopment, 2005

support⁶⁸, led to intervention to intensify the manifestations of Salafi-style jihad as an extension of those parties, as the majority of the factions of the Free Army and tribal military formations used this form of religion, although it is outwardly.

Generally, the presence of religion, in its retroactive style in particular, which is based on tendencies, as an intellectual and cognitive manifestation of the identity crisis of the civil society, which was subjected to violent shocks that damaged its social structure and cracked it, and in the absence of any ideological basis or political legacy, in addition to losing patriotic ID, religion has become an appropriate expression of essence, and represents the collective consciousness of the shattered civil society as an accomplished identity also the societies in the crisis phase change their value framework to violent problems and tremors, conscience appear in surface in all its different meanings in the name of creed, heritage or the past emerges in a mythical form.

The civil society in the governorate of Deir Ezzorin general began to live more independently than when it was under the authority of Assad regime, and re-produced the conditions of its social and economic life away from any external institutional intervention, but by changing the form of economic activity in the tribal area, As well as the importation and smuggling of uncontrolled goods and materials, which negatively impacted the agricultural and livestock activities, which is characteristic of the economy of that region. Consequently, the percentage of cultivated land has decreased, and livestock have been depleted, so most of the tribal military fractios have taken refuge in their social environments depending on external financial support, control of trade routes and smuggling, and oil resources in their regions. They have tended their interests and businesses and run their wars according to sources of funding away from their goals. This has created a social injustice that is uneven in its intensity in the social environments that have been left in turn by these factions and military formations to face changes in their deteriorating economic and humanitarian conditions.

1- The present / absent clan:

With the continuation of the war, the tribes formed networks of safety and social solidarity for their children, especially those who were displaced from the cities to their areas, and even to those who had no cities in tribal areas. The clan structure merges became the dominant center of the clan structure, forcing the traditional leaders of the clans to step down from the public scene in return for the emergence of social-military class actors, with individual tendencies, and seeking to establish new legitimacy and

⁶⁸ Muslim Brotherhood, Organization of Prserving Islamic Heritage, Gulf-based Islamic Groups

gains, making them contending within the same region / clan, and contradicting their alliances outside. These new actors, very few of them which are from hierarchy of the tribal sheikh, many of them from outside, some of what are poor and marginalized in their clans. This coup in the tribal structure did not have the new potentials and expertise needed to reshape it and organize it in a social, but took shape by / economical and military shape, which led to the creation of great disparity and rivalry between individuals and groups within the same clan, and widening circle of conflict, which reflect crisis of social balance within them because of the lack of coordination that the clan is in a turbulent military environment, competitiveness for control over resources, in addition to the clan's transformation, at the very least, into a safety net and social solidarity for its displaced children, which has maintained a conscious social structure and subsistence in the absence of the state and the law, though ineffective, have in turn somehow preserved their social And military presence in their new capacities in exchange for other tribal clans.

Most tribes shiekhs remained in their areas without any interference or influence on the events, except for Al Dameem clan elders who made a decision to protect the clan areas, and warned the clan members not to take part in military actions against the Assad regime⁶⁹, but this did not prevent some members of the clan from participating individually with revolutionary military factions, nor the dissenting of colonel Nawaf Al-Faris" from the Assad regime in July 2012⁷⁰ any change of attitudes in the House of tribe Sheikhs who maintained their allegiance with Assad regime. Raja al-Dandal Al-Hasun clan leader, tried to establish relations with some military factions in the city of "Albuqmal" but was rejected by the leaders of these factions, while "Safuk al-Najrs Al Buhasan clan Sheikh moved to Asad controlled areas, while Khalil Aboud al-Hafel Alakidat tribe leader and Muhanna al-Fayadh Abusaraya tribe to move between Assad and ergime controlled areas.

The social and symbolic status of the tribal sheikhs among the members of their clans contributed to the fact that the revolutionaries did not face them while they were traveling and residing in their areas of control, contrarily, the tribal fanatic among the tribesmen clearly appeared in the protection of their clan leaders. And the most prominent example of what happened to Muhanna al-Fayyad, the sheikh of al-Busariya, a pro-Assad regime who was arrested for two times, the first during his return from Damascus where he was arrested by members of the Free Army near Al Shula village, the second time he was arrested from his home in Shmitia village by Ahrar Al Sham village because of the shooting at a patrol of them as they passed through the town⁷¹, Despite the contribution of Albuzam and Alshlash members in the arrests, but "Busraia

⁶⁹ Interviews with tribe members and they all confirmed this incident

⁷⁰ <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=wLmCMnb8Pvk>

⁷¹ <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=j3PexlSGOmW>

clan were keen to release him and ensure that he will not get any harm. Referring to clan members associated with Assad regime, some of them moved to Assad controlled areas for fearing from rebels revenge, while tribal spread provided protection to the others.

2-The Dynamics of military divisions and alliances:

Despite the predominance of revolutionary and regional names, and the elimination of tribal names on most of the factions of the Free Army and some military formations tribes, the alliances and behavior of individuals and groups within them were not separate from the tribal environment to which they belong, which is often the structure of the subconscious continent in the depths of individuals. And the tribal affiliation alone is the engine of the behavior of clan members, as the relations of power and balance in the countryside of the province, and seek to gain material and control of resources or parts of it in addition external financing which affected on behavior of groups and individuals and clan social characteristics emerged, and the cause of multiple splits of many military factions at the individual or group level; for example, the most of these forces were subject to splits/dissidents on the basis of seeking gains material and leadership competition. Ja'far al-Tayyar faction which was led by "Salim al-Khalid who are from Albokml clan who come from several battalions and from different tribal areas in the province⁷², and received support from the Gulf communities⁷³ and from military council in the eastern region, also from Deir Ezzor rebels, then relied on selling oil from Alward oilwell⁷⁴. The brigade/faction witnessed several splits, most notably the splitting of the "Al-Ikhlas brigade, they are mostly from Shuhail village/Bukamil clan, due to disagreements over the distribution of the revenues of the oil wells controlled by Shuhail village people, AlHamza and AlShuaitat rebels battalions split from the brigade because they did not accept the leadership to be for a member from AlBukamil clan and to obtain greater allocations of oil revenues from the oil field, at the end, the remaining part of Ja'far al-Tayyar brigade allied with Islam Army to fight the "Islamic state".

Most cracked forces based on the rivalry of individuals, their different choices and alliances according to their sub-clan affiliations and the influence of religious ideology is Al Qaqaa Brigade⁷⁵, which is a revolutionary military force in Qouriya town, most members from Al Qar'an clan, led by Ali Matar⁷⁶ from Albuwad thigh, the military commander is Obeida Ahmad from Al-Hamad Muhammad branch⁷⁷ which is considered the largest branch in the town, the brigade finally split after his alliance

⁷² It was established in January 23rd 2012 and included the groups of Al Hamza, Abo Obieda bin Al Jarrah, Zeid bin Haretha, Ussoud Al Jazeera wa Furat, And Al Hareth.

⁷³ Throughout Abdultawab Al Rodan, a religion man from Abo Hamam village who reside in Kuwait.

⁷⁴ One of the biggest oil wells in Deir Ezzor

⁷⁵ It was established in March 21st 2012.

⁷⁶ He was assassinated by unknown people in April 10th 2013. Then, some information indicated that IS killed him.

⁷⁷ He was killed by IS group

with Ahfad Alraswol gathering⁷⁸ under the name of "Qaqaa squadron, led to the split its commander "Obaidah al-Ahmad" because of differences on the nature of the coalition and the existence of "Saddam Aljamal" in it and established "Islamic Brigades of the Euphrates" that joined the "Al Nusra Front." The second split took place after the assassination of its leader, Ali Matar, so his brother, Mahmoud Matar, took command. The brigade was divided into three factions: The Qaqaaa, Qaqaa 112, because of the competition for leadership and representation of the military faction Islamic Qaqaa faction led by" Mahmoud Matar who joined Islamic State ".

While military brigades in the eastern region which is linked to the Free Army, which was established to unify the provided support and to organize military action against the Assad regime, it was confined to the Free Army battalions in the Mohssen district after removing the majority of the Free Army factions and the military forces in the province denied their link to with Military council Because of the favourism in the distribution of support and the allocation of the Free Army battalions in the town of "Muhasan⁷⁹" it cannot be denied also the completion inside the council between dissident officers from the army and military and civilian commanders from AlBukhabur" to lead the military action in the " Muhsin "and Deir Ezzor , The rivalry within the military council was not based on the Bukhabur clan, but on individual choices and personal goals. Indeed, clan sensitivities due to the existence of the military council in the town of Muhsin / Bukhabur clan also played a role in the removal of recognition by many Free army factions from the rest of the tribes in the province in general.

Most prominent military factions that have been aparted on the basis of sub-clan identities are the Qadisiyah Army in the area of al-Basayra, led by Ibrahim al-Attiyah- Abu Bakr / Al-Buqair clan. He is a member of the al-Bakir clan and the Bakara tribe, Dhi Qar Brigade splited from him whose majority of its members from the tribe of "Abed / tribe" Bakara led by Hamad Mohammed, "and all elements of the tribe," Bakara ", splits according to tribal lines, The leadership of the "martyrs of Badr" led by Lieutenant "Thamer Shehata" to represent the branch "Alburab", and the secret of " Aour "led by" Hussein Al-Abdullah⁸⁰ to represent the branch," Al-Hamad Al-Abed ", and the brigade," Knights of the Caliphate, "the majority of the elements of the thigh," Abdul Jader ", but his commander," Amer Bashir⁸¹ from the branch of Albuarab.

The military factions in the Shu'aytat clan were the clearest example of the competing military forces since its formation on the basis of sub-tribal identities in their regions as Ibn al-Qayyim/retroactive Brigade and Ahfad Aisha Battalion led by Khalid al-Ahmad and Muhammad al-kudor whose most members from Garanich village. And Alummah army led by "Abu Saif al-Shu'aiti⁸², Al Hamzah brigade led by "Mahidi Ja'ilah / Abu Saleh

⁷⁸ A group of more than 40 factions. It received direct support from Qatari government.

⁷⁹ It includes Muhasan, Bouamer, and Al Mraeya

⁸⁰ One of the Baqqara tribe members was working in Lebanon before revolution

⁸¹ Former employee in oil fields

⁸² Mohammad Hussien Al Ghadeer from Al Kushkeya village.

Shuaitat ⁸³, the majority of the elements from "Abu Hamam village," As the people of these two villages have significant differences on land holdings, which resulted revenge in the past. These factions were supported by various sources, such as the Military Council in the Eastern Province in a limited way, and from Saudi civil groups, and the largest support whose main source of funding is the oil wells in their areas from Tanq" oil field, these forces were major founder of the Shura Council of the Eastern Mujahideen⁸⁴.

There are military factions that have been formed in their areas and have over time adopted their sub-clan identities, such as the Al-Ahwaz Brigade⁸⁵ led by First Lieutenant Ismael Al-Abdullah / Abu Ishaq, most of whom are from the Al-Kubaisa / The movement of "Ahrar al-Sham" and fought the organization of the "Islamic state", and the Brigades, "Abdullah bin Zubair," which consists of several combat battalions in the town, "Khasham" and most of the elements of the foot of "Annabza / clan Albkair." In addition to the military factions in the area of the "Busraia" clan, such as the "Tariq ibn Ziyad" Brigade led by Ibrahim al-Taha⁸⁶, and the brigade of the martyr Mu'adh al-Rikadh led by Muhammad al-Salih⁸⁷. Most of them are from the Boshai'b's thigh, Their cousins from the branch of "Album Ahmed" in the town of "Bqrc" were joined to the movement "Ahrar Al Sham". In the area of the Bukamal clan, the Mu'ata Brigade⁸⁸ was led by Saddam al-Nawfal⁸⁹, who was formed in the town of Shuhair from the Buqamil tribe and allied with the Nusra Front in the beginning. On the distribution of oil resources in the region There are also some prominent military forces in their regions, which was a military alliance of various tribesmen, was the main engine in their alliances is the differences of individuals on the leadership and the quest to form larger military factions to provide protection and support, And the group ", which consists of military factions splitting from the Front of Authenticity and Development⁹⁰ due to differences over the on leadership and funding, with independent military factions, led by Lieutenant "Abu Mountaser," and was receiving support from the Saudi civil groups.

The most diverse military forces, and a coalition and coordination with the other factions and military formations in the governorate of Deir Ezzor and beyond, is the banner of "Bashaer al-Nasr"⁹¹, led by "Talas al-Salama⁹²". It includes a diverse mix of members of the Al-Azhar clan, The Revolutionary Military Council, and then affiliated with the Front for Authenticity and Development, which receives support from the

⁸³ He was in Kuwait before the revolution

⁸⁴ A military alliance for fighting IS.

⁸⁵ It was established in April 2012.

⁸⁶ Salafist and former detainee in Sednaya prison.

⁸⁷ Former employee in RODCO company

⁸⁸ It was established in May 5th 2012.

⁸⁹ He was killed in a fight against Jabhat Al Nusra in Al Masrab village.

⁹⁰ It was established in October 2013 by Ahl al Athar, Ussoud Al Sunna,Ahl Al Raya, And Al Fateh.

⁹¹ It was established in March 2012 in Al Ashar town

⁹² He is from Al Ashara town, and he used to work in trading before the revolution.

Society for the Preservation of the Islamic Heritage by Khalid al-Hammad⁹³. He fought against the Assad regime and took part in the fighting against the PYD forces in rural areas. Hasaka, and fought against the organization of the "Islamic state".

3- Sons of the Clans and Al-Qaeda Organization Jabhat Al Nusra:

Many activists confirm that al-Qaeda's first presence in Deir Ezzor was in the villages of "Sheheil, Gharibeh, and Aikidat" by some members of the region: the mainly Bukulan tribes who fought in Iraq in 2003, Many members of the village in Saudi Arabia have ties with Salafist jihadist groups, headed by "Mahmoud al-Hajar / Abu Dajana Shahil" and joined by members of the clan who were released from the Sednaya prison in mid-2011. "jabhat al nusra" initially formed as secret cells in those villages, and appeared openly after the liberation of the majority Deir Ezzor was controlled by the Assad army and its main presence was concentrated in the village of Shuhair. jabhat al nusra, through its powerful clans, has worked to establish alliances with some tribesmen in the region using religious ideology. Despite its influential leaders, headed by Abu Mariah al-Qahtani⁹⁴, to renounce tribalism and described it as ignorant. However, the "jabhat al nusra" maintained tribal balances in the region and benefited from the network of relations provided by the tribes to infiltrate and spread. , Where each group consists of members of the family Or in her area only.

Through the interviews with many members of the clans, it appears that embracing the "jabhat al nusra" by some members of the "Bukamil" tribe in the village of "Shehail"⁹⁵ in particular is a mutual employment of the parties. For the "jabhat al nusra" we think it was probably an option By the leaders of the organization "Al Qaeda" that the clan "Albokml" represents a clan symbolized at the level of the tribe, "Akidat", to indicate the nature of docking within the "jabhat al nusra" and ensure the continuation and expansion. As for the Boukamel clan, it is likely that the desire of members of the Bukamel clan to regain their authority and leadership over the tribes of the Akeidat tribe is one of the main motives for embracing the "jabhat al nusra" and because they are outside the traditional hierarchy of the Bokmil / jabhat al nusra has a tribal character in the region, as it became known to the people of the region as the Bukhmal Front, despite the presence of members of other tribes such as Burmah, Shuwayt, Busraia, Qar'an , The Bukharan, Bakkara "within its ranks.

4- Control of resources and their employment:

Some tribesmen, factions and tribal military formations controlled the oil wells according to their geographic distribution areas, justified by the fact that they were

⁹³ The secretariat of the Front in Syria.

⁹⁴ Muyasar bin Ali Al Jubouri Al Qahtani from Hrara in Iraq. One of the founders of Jabhat Al Nusra in Syria. He was the top Sharee and the Amir of the eastern area.

⁹⁵ It is considered as the stronghold of Jabhat Al Nusra in Syria at that time.

within their territory, as well as compensating them for years of depriving them of the proceeds of these wealth over the decades of the rule of the Baath regime and the Assad regime. To finance its military action against the regime.

Where the control of the military factions of the tribe of "Shoa'aitat" the field of "tink" oil located in the territory of the clan in the Badia, while some members of the tribe "Qar'an" control of some wells in its territory, as well as some members of the "Albkarah" With the members of the clan "Albokamel" control of the plant, "Conoco gas", while some of the people of the town, "Khasham" and its military factions from the thigh, "Annabza" of the tribe "Albkir" on the field, "Conoco" oil, On some of the oil wells near my village: Shehail, Hreiki "in addition to their control of the field," Omar "oil⁹⁶ with the help of Japhet Alnusra And some of the factions of the Free Army took control of the "Bakara" tribe on the "Malha" well in their areas, while some of the sons of the "famous" tribe took control of the oil field "Dero" The Al-Ahwaz Brigade of the Al-Anabzeh / Al-Bakeer tribe took control of the grain silos in the (7) km area, The "Japhet Alnusra" controlled the grain silos in the 10 km area and the "Hawayj al-Bomsa" silos, in addition to its control of the mill in the governorate.

There were many differences between the tribesmen about the sharing of resources, whether inside the armed tribal formations or the military factions, or among the people, especially in the villages and towns of the Shu'aytah clan. In the town of Khasham, the al-Anabzeh / Al-Bakir clan, Fighting among members of clans, causing many of the dead.

The clan members and some factions and tribal military formations have taken control of their new gains by further arming and the involvement of a number of clan members to protect the wells, especially after the clear intentions of the Japhet Alnusrah to control all the oil fields in the province through the Central Shari'a Council Oil, and the fair distribution of revenues on military actions, services and relief, and this is why we have bloody confrontations we will see later. While some tribes adopted the principle of allocating proceeds to the members of the clan alternately according to the number of members of the single thigh, including the clan of "Qar'an", and part of the "Alqbisp" of the clan "Albkir", and part of the tribe, "Shuait," while some of the factions of the Free Army in the tribe the "Albakara" a large part of the resources to support battalions and some civil works through many local councils in their regions.

VII: conflict clan in the interruption surrounding:

- *Conflict clan dynamics:*

The first test of the clan in the war was between the "Nusra Front" and some of the sons of the "Al Assaf / Al Busraia" tribe in the village of Al Mesrab in the western suburb of Deir Ezzor because of the killing of the Amir⁹⁷ of the Nusra Front and the capture of

⁹⁶ The biggest fields in Deir Ezzor in terms of production. Jabhat Al Nusrah captured it after driving IS group out of it and secured the regime to withdraw to Al Hasaka governorate.

⁹⁷ <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=RVNW1nv8-lc>

two other elements by an armed faction and some villagers "Almsrab" from the branch "Asaf" against the backdrop of his claim to recover the tank, "fuel" stolen by members of an armed faction of the village⁹⁸ and a number of members of the tribe "Albosbe" from the town of "adoption".

This incident has other accumulated background that may explain the arrival of the order to such degree of obstinacy, although it does not eliminate the causes of direct fighting. These dynamics are related in part to preventing the armed faction of the "Assaf" faction from entering the village and managing its mosques in coordination with Mokhtar The village loyal to the Assad regime, which was welcomed by many of the villagers, and on the other hand related to the killing of "Taha al-Yasin⁹⁹ from the thigh" Asaf "because of differences with the" Nusra Front ", which was allied with it, in addition to the sharp dispute that was close to exchange Fire between elements of the armed faction and Grate Brigade "Muta" village "Ahal / clan Albokamil" because of the theft of a truck loaded with flour refused some of the sons of the village "leaker" returned.

The "Nusra Front " mobilized its allies from the factions of the clan "Albu Kamel" and some factions of the clan "Bakara" to attack the village, and the intervention of the leaders of the tribe, "Alb Saraya" to resolve the dispute in the house of Sheikh "Muhanna Fayyad" village "Shamitiya", and all parties agreed not to protect (6) in return for the payment of 3 million SP from the branch of the "Assaf" Kadiya to the Front for the Nusra and release of the prisoners of the "Nusra Front" in the village of "Al-Mesrib", but this agreement was not completed when the princes insisted " Nusra "on an additional condition to enter the elements of the front to the village and the recording of a statement to explain what happened, met by a categorical rejection by the villagers, what Ed (10) days and resulted in the deaths of (36) from the "Nusra front" and its allies and (6) dead from the foot of "Assaf", all civilians, while the majority did not participate in the village of" Al Masrab" In the war alongside their children, neither the Free Army factions of the Bosraya clan did not participate in the fighting with their cousins. On the contrary, members of the village of Al-Busheib / Al-Busraiya and the Front of Nusra participated.

The majority of the people of the village of Al-Misarab and members of the Al-Busraia clan did not support their cousins from the branch of Asaf for moral reasons. This was confirmed by the statement of the elders of Al-Masrab and the Al-Busraia tribe¹⁰⁰, After the end of the clashes, the gunmen of the village of Al-Mesrab returned to the village around the village in coordination with the local authorities of the Assad regime in the province. After providing them with weapons through the village's Mukhtar, and cut off the road to the sons the village of "map" from the branch of "Bouchaib" and arrested

⁹⁸ Mouaz bin Jabal faction which was established following military actions against Assad regime.

⁹⁹ Leader of Ussoud Al Sunna which was affiliated to Jabhat Al Nusra.

¹⁰⁰ https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=39hJR4ngb_E

some of them, the sons of the branch "Albushaib" similarly to the intervention of some of the elders of the clan "Bosraia" to calm and release the detainees.

The "Assaf" armed men remained in their area and allied themselves with the Nusra Front and Ahrar al-Sham during their fight against the organization of the Islamic state, which shows the role of power balances in determining the conflicting options and alliances of that armed group.

- *Fighting between Bakkara with Tae clan:*

A small group of the "Tae" tribe lives in the village of "El Mellag" village in the western suburb of Deir Ezzor next to the villages of the "Bakara" tribe because of their relationship with the "Abd al-Jader's thigh." The fighting took place against the background of the killing of 3 members of the "Generators from the water pumping station in the village of "Mellaj carrot" in order to operate the pumping station in the village of "Hawayj al-Pomsa", according to the decision of the local council, where they objected to the people of the village "carrots Almilag" and prevent them from the transfer of generators, The two sides exchanged fire, and the members of the small "Bakara" clan were unable to cope with the growing crowds Of the sons of the clan "folding", making them sheltering inside the building water station, and the clashes resulted in the killing of three sons of the family of "Bakkara" They are the sons of brother Sheikh "Hajim al-Asaad al-Bashir," and deliberately militants clan "Collapse" representation of their bodies and cursing the free army factions. The reaction of members of the "Bakara" clan after burying their dead in the gathering of the people with the elements of the Free Army factions in front of the house of Sheikh "Hajim al-Assad al-Bashir," who was opposed to the attack on the village of "Mellaj carrot," but the sons of Sheikh "Nawaf Ragheb al-Bashir" (11) armed men from the village and captured 13 others, the intervention of the elders of the clan "Bakara" to solve the problem in the house of Sheikh "Hajim Asaad Bashir" and in the presence of Sheikh "Najm Abdullah Salman," and spent the assembly To release the prisoners of the tribe "Tee" in the Free Army factions of the clan "Bakara" and not take the blood of the dead from The parties.

2 - The emergence of sub-clan sensitivities:

The third cases of fighting were against the backdrop of a killing incident, but the reactions were carried out according to tribal sensitivities and the other during the revolution, the first concerns the differences on the Presence and land holdings among some members of my clan: "Buhsin and Qurans" members of the tribal alliance: "alliance of the third" The "Burmah" clan, the alliance formed to counter the encroachment of the clan "Albokml" on the three tribes in the territory of the desert. The second is due to its dynamics in 2011 after the Assad army invaded the town of Qouriya. The commercial auction in the area was transferred from the town of Qouriya to the town of Al-Ashara. The village was located on land owned by Al-Najrs. "An important resource was the transfer of all shops and accompanying activities outside

the town. The attempts of some of the residents of Qawariya, including the Qaqaa Brigade, failed to restore the commercial auction to their town. The killing of "Ali Matar" commander of the "Qaqaa" military brigade of the clan "Qar'an" in the city, "fields", an engine of tribal sensitivity of some members of the clan "Qar'an," who rushed to accuse "Saud Alngers" Despite the lack of evidence to indicate the perpetrators of the crime, but the restoration of the past is the one who was in control of the course of events, was kidnapped, "Saud al-Najrs" and detention in an unknown location, which led to tension between the members of the two tribes, "Qar'an" from the "Al-Manadi, the Serail" led to calm the situation and agreed to hand over "Saud Al-Najrs" to the body The "brother of the assassin" Ali Matar "attacked the town of" Al-Ashra "and bombarded with heavy weapons¹⁰¹, resulting in a number of deaths, and entered the" front " Nusra "and some factions of the Free Army and some dignitaries in the region to stop the attack and calm the situation. The previous incidents reflect the dynamics on which the Bosraya, the Bakara and the Qar'an tribes have taken their positions during the conflicts. Although there is an internal rivalry between the clan clans loaded with old clan clans, the attitude of external conflict in all cases was This is explained by the emergence of sub-clan and even family identities that contributed to the members of the Bosraya family in general and the sons of the Assaf tribe in particular, the support of their cousins as thieves and bandits on the one hand, and the fact that the other party in the conflict It includes a coalition of tribal group led by the Front Nasra, on the other hand, is an alliance not before the children of the village of Al-Mesrab, facing it alone. The attitude of the Bakara tribe reflects the role of the tribal balances on the general level in mobilizing some members of the Al-Bakara clan who are different and competing against A small part of the tribe of "Ti" in the vicinity of their areas, seeking revenge and rehabilitation after the assault on the members of the house of Sheikh in the tribe, and some members of the clan, "Qaran", their position is specific and branch more against members of the family of cousins of the " Because of tribal sensitivities related to the sheikh and the exclusion and the local competition with the sons of a family Of "Faisal Alngers".

3-	Resourcees	Conflict:
<p>The oil wells in the province of Deir al-Sour were a new resource competed by tribesmen and tribal military formations and some military factions. Tribes were competing with each other on the one hand and among their thighs on the other hand, land holdings in the Bada, Is fertile for livestock in the spring, and although this competition no longer exists today, many of the differences resulting from the sharing of these holdings in the past are still unresolved, and the repercussions of these differences still affect in one way or another the attitudes of the tribesmen against each other overally as the shape of one of the dynamics of competition again after the control of tribal members and military formations tribal and military factions, some of</p>		

¹⁰¹ Some testimonies states that Al Nijris payed an amount of money to be released.

the oil resources that were as new holdings, and notes this competition most clearly in areas where oil wells without other fields spread.

The fight between my branches of "Mashhour and Al Hlami" in the tribe "Bakara":

The confrontations between my thighs: the "Mashhour and the criminal" of the tribe "Bakara" to control the field, "Dero" oil, the traditional form of tribal conflict in the past on land holdings and borders, in addition to the role of clan reprisal revenge in moving the conflict.

It is located in the oil field of Diru in the front of the lands of my village: Zghir Jazira, Al-Sa'awah, where he lives in the village of Al-Sa'wa. He is a resident of the village of Zghair Shamiya. Also live in the village of "Ali" and a section of the "Kasra", where the villages of the clan "slaves" surround the village, "Al-Sawa" on three sides. The residents of the village of Al-Sa'awah invested the oil wells located in the front of their land, as well as some wells located in the front of the land of the village of Zghir Shamia, after purchasing them from some of the sons of Al-Halami. They agreed with the Free Army factions to pay 1.5 million LS per day as a commission to meet well investment. Six months later, some of the sons of the "famous" branch had invested most of the wells in the oil field and increased their armament from the oil revenues during this period; 5 people from the village of Zghair Island attacked the branch of some of the sons of the branch The "famous" alone on the field and demanded the redistribution of oil revenues under the pretext of the existence of some wells within their land, and began to feed their relatives from the tribe of "slaves" of the people of my village: "Ali, Zghir Island" and "Kasra". Some of the members of the "slaves" clan from my village responded: "Zghir Shamia, Al Ali" and rejected the proposal of the Free Army factions to allocate part of the oil revenues for the benefit of the local councils in the two villages and insisted on handing over the oil wells located at the front of their lands. Of the sons of the branch "famous", which made some members of the clan "slaves" attacking the sons of the "famous" in the field of "Dero" and kill one of the workers from the branch "famous", intervened factions of the Free Army in coordination with Sheikh "Hajim Bashir" Salman "to break the clashes and work to solve the problem. Some of the members of the clan "slaves" in the village of "Ali" these events to fuel the conflict against the backdrop of an old vendetta with some children of the "famous", by shooting a car belonging to the children of the "famous" branch as they passed the outskirts of their village, which led to the escalation of tension between the families and the expansion of the circle of recruitment from both sides, some of the sons of the "famous" branch attacked my village: "Al-Ali, Zghair Island," who clashed in their respective areas. The clashes resulted in 8 deaths from the "famous" The tribe of "slaves". The Free Army factions intervened again in the area and the clashes were resolved and things remained pending until the organization of the "Islamic State" controlled the province.

Employing tribal sub-identities in ideological conflict:

The dispute between some of the members of the Bukamal clan and some of the sons of the "Al-Mushrif / Al-Bukhair" tribe within the Nusra Front, on the one hand, and the Nusra Front attempts to control the majority of the resources in the region and the dispute with a section of the Al-Anabzeh / In addition to the struggle between the "Nusra front" and the organization of the "Islamic state"; the most extreme test of the tribal affiliations, the emergence of sub-tribal tendencies inherent in the pursuit of personal and collective gains and status, and the role of clerical clans in moving and promoting these conflicts, not to mention That these conflicts were the clearest example of Hue Micro-clans behind religious ideology. The conflict began between Amer al-Rifaqan, who leads a group of sons of the al-Mushrif / Al-Bukhair tribe in the Nusra Front with some members of the Bukamal clan, who controlled the vast majority of the revenues of the Conoco gas plant. Between "Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi and Abu Muhammad al-Julani¹⁰²" the opportunity for the aspirations of "Amer al-Riffan" to obtain significant gains, and reinforced the role of the incitement exercised by "Abu Osama Iraqi"¹⁰³, "Amer al-Riffan" coup with a group of elements on behalf of Organization of the "Islamic State" within the "Nusra Front", and controlled the gas plant "Conoco" after besieging a group of Nasser "Nusra Front" inside, and paid them a huge sum of money after they refused to join their ranks, this coup made an opportunity for some members of the tribe "Albuazeldin" led by "Ahmed Obaid Aldham / Abu Dajana button" seeking a larger role is also to join the organization " Islamic State. "This alignment had a tribal background related to ancient tribal vengeance and disagreements over land holdings in the Badia between the two tribes of Albu-Ezzedeen and Bokamel. It is worth noting that Amer al-Riffadan and Ahmad al-Dham are descended from two socially marginalized families in their tribal surroundings.

"Amer al-Riffadan" from the village of "New Akidat", inhabited by the seat of "supervisor" the headquarters of the "Islamic State" polarizing some fighters from some members of the clan "Albkir" in general, and the thigh, "supervisor" in particular, was to split "Yousef al-Qazubir / Abu Dujana "The front of the victory" is a clear picture of how tribal sub-gangs moved within the same clan at the level of the thighs, families and individuals. This was manifested by the control of the organization of the "Islamic State" through Amer al-Rafdan on silos of 7 km Which was under the control of the brigade "Ahwaz" of their cousins from the branch "Annabaza", which made the elements of the brigade Ahwaz "killing two of the migrants in the" Islamic State "on a military Hawwadzhm near the village" Brehh ".

In the meantime, the "Nusra Front" formed a military alliance under the name of the "Central Shariah Committee", which sought to control the oil wells in the region on the pretext of organizing and distributing revenues¹⁰⁴, took control of the poor clan "Siyad" village in the village of "sugar" And some of the residents of the town of Khasham / al-

¹⁰² The disputes emerged following the declaring of Abo Bakr Al Baghdadi in april 2013.

¹⁰³ A member of shura council of Islamic State and close person to al Baghdadi.

¹⁰⁴ Jabhat Al Nusra made the wells under control of Liwa Mouta.

Anabaza and their military and clan factions agreed to hand over the Konoco oil field and redistribute the oil revenues according to the families' statistics, while the military factions and the people in the town of Al- "And village" Tayana "of the clan" Qaraan " And members of the village of "Abu Hardoub" of the clan "Burmah" and the military factions and the people of villages: "Kashkia, Granig, Abu Hamam" of the clan "Shuaitat", and some members of the tribe, "Shuit"; refused to hand over oil wells they control in their areas, Tribal, tribal, tribal, tribal, tribal, tribal, tribal, tribal, tribal, tribal, tribal, tribal, tribal, and tribal. The "Nusra front" overtook it.

Some of these agreements were not fixed because of the rivalry of military formations within the same thigh. This was manifested in the rebellion of one of the sons of the "Anabaza", who leads a military faction called the Jojo Army. While Abdullah Bin Zubayr / However, "Huwaidi al-Dabaa / Joujou" felt the loss of its huge gains, and contributed to the procrastination of the "Nusra front" by distributing the proceeds to the "Gogo" acts of sabotage of the gas line in the vicinity of Conoco gas plant repeatedly, "As they passed through the town of" Khasham ", the" Nusra Front "in turn responded to the attack on the" army of Jojo ", and bombed the town," Khasha "The commander of this attack was assigned to one of its members, Abdullah Ahmad al-Zaher / Abu al-Leith, from the branch of the Al-Kubaisa tribe, which was appointed by an emir of the region to carry out these tasks in order to ensure that the members of the al-Bakir clan were not raised and lined up Their cousins are from the "Annaba" clan. The attack resulted in the deaths of two civilians and the arrest of "Jojo / Huwaidi al-Dabaa" and handed him over to the "Central Shari'a Board" to be tried, despite the success of the "Nusra front" neutralizing the majority of the members of the family "Albkair", but this attack aroused the sons of the branch "Annabaza" Considered the attack to be a tribal background by some members of the clan "Albokml", which led to the abduction of elements of the "Front of victory" and negotiate with them for the release of "Jojo"¹⁰⁵, the intervention of dignitaries from the region to contain the dispute, and the release of detainees on both sides, The conditions are relatively.

The group of the "Islamic State", which became a significant force in that period, took advantage of the state of discontent towards the "Nusra front" because of that incident, and attacked the elements of the "Nusra front" in the field of "Conoco" oil and silos of the area of (10) Km and mill in agreement with Some of the elements within the "Front of victory" during the shift of guards, where they restricted the guards and expelled them outside the sites, what was the "Front of victory," but launched an attack on the group "Islamic State" to regain control of those sites, and re-ordered the leadership of the battles to " Abu al-Layth "to ensure that the members of the" Al-Baqeer "clan did not align with" Amer Al-Rafdan "and after two days of Al-Ma'ar The "Nusra Front" was unable to regain control of any of these locations. A car bomb exploded at a fuel market on the outskirts of the village of Al-Sabha, which is inhabited by some members of the Al-Kubaisa / Al-Bakeer clan. The result resulted in 18

¹⁰⁵ Huwaidi Al Dabe, from Khsham village. He established a military group under the title of Jojo Army.

civilians¹⁰⁶, From the branch of the "Al-Qubaisah / Al-Bakir clan", and it was promoted that the organization of the "Islamic State" is behind the bombing, which was aimed at the headquarters of the movement "Ahrar Cham" in the region, , Especially the children of the branch "Alkbisp", who came to retaliate against the group "Islamic State" and besieged them in the Ga factory And the Konuku oil field. In the meantime, elements of the Front of Nusra and its allies were regaining control of the grain silos in the areas of 7 and 10 km after the withdrawal of the elements of the Islamic State. Of the elements of the "Islamic State" of migrants in the area of (7) km. "Amer al-Riffadan" asked for help from "Ibrahim al-Attiyah / Abu Bakr," the commander of the brigade "Qadisiyah" and his cousins from the thigh, "Kubis", which intervened with some of the elders of the region and the siege of the elements of the organization, and facilitated their exit to the town, City of "Shaddadi" Southern countryside of Al - Hasakah. After taking control of all the sites, the "Front of victory" "Abu al-Leith" for the third time to the forefront of events through the bombing of the homes of the family, "Amer Refdan" in the village of "Jadeed Akidat"¹⁰⁷. And then took control of the "Nusra front" on the field, "Omar" oil in agreement with the elements of the Assad regime army, who withdrew to the barrier "Milibia" south of the city of "Hasaka."

- The role of tribal alliances and tendencies in the conflict:

The sensitivity of the organization of the "Islamic state" is evident in the movement of this changing reality through the reading of its leaders to map the balances and tribal sensitivities and military cracks. The first thing that the "Islamic State" has started is an attempt to strengthen its position among the members of the " The village of "Al-Husain" in the northern suburb of Deir Ezzor. The meeting was attended by Sheikh Abdul Aziz Al-Hamada, the elder of the Al-Bakir tribe. Ali Al-Anbari, "Amer Al-Riffadan" presented to the dignitaries the protection of Manat And the establishment of Islamic courts in the region, and the allocation of tribal leaders and their children to part of the oil revenues in return for standing alongside the organization, the offer was rejected by Sheikh "Abdel Aziz Hamadeh" and the majority of clan elders, but the organization continued to contact And coordination with leaders of the third and fourth degree of my thigh: "Kassar and Eid" of the "Bakir" clan who have issues of revenge with the clan "Albokml" on the one hand, and differences on the holdings of land Badia with the other sub-clan "Albkir" on the other hand, Number of members of the clan. The organization of the "Islamic state" has also followed the clans and other military factions. The policy of polarization and neutralization of some military forces and tribal formations by playing on the contradictions and competition of these forces and formations at times, and using sectarian tensions at other times, and aided by the state of discontent on the "Nusra front" Deir Ezzorgovernorate, and the consideration of some military factions, that the ongoing fighting is only a struggle for resources have

¹⁰⁶ : " https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=clhjVQ2L_2w

¹⁰⁷ <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=smQArmKHrDw>

no interest in it. The "Islamic State" organization has attracted some military factions from the Qar'an clan and the Shu'ayat tribe, which was part of the "descendants of the Prophet" group, which was organized by the organization in cooperation with the Nusra Front earlier. Most notably, And the "Qaqaa Brigade" and "Qaqaa Brigade" led by "Mahmoud Al-Matar", the cousin of "Saddam Al-Jamal"¹⁰⁸ (commander of the brigade "Allah Akbar" in the city "Albuqmal" and who also claimed the organization because of tribal sensitivities with the clan "Nusra", in addition to the fear of leaders and elements of these military factions of the revenge of the organization. The organization also worked to neutralize some of the military factions according to tribal considerations, most notably the gathering of "Abdullah bin Zubayr" in the town of "Khasham / branch Annabza / clan Albkair," whose commander signed an agreement with "Omar Chechen" to neutralize the town of fighting in exchange for the commitment of the guerrillas neutral, But the "Nusra front" which failed to ally with the group for tribal reasons also, worked to hit this agreement through some elements of the sons of the thigh, "Annabza" and other elements of other tribes who targeted a military barrier to organize the "Islamic state" was located on the outskirts of the town "Khasham", making the organization break into the town and destroys two a Built, the group engaged in fighting the organization. The "Islamic State" organization also worked to weaken the front of the "Deir Ezzor Airport Operations Room" in the area of "Muhasan" by playing on the differences between the members of the "Bukhabur" clan divided between the military council and the Revolutionary Council, where the bias of members of the "Bukhabur" According to the rivalry of individuals and not according to the sub-clan, the organization of the "Islamic State" exploited the marginalization of the Revolutionary Council in the region, coordinated and supported a military coup by the factions of the Revolutionary Council led by Brigadier General "Sukkar Al-Ahmad"¹⁰⁹ against the factions of the Military Council, Tribal tendency against the Shua'i clan fighters And the fighters of the banner of "victory" in the area of "Muhasan" to hit the organization of the "Islamic state" through the Euphrates River, and the assassination of: "First Lieutenant Hassan al-Hafiz, Captain Yasser Mutlaq, Thaer al-Hammad, Loay al-Zayr," a negative impact on cohesion In the town of "Muhasan", in addition to the organization to exploit the sensitivities clan between the members of my clan: "Bukhabur and the Bolil"; attracted some of the military factions from the clan, "Bolil" headed by the brigade, "descendants of the Sahaba," and thus besieged the organization The area of "Muhasan" alone is the possibility of impact, which led some factions of the military junta to M neutrality or to swear allegiance to the organization for fear of reprisals. On the other hand, the Nusra Front formed a military-clan alliance under the name of the Shura Council of the Eastern Mujahedeen¹¹⁰, which includes the following: Army of Islam in the Eastern Region, Ahrar Al Sham Movement, Front of

¹⁰⁸ The leader of Allahu Akbar group, he received a military and financial support from the Free Army Commision.

¹⁰⁹ A retired colonel who was assigned as the leader of Deir Ezzor military airport operations room.

¹¹⁰ <https://youtu.be/yGrD9yzvHgM>

Construction and Development, Army of Sunnis and Jamaa, , Al-Ikhlas / Bukamil Army, Bairaqa Shu'aytat, Al Qaqaa Army, Al-Muhajirim and Ansar Battalion, Al Qadisiyah Brigade / Al Bakeer. " These complex alliances reflect several levels of specific dynamics of queuing and competition; the role of clan reprisals according to sub-clan and general clan identities, and individuals competing for tenure and status even against the same or other clan cousins as well as groups and individuals from sub-clan backgrounds. In their quest to control resources and gain more material gain in retaliation for other clan members and tribal groups that control and control the resources of the province.

The policies of the "Nusra Front" were clearly affiliated with tribal fanaticism against members of the al-Bakir clan. Abu al-Leith was deposed after his previous employment and sometimes refrained from selling oil to members of the al-Bakir clan, This was a reaction that led to the accession of some members of the "Bakeer" to the organization of the "Islamic State" and announce them in areas controlled by the "Front of victory," in addition to the occurrence of some bombings by dormant cells belonging to the organization in the city "and" , The Front "victory" military force to arrest some elements of the "Islamic State" of the father Al-Bakair clan headed in the town of al-Basira, headed by Khaled al-Kamaz, Sa'id al-Baqji. They then raided Khaled al-Kamaz's house on the outskirts of the town. He then exchanged fire with the group, and a number of al-Qubaisah (13) elements, including (8) elements of the immigrants, and other members of the clan "Albokamel", and captured other elements, in turn, "Front victory" and its allies mobilized their armored vehicles On the outskirts of the town of "insight" and threatened to bombard; "Amer Rafdan" took advantage of this escalation and infiltrated at the head of a group of elements of " Organized the Islamic State "to the outskirts of the town of" insight "from the Badia, and threatened to shell the town," Scheheil "; which raised the morale of many members of the clan" Albkir "who dispersed around him.

The transfer of "Amer Rafdan" prisoners "Front Nasra" to the city, "Shaddadi", and escalated tension between the parties when the elements of the "Front victory" and the faction "descendants of Aisha / Shuaatat clan" fire on the town, "insight", the events escalated into a mutual bombardment of the parties , And the intersection of roads and the occurrence of mutual arrests on the basis of tribal affiliation, which made the faction, "descendants of Aisha," withdrew to the areas of the tribe, "Shoaaitat", entered "Ibrahim al-Attayah / Abu Bakr" with a number of dignitaries of my clan: "Albokml and Albkair" and calmed the situation and coordination To hold a reconciliation between the parties, began to withdraw the bodies of their dead and the release of all prisoners in each of them.

The two parties held a reconciliation council in the presence of the dignitaries of the two clans: Rami al-Dush, Muhammad al-Bash, al-Buqamil, Abdul Aziz al-Hamadeh, Sheikh of al-Bukhair clan, and the al-Buqamal family, who live in the village of Tkehi, , And the parties agreed not to be responsible for each clan for its sons who are killed elements in the jihadi organizations and to drop the right to claim their revenge, and thus the rights of all the dead fell due to the fighting that took place between the "Nusra Front" and the "Islamic State" Oil and gas in the area of the tribes of "Albkir, Bukamel

and Shuaatat" on all b The al-Akidat clan is based on records prepared on the basis of personal documents, but the Front of Nusra did not comply with the second clause of the agreement.

The tension between the two sides continued as they kept their military barriers on the outskirts of their areas of control until the situation erupted again because of the killing of a member of the clan "Albokamel" by a member of the foot of "Kassar / clan Albkir" against the backdrop of old revenge between them, making my uncle the victim: Abu al-Harith, "commander of the army of" Ahl al-Sunna wa al-Jama'a "and" Abu Gamed "leader of the" Taliban "group, leading an attack with a group of fighters from the clan" Albokaml "elements of the" Islamic state "in the village," Z " "Which led to the collapse of the fragile agreement and the start of bloody battles between" Jab Of Nusra "and its allies in the" Shura Council of the Mujahideen of the East "and the" Islamic State "which has strengthened its military strength after its withdrawal from the provinces:" Aleppo, Idlib. " The battles ended with the organization's control of Deir Ezzor after bloody battles that resulted in many dead. This conflict represents the most tense and contradictory model of the emergence of sub-clan and clan tribal revenge on families and individuals, as well as the recruitment and use of sub-tribal identities in mobilizing and inciting some members of the clans ostensibly or covertly within a religious ideological framework. "The Islamic State" and the "Nusra Front" in their struggle for control of oil resources and the region in general, is a reflection of a local micro-tribal reality that is fragmented, led by members of tribal backgrounds influenced by social and economic marginalization, the jihadist organizations were a refuge for the explosion of social sub-identities to express marginalized souls. Sub-clan militias and jihadi organizations employed each other to impose themselves on other sub-nationalisms and to force the local community in general to merge or bow through two different policies, the first socio-economic policy, and the second a bloody bloody policy.

The first is that, despite the sensitivity of the conflicts and their bloody consequences in the region, they did not lead to the mobilization of the general population of the tribes and sub-groups in their dynamics. times. The second is the fact that all the conflicts and clashes between the tribes and individuals are symbolic of the symbolic presence of the tribal sheikhs and their leaders. This presence is ineffective in most of these conflicts because they do not possess the necessary tools to stabilize the truce and seek solutions, which they derived from the authority of the state. However, all the periods of calm were passing through the presence of some sheikhs and tribal elders, reflecting the symbolic and social status of tribal leaders among tribal clans, for whom these events constituted an opportunity to seek a foothold to regain some of their roles. The third is the nature of the agreement between the two conflicting parties, as a tribal custom that illustrates the way to deal with such inter-clan issues. The clan is not responsible for the revenge of its sons who fight or are killed under the banner of the jihadi organizations.

Eighth: the Implications of the scene after the domination of the "Islamic State":

After the control of the Islamic State Organization in the province of Deir Ezzor, the whole scene changed, especially the military, and subjected to various repercussions, as the results of the conflict a key role in determining their direction, apart from the forces that the organization and the military forces that stood on the neutral, the rest of the factions and formations. The majority of the fighters of the Ja'far al-Tayyar Brigade, for example, had sought refuge in Turkey, and a few of them had moved to Aleppo province and joined the Shami Front under the umbrella of the "Mujahideen Shura Council" or individually. Called the "group Aldairien." The Al-Qaqaa Front, Qa'qa'a 112, in the town of Qawriya and some of the brigades in the village of Al-Tiyana from the Qar'an clan, which committed neutrality and subsequently surrendered their weapons. Most of them left the military. Themselves "under the name of" gathering Qaqaa "led by" Amer Naklawi "and then" Ismail Abdullah Saud, "and joined the" Sham Front ", and refused to join the group," Ahrar al-Sharqiya."

Whereas "Bashaer Al Naser" brigade withdrew from the area for sake of the desire of the populations to stop the bloodshed. It headed to Al Qalamoun with all of its arsenal under the name of "Usoud Al Sharqeyya" army which is led by Tlas Al Salama. Many fighters from other armed factions headed to Aleppo and Idlib provinces. They announced the establishing of "Islamic Salvation Front" in Deir Ezor and the eastern area in 2014¹¹¹, which includes many tribes of Deir Ezzor province. Then, many of those factions joined "Ahrar Al Sharqeyya" in January 2016 that fights within the forces of Euphrates Shield.

While the most dramatic scene was the result of the military forces of the tribe of "Shuitat", leaving many of their fighters towards the Turkish territory, and re-formed themselves within a group led by "Abu Saleh al-Shuaity" and allied with the forces of "elite", which includes fighters from the tribe "Shamar" and fought under the umbrella of the "Syrian Democratic Forces", while others went to Kalamoun joined the army, "Black Oriental", which includes a diverse alliance of the families of Deir Ezzor, and the third part went to the camps of the Assad regime in the city, "Palmyra" Arming and training them and putting them in the formation of the "tribal army", and split them with Counting the number of fighters in full their equipment, and joined the Army "Black East" in the "Qalmoun" area, while the transfer of the Assad regime Almqatin

¹¹¹ <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=2EskqsYwgUY>

remaining to the fighting fronts in Deir Ezzor and the military airport of Deir Ezzor, led by "Abdel Basset al-Hamdo Rajab"¹¹²

The "Nasra Front", the majority of its members from the town of "Sheheil / Bukamil tribe" and the movement "Ahrar Sham", elements of all members of the tribes, they headed towards the provinces of "Aleppo and Idleb" and merged into their organizational structure, Where the "Nasra Front" in the province of Idlib training camps for fighters coming from the eastern region included fighters from all the people of Deir Ezzor. Although some clan members gathered after leaving Deir Ezzor, they returned and disbanded in clear tribal lines in some areas and re-formed themselves in tribal-military groups, and may be due to the gathering at first to what is imposed by the change of geography and the nature of the new environment primarily on individuals and groups, and the imperatives and nature of regional and international alliances that occurred in the maze of political opposition and local forces in Syria in general, But after a period of stability in those areas tribal identities have returned to act and influence the form and nature of gatherings, and even in the political choices of the sons of the clans.

The clan elders and Jhaiha, many of them have left the organization outside the control of areas such as: "Najm Abdullah Salman / tribe Bakkara " who left to the control of areas of the Assad regime, which is now a member of parliament,

While "Abdul Aziz Hamada / clan Bakar, Raheeman Kwan mighty / clan Alborhnmh" left to the Turkish territory, and have worked with a number of elders and notables of the tribes of Deir al-Zou¹¹³ several times on the formation of a special gathering Bashair Deir Ezzor province, through coordination between the councils clans problem Some members of the tribes in Turkey and Syria: "Council of the Bakara tribe, the Shuitat clan council, the Bosraya clan council" and with military and social figures from the tribes, was the result of the formation¹¹⁴ of the "Council of tribes and clans of Deir Ezzor" in the city of "Orfa"¹¹⁵.

Nawaf Ragheb al-Bashir, the Bakara tribe, who split from the ranks of the Syrian opposition and returned to the authority of the Assad regime under the auspices of the

¹¹² He was killed in August 2015 in Deir Ezzor military Airport.

¹¹³ <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=3LSLSdPJfZY&t=6s>

¹¹⁴ <https://www.facebook.com/967317013383155/photos/a.981210268660496.1073741828.967317013383155/1315473818567471/?type=3&theater>

¹¹⁵ <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=KY5DvDzDMOM>

Lebanese Hezbollah, is seeking to form a clan mobilization in coordination with the Assad regime and the Iranian authorities to fight the "Islamic state"

Which has been sought by "Nawaf al-Bashir" since the beginning of the Syrian revolution, and met with rejection and disregard of the Syrian opposition, and many international and regional parties, most notably "Turkey," which thwarted the project because of the nature of the agreement, "Nawaf al-Bashir" Democracy "without the knowledge of the Turkish authorities.

This reversal was an angry reaction among members of the Bakara tribe whom they considered not to be members of the clan. They described his behavior as treachery and declared their categorical rejection of his alliance with the Assad regime. This was also announced by some elders and dignitaries of Deir Ezzor in Orfa,

In addition to the separation between the tribal components, the military factions and the traditional leaders, the traditional totalitarian view of the tribal component in Syria in general, and Deir Ezzor in particular, issued by the Assad regime for public opinion since the beginning of the revolution in Syria through the symbolic use of some Tribal sheikhs and their loyal supporters,

On the other hand, the attempts of the Syrian opposition to attract the tribal component also appear through the holding of conferences and the formation of councils, bodies and assemblies representing the tribal components in general through the sheikhs and dignitaries aligned with the ranks of the opposition and the Syrian revolution;

We believe that the insistence on this method of political representation of the tribes of Deir Ezzor is only a kind of authoritarian reproduction that is not commensurate with the reality of the tribal components or with the choices of the tribesmen in general.

But rather to perpetuate the cracks of tribal structure and reinforce its contradictions, especially at the stage of the American-Russian race to control the province of Deir Ezzor

Ninth: The policy of organizing the "Islamic State" towards the clans:

The organization of the "Islamic State", and by virtue of its experience of Iraq, and the presence of some members of the tribes in the ranks, was able to read the map of the military factions and tribal realities scattered in the east,

He was the most successful of the money for the construction of clandestine and clandestine military alliances, and he employed sub-clan identities successfully, both at the individual and tribal military levels, and benefited from the network of relations that he provided as far as possible in his quest to control and eliminate his opponents,

However, after its condemnation of the general rule of Deir Ezzor, its policy differed with the civil society in general, in accordance with the objectives of the organization, which exceeded the narrow tribal horizon and its local conflicts, and according to the location of the clan and the position of its members from the organization.

The main policy of organizing the "Islamic state" in all areas of its control is to instill fear and terror by beating its opponents and harassing its opponents,

This is what happened to the people of the village of "Sheheil / Albokamel" where they were forced to surrender under his conditions;

The elders of the village of Shaheil announced their surrender and pledge to organize the "Islamic State" and handed over all their weapons, in addition to displacing them for 10 days outside the village.

As for some members of the Shua'at tribe who rejected the peace and resisted the organization alone, the call of panic launched by one of the elders of the Shua'at tribe, Rafi Rajo¹¹⁶, did not resonate widely among the tribesmen,

And despite the announcement of some of the elders of the tribe "Shuaitat" to renounce him as an attempt to spare the tribe members a black destiny¹¹⁷,

However, this did not prevent the organization of the "Islamic State" from the abuse of the Shuaiteh family with the most horrible images. Many of their children were brutally¹¹⁸ killed and their weapons were confiscated and abandoned by their villages: Al-Kashkiyya, Granij, Abu Hamam for periods ranging from 6 months to a year.

¹¹⁶ <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=jZQiBjiljjw&t=5s>

¹¹⁷ <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=WeLftpTcuJE>

¹¹⁸ More than 1000 people were killed by IS

Attempts by some leaders of the Deir Ezzor clans to seek amnesty for members of the Shua'at tribe did not benefit from the organization's leaders¹¹⁹.

After the suppression of the organization of the "Islamic state" the hotbeds of rebellion in areas of control, the organization did not restrict and detained within the networks of tribal structures and conflicts; gradually began to impose itself as an organization above the civil structures in the region; the organization did not advocate in this context some elements of the members of the " Who tried to retaliate on behalf of the organization of the Bukamil tribe in the village of Shehail. They even blocked the way for them by sponsoring reconciliation between the two conflicting factions at the Conoco gas plant in the presence of the dignitaries of the two parties headed by Sheikh Jamil Al-Rashid Al-Hafel "He said. The organization renounced its promises to some tribal groups and withdrew privileges from its military groups. All the weapons from the Revolutionary Military Council battalions and brigades were eliminated: "Qaqaa, the nation, God is greater" in particular, and the absence of a group or group that could constitute a pressing entity On his authority,

The organization dismantled the social-military network of Amer al-Rafdan. Both Saddam al-Jamal and Mahmoud al-Matar removed their followers by distributing members of their groups on different fronts in Iraq and Syria, as well as with the rest of the military and clan groups that allied with him. Thus, the organization imposed a new reality .. neutralizing the role of tribal groups as an intermediary between his authority and individuals,

In addition to the disruption of its social system and its fragmentation, the clan is completely devoid of any role, except for what is allowed by the organization for some dignitaries, and thus the relationship between individuals and the authority of the organization became a direct and personal relationship

Although the organization held a number of meetings for Sheikhs and dignitaries from the Deir Ezzor clans through the tribal and public relations office in the organization, trying to attract the elders and members of the tribes through its influential elements in the organization, such as "Amer al-Riffan" who was the guardian of the mandate of "good" and then isolate And appointed "Kamal Raja - Abu Montaser",

However, these measures did not have a wide impact in attracting the elders of the tribes and their children, and some of them broadcast through the media channels of

¹¹⁹ https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=MgvWNS_e7go

the allegiance of a number of elders and dignitaries of the tribes in Deir al-Zor for the organization does not exceed the media propaganda directed specifically abroad,

Through which the organization seeks to show the extent of its power and the subordination of the civil society to its authority even if the reality is the opposite of what the organization is trying to promote.

In our opinion, the relationship between the clans and the organization is determined by the way the elders of the tribes and their sons treat the organization as a de facto authority. The use of elders and tribal elders with the organization differed between stepping down from public affairs and the commitment of their homes, as did Sheikh Khalil Abboud al-Hafel "Who refused to accept the organization of the" Islamic state ", although the organization offered him to return land confiscated in accordance with the law of agrarian reform and the removal of farmers from them,

Like many wise men, and between dealing rationally with that authority in an attempt to protect the members of their tribes and the conduct of their affairs, which was welcomed unevenly by the organization of the "Islamic State" in accordance with the available interventions,

This approach was followed by Shaykh Jamil Rashid Al-Hafel, the clan of the Bockamil, who was given by the organization as a mediator through some princes and influential within the organization's authority in the province to resolve the issues of the clan that the organization allowed to intervene in. Has played a role in the release of many members of the clan "Bakara" arrested recently by the organization on charges of dealing with the "Syrian Democratic Forces"¹²⁰

The organization also worked through these elders and dignitaries to sponsor reconciliation and resolve some differences among the tribes. For example, the organization's officials in the presence of Sheikh "Hajim Asaad al-Bashir," the reconciliation between my thigh: "Hlami and famous" of the tribe, "Bakara" The dead according to tribal custom in the region. While some of the dignitaries turned to

¹²⁰ More than 150 people from Al Bakkara were detained by IS due to mentioned reasons.

allegiance to the organization of the "Islamic State" in anticipation of the material gain and status, most of them of the second and third tier dignitaries in their clans. While he chose a number of tribal leaders and their leaders to leave areas of control of the organization as mentioned earlier.

As for some members of the tribes in the organization of the "Islamic State" has exploited many of them the power of regulation to settle their personal accounts with some members of their clans or other clans,

If many members of the tribes are subjected to physical liquidation or severe torture and torture as a result of these practices, it is not clear whether the organization overlooks such practices to ensure the loyalty of its members of the clans, or that it is done by misleading and pinning charges without the knowledge of officials of the "Islamic State ",

But more importantly, clan members respond to many executions carried out by the organization and extended their relatives to the liquidation of personal and tribal differences by some members of the tribes in the organization, which adds a more subversive dimension at the level of individuals and families, in addition to the previous tribal rifts .

* * * * *

- The policies of successive authorities on the tribal region, especially the Syrian state, and then the Baathist regime and the Assad regime, have not been able to achieve a radical change in the tribal social structure that transcends tribal affiliations towards national integration as an alternative identity,

All these policies have resulted in the partial dismantling of structural structures and their structural fragmentation in contradictory forms that have led to their fragmentation at many levels and undermined the ability of these traditional structures to play any role in maintaining social balance;

The absence of state authority over large areas of Deir Ezzor governorate and the absence of many of the administrative, security, and security functions that it carried out were only a manifestation of the reality of these structures, which were confronted with the question of identity in a widespread manner. They closed themselves according to their micro-

The re-emergence of tribal tendencies and the re-engagement of clan members in their neoconservative structures in various forms were evidence of the tribal existence - albeit minimally - culturally, psychologically and socially. The nature of this paradoxical deconstruction is one of the main factors that explain the spread of inter-clan violence in the region. Most of the reactions were carried out through the dynamics of actors outside the traditional tribal leadership, The expression of their freedom and independence as individuals outside the control of the clan and the suppression of the non-derogatory State of the individual, but the legacy of pent-up differences within groups and individuals, political alignments and conditions of war and the degradation of those social structures, competition for resources and personal gains;

All of which contributed to the localization of tribal and general conflicts and various forms of sub-conflicts, and contributed to the maximum, which added a new division and serious revenge is the main focus.

The clan is no longer perceived by some as a homogenous bloc and organizational structure that can take a clear political stance and act according to the choices of its traditional leaders. And the tribal leaders still have a social symbol for many of their children. In addition, many clan members today are free to move according to their choices, interests and political affiliations, but tribal tendencies are still present as a continent of conscience. Tribal identities are culturally, psychologically and socially effective so that they can influence, albeit in a limited way, some of the choices and behavior of their children.

The current reality of the tribes in the governorate of Deir Ezzor, as reflected in the previous events, but it increases the complexity of the public scene, but it has shown, because of its multi-level cracks, the contradiction in the rapid transformations of the clans and a section of groups and thighs according to the balance of power and the nature of social and economic conflict The political,

And this makes it difficult to predict its future impact on the Syrian scene in general and the future of the tribal region in the province of Deir Ezzor in particular.

In the end, we must point out that the circumstances experienced by the tribes during the war and the conflict, given the experience of using new mechanisms and tools, will in the future enhance opportunities for their reproduction through the narratives of the same clan identities, redefining and restoring their old history, To these narratives, whether it is based on the tournaments and sacrifices made, or based on the injustice that suffered during the past experience.

This leads to a multiplicity of possibilities with regard to the shape of its course. Its direction is largely determined by the nature of the political solution in the country and its impact on the tribal region, which can lead to more bloody patterns or push towards more stable conditions.

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Section II

Options of the tribesmen in the cases of tribal revenge in the province of Deir Ezzor:

The successive events on the tribal area in the province of Deir Ezzor, whether conflicts on the resources and influence between the tribal military factions and clan members, or fighting between the jihadi organizations and allied with tribes and military factions, or the policies of the organization of "Islamic State", all produced many Of the collective and individual reprisals that have caused great damage to social relations in the region of the tribes in Deir Ezzor, which will add internal challenges to individuals and families Revenge and the pursuit of revenge is the main engine, which will deepen the multiple divisions in the brown Social, and threatens the basis of the meeting and civil peace in the province in general, and in particular Orfa,

This will aggravate the situation. Vengeance will be one of the most important destabilizing factors in the region and one of the most important dynamics of the conflicts that are expected to occur, which may be more violent and bloody than previous conflicts.

To know how to deal with the issue of revenge resulting from the local fighting in Deir Ezzor governorate and to determine the mechanisms of building the local civil peace, it is necessary to know the viewpoint of the members of the tribes themselves on this issue in order to avoid prejudging and stereotyping such sensitive issues first, And to find a preliminary picture that enables those involved in civil peace issues to develop plans aimed at isolating the factors of conflict in the future.

- Polling the opinions of the tribesmen on the issues of revenge in the province of Deir Ezzor:

A research center designed a questionnaire to investigate the opinions of the tribesmen on the issue of revenge resulting from infighting among individuals, military factions, armed tribal groups and jihadi organizations in Deir Ezzor governorate, based on single questions.

The questionnaire is divided into two main sections:

- Demographic factors:

It included (6) variables used for comparison, five of which are descriptive variables: (educational level, tribe, region, region, village) and one quantitative variable is: (age).

- The study axes:

These are (13) questions, including (4) multiple-answer questions.

472 questionnaires were distributed electronically to members of the tribes living in the Turkish cities and through a direct questionnaire with the tribesmen residing in Idlib, Aleppo and Hama. The questionnaire included as much as possible the members of the tribes who are directly affected by the revenge cases. As for the sons of the tribes residing in Deir Ezzor governorate, 96 questions were conducted indirectly by asking the respondents verbally and without knowing that they were being interviewed

because of the security situation in the governorate under the control of the "Islamic State" organization. As follows:

1- Areas of fighting:

76.3% of the respondents agree that there is a conflict between the tribal military factions on the one hand and between the tribesmen in the military factions and the jihadi organizations in their areas. While 23.7% say there is no sectarian fighting in their areas. The results indicate that the area that is the most common among the tribal military factions and jihadi organizations is the "Khasham, Al-Basira", which is inhabited by the tribes of Al-Bakeer, Al-Buqamil, Al-Bawazeldin and a section of the Bajara tribe. ",

In addition to the area of "Kasra" in the area of the tribe "Bakara", and the "adoption" in the village of "Almsrab" in the region of the "Bosraia"

The areas where no clan fighting occurred were in the areas of the spread of my two tribes: Al-Daimim and Al-Hassoun, belonging to the two communities: Al-Jalala and Al-Sousse, respectively, which did not participate in the Syrian revolution in its peaceful and armed stages.

It is noted that the areas where the most prominent incidents of fighting occurred are the location of oil resources mainly, as there has been no internal fighting in the areas of clans: "Alsson, Dameem, Bukhapur". This illustrates one of the most important direct causes of the clashes between some members of the tribes in the military factions and jihadi organizations.

1. The nature of the fighting and the resulting revenge:

As for the nature of the fighting in the governorate of Deir Ezzor related to the tribes, according to all the different answers, the results of the questionnaire were as follows:

N	Nature of the fighting	% of the total answers
1	Fighting between clan members with members or tribal groups in jihadi organizations.	68.8
2	Fighting between members of two or more clans of the governorate	33.3
3	Fighting within one clan (between the thighs of the clan).	25.8

In detail, 23.8% of the general population consider that the nature of the fighting in the governorate is between the sons of two or more of the tribes of the governorate. Most of them are in the age group (36-45) years and over (45) (Uneducated, elementary, preparatory, secondary).

(%31)believe that the nature of the fighting is between the tribesmen of two or more tribes, and also among some clan members and members of the clans in the jihadi organizations. This is true of the fighting that took place between the "Assaf" Al-Bawakil, Al-Bokair, who belong to the organization Al-Nasra, the Islamic State, respectively,

The majority of the supporters of this classification are members of the clans: "Bosaria, Bukamel, Al-Bakeer" of the age groups (26-35) years and different levels of education.

In the opinion of 19.9% of the respondents, the fighting is within the same clan. It is the fighting that occurred between my thighs: the Mashhourand the criminal among the Bakara tribe, the majority of whom are members of my tribe: Al Busaria, Bakara, 15-35 years) and different levels of education.

(25.3%) believe that the nature of the fighting is complex and complex, involving fighting between two tribes or two or more and within the same tribe and among the tribesmen and members of the clan members in the jihadi organizations together in determining the nature of the fighting. They are members of a clan: Al-Buhsin, Burmah and Shuwayt. "Among the age groups (26-45) years and older than (45) years, and the level of medium education and university.

The view of clan members as their tribes or parts of them is a party to the fighting according to the factors studied, (34.4%) of the respondents said that their tribes are part of the fighting. They are members of my family: Shuaiteh and Bokamil. Most of them are in the age groups (15-35) years of age and from educational levels (uneducated, elementary, preparatory, secondary) , Intermediate education).

(39.3%) said that a section of one or several thighs in their clans are parties to the fighting. They are members of the Al-Buzazidin, Al-Bakeer, Bakara and Bukamel tribes. Most of them are from the age groups (36-45) . While 26.3% believe that members of their clans and other clans

And not the thighs - are the parties to the fighting in their areas, they are members of the clans: Bosraria, Boukhabur, Bouhsin, Qaran, Hassoun, Damim "of all age groups and

different educational levels.

These results reflect tribal tendencies in the younger age groups in general, and in the Shuyatat and Bukamal communities in particular. This is due to the suffering of the members of these two groups due to the fighting in the region and the policies of the Islamic State, while the age group (36-45 and over 45) A member of the Bukamil clan, and my two tribes, Al Bakeer and Al Bawazeldin,

Although they view the fighting as among the clans of the province, perhaps due to their awareness of the inter-tribal conflicts over land holdings, they were less tribal and more rational in assessing the situation in not considering the whole clan involved in the fighting, Major conflicts in the future, while the educational level of individuals did not have a clear impact on those choices.

While the sons of the other tribes were more specific and aware of the seriousness of the generalization of the conflict, due to the fact that their tribes are not directly involved in them, which makes them less tense in their vision of events.

As for the revenge of the fighting according to all the different answers:

N	Type of revenge	% of all answers
1	Personal Revenge	78.5
2	Revenge of the clan	69.9

In detail, 28% of the tribesmen consider that the revenge resulting from clan fighting is a personal vendetta for which individuals and their families are generally responsible for their families. The vast majority of the tribesmen who are given this direction are members of the clans: the Bukharan, Al-Qar'an, Al-Buhasin, Shuwayt, Burmah, Al-Hasun and Al-Daimim. Most of them are from the age group (26-35).

(20.9%) consider revenge to be a tribal revenge for the tribal thighs to which the parties to the fighting belong only; most of them are from the tribes of Bakr al-Baqara and al-Buqair, and most of them are from the different age groups (36-45).

While 51.1% of the tribesmen consider that the revenge resulting from clan fighting in the region is both personal and tribal revenge. This means that personal revenge can be spread to the general population of the thigh or clan. Most members of the Shu'aytat tribe, (Uneducated, elementary, preparatory, secondary, middle school), and the nature of tribalism that triumphs for the closeness of blood in such a sensitive case, in which individuals in their clans are perfect.

The effect of the age group and the level of education on determining the type of revenge resulting from the fighting in the Deir Ezzor tribal region is illustrated by the results. This relates to the size of the same revenge in some tribes,

Not directly concerned with reprisals. It also relates to the impact of tribal values and concepts on the issue of revenge among the age groups (36-45) regardless of the level of education, which is less influential in the age groups (26-35) years and the middle and university educational levels.

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Causes of infighting:

As to the causes of the fighting according to all the different answers, the results were:

N	Causes of fighting	% of all answers
1	Differences between the jihadi organizations and their allies of tribal and revolutionary military factions	74.3

2	disputes during the revolution on oil wells and resources	61.4
3	personal differences	25.8
4	Ancient clan disputes (resources) before the revolution	10.8
	other reasons	3

In detail,

(%28.4)of the general population of the tribes responding to the causes of fighting between the tribal factions to the conflict of the jihadi organizations and their allies of different factions or members of the clans who have their differences and personal goals, most of them in the age group (26-35) Intermediate and university level.(

(46.1)members of the tribes that the causes of fighting are summarized in the differences during the revolution on the oil wells and the strengthening of influence and personal gain, and because of the fighting between the tribal factions and jihadi organizations, while the majority of the age groups (15-25) and (36-45)) From all levels of education.

(%22.5)of the tribesmen attributed the causes of the fighting to the differences during the revolution over the oil wells and influence, which is an extension of the tribal disputes on the old resources (land and pasture)

These are members of clans aged between 36-45 and older than 45 years of age and from different levels of education.

(3%) of all respondents believe that the reasons for the fighting are sectarian reasons. They point to the fighting that took place in the village of Hatala between the "Front of Victory" and its allies of some clan members against the militants of the village of Hatala who are loyal to the Assad regime. (36-35 years) and from the educational level (secondary, intermediate, university).

Resolving the issues of vengeance:

%(97.8)of the tribesmen prefer to resolve the issues of revenge in the governorate in a peaceful and fair manner,

While 2.2% of the tribesmen do not want to solve it in a peaceful and fair manner, the majority of whom are members of the Shuitat clan of different age groups and educational levels.

This is due to the magnitude of the humanitarian disaster that occurred among the members of the Shua'at tribe, compared to other members of the tribes, by the organization of the "Islamic State."

(%51.4) of the tribesmen said that the revenge cases in the region can be solved by the members of the Bakara tribe and the tribes of Bukhabur, Busraia, Buhasin, Qar'an, Shuwayt, Burmah, Al-Hassoun and Al-Daimim from all age groups and educational levels.

(%47.3) acknowledge the existence of various difficulties that impede the possibility of resolving the issues of vengeance in the province and they are members of the clans: "Albokamel, Albair, Shoaetat", of all age groups and levels of education. While 1.3% of the tribesmen say that revenge issues can never be resolved in the province.

Although there are no differences according to age group and educational level, the results show that the tribes will have difficulty in solving the issues of revenge among them: "Albokamel, Shoaiteh, Al Bakeer" due to the large number of deaths caused by the fighting in the region.

As for the potential effects in the absence of resolving the issues of revenge in the province, the ratio in order according to all the multiple answers

N	Effects of unresolved issues of revenge	% of all responses
1	The emergence of tribal influence areas	82.2
2	Instability in the governorate	77.4
3	Jihadi organizations infiltrated into the tribal area again	60.2
4	Violence escalated because of the quest for revenge	51.6

The sons of the tribes differ in the way they prefer to solve the issues of vengeance in the province of Deir Ezzor according to the factors studied,

(44.1%) of the tribesmen prefer to form two tribal and judicial committees to solve the issues of vengeance in the region and to be associated with a special military force in the region. The majority of them are members of the clans: Albokamel, Al Bakeer,)
From all levels of education.

(20.5%) prefer to be a tribal committee composed of tribes of the region, whether they are related to a military force or not, and the majority of the age groups (36-45) and greater than (45) years, and educational levels (uneducated, primary, preparatory, secondary).

And 18.3% also prefer to resolve the issues of vengeance judicial committee linked to the military force of the region, the majority of the members of the clans: "Bukhabur, Buhsin, Qaran" and to a lesser extent members of my clans: "Bakara, Bosraia," mostly aged (26- (17.2%) that two tribal committees coordinate with a judicial committee, the majority of whom are from the tribes of Burmah, Shuwayt and Al-Bukhabour from the age groups (26-45) And from different educational levels.

The members of the tribes are aware of the consequences of not resolving the issues of revenge resulting from fighting in the region. The results show the most fears that can lead to the emergence of tribal areas of influence that are difficult to move among the tribes among them, in addition to instability throughout the governorate, which negatively affects social and economic activities. The region does not overlook the danger of the infiltration of jihadist organizations back into the rural areas of Deir Ezzor. These organizations are likely to ally themselves with some tribal groups in order to strengthen their revenge and realize revenge from their opponents if the issues of revenge in Deir Ezzor remain unresolved.

Responsible for revenge:

(37.6%) of the tribesmen, that the leaders of the tribes in the jihadi organizations are responsible for the revenge resulting from tribal fighting in the province, the majority of the members of the clans: "Bosaria, Boukabur, Bakara, Qar'an" and the age groups (26-35) Years, mostly from educational levels (secondary, intermediate, university).

(30.8%) of the tribesmen consider that the individuals responsible for the crimes from each clan are responsible for the revenge, most of them are members of the families of "Bukhabur, Buhsin, Shuweit, Burmah", mostly aged (15-25 and 26-35) Years, and at all levels of education.

(17.9%) of the tribesmen that are responsible for tribal revenge are all members of the tribes belonging to the jihadist organizations, the majority of the members of the clans: "Albokml, Albkair, Albozaldin," mostly from the age groups (36-45 and more than 45) And from different educational levels. (13.7%) consider that the children of the thigh / thighs participating in the fighting are responsible for revenge in the province, most of them from the tribe of "Shuaitat", and most of them in the age groups (26-35 and 36-45) and all levels of education

All members of the tribes refuse to consider the entire clan responsible for revenge even if one or more of the clan is a party to the fighting and they are from my tribe: "Alsson, Damim" and of all age groups and levels of education.

It appears from the results that members of some tribes not directly involved in major

vendetta cases, from the age groups (15-25 and 26-35) and from the educational levels (secondary, intermediate, university) are more specific in bearing the responsibility for revenge resulting from infighting Individuals, not tribal groups or subgroups,

While the sons of some tribes concerned in cases of revenge directly and from the age groups: (36-45 and greater than 45) years are responsible for the revenge of all members of the tribes involved in the fighting,

This indicates their position among the tribesmen involved in the fighting because they ignore the views of this age group.

As for the scope of accountability for those responsible for vengeance cases in the governorate, the ratio was arranged in accordance with all the different responses:

	Accounting	% of all answers
1	Accountability of those responsible for clan killings.	82.2
2	Accountability of clan members who commit crimes.	80.1
3	Accountability of perpetrators and compensation of the families of the dead.	64.5
4	To compensate the families of the dead from all sides.	59.1
5	Accountability of all members of the clans affiliated with the jihadi organizations.	20.4

Social pregnant women and laws used to solve the issues of vengeance:

77.5% of the tribesmen believe that tribal leaders and their trusted social actors can play a positive role in solving the issues of vengeance in the province. Most of them are from the tribes of Bakrara, Busraia, Bukhair, Bukhabur, Burmah, Buhsin, Qar'an (36-45 and 45 years) and educational levels (uneducated, elementary, preparatory, secondary, intermediate).

(20.4%) consider that tribal sheikhs, dignitaries and social actors have limited role in solving these issues. Most of them are members of the Shu'aytat, Busraia, Buqamil, Qar'an, Buhasin and Al Bakeer communities. Most of them are from the age groups (15-25 and 26-35)) Years and levels of education: (secondary, intermediate, university).

(2.1%) do not consider that social dignitaries and actors can play a role in solving these issues. They are members of the Al-Bukhabur, Al-Buhassan and Al-Qar'an families of the age groups (26-35) and educational levels (average, university).

As for the laws used to solve the issues of revenge and the accountability of those responsible for it; the clan members differ according to the factors studied, as 57.6% of the clan members prefer that the tribal custom only be the one to be held by the opponents in resolving the cases of revenge, Al-Bukhari, Al-Buqara, Al-Bukhair, Al-Buhasin, Al-Buqamil, Shuwayt, Burhameh and Al-Bawazidin. Most of them are from the age group (36-45 and 45 years) and from all levels of education.

And 30.2% believe that the laws of the state and the transitional justice laws are the ones who decide the cases of vengeance. Most of them are from the tribes of Bukhabur, Buhsin, Qaran, Bakara and Busraia. Most of them are from the age groups (26-35) : (Intermediate education, university),

(12.2)% of the tribesmen that the solution of the issues of revenge based on the tribal custom of the region and the laws of the state and transitional justice together, and the majority of the members of the clans: "Albusaria, Bakara, Albkair, Bokamel, Albuazeldin, Buhsin", of the age groups: 15-25 and 26-35 years) and educational levels: (uneducated, elementary, preparatory, secondary).

The results reflect the effect of age and educational level within the population on the influential social pregnant women and the laws used to solve the issues of revenge in the governorate of Deir Ezzor, and it is clear that members of the tribes of the age groups (36-45 and greater than 45 years) are the most effective of tribal values and customs in such cases ,

The clan elders and their leaders played a positive role in solving some of the revenge cases in the Deir Ezzor governorate before the revolution, with the authority of the local authorities. Moreover, the tribesmen in this age group do not trust the laws of the state compared to tribal customs because of corruption and cronyism in state courts, In addition to the speed of resolving the issue of revenge through tribal custom and encircling the reactions and stability of the solution under the auspices of elders and tribal elders previously.

(15-25 and 26-35) years and levels of education: (average, university education), which generally reflects the state of concentration and some independence towards concepts and customs. And tribal values influenced by age and educational level.

The results of the questionnaire reflect the different views of the tribesmen and their interpretations of the events in their regions according to their personal considerations, their cultural background, their life experiences and tribal affiliations, on the one hand,

The influence of tribal values on their judgments and choices on the issue of vengeance

in the region, according to the factors studied, is not clear. The choices within the same factor are contradictory and variable. This question adds to the results of the conflict and clan fighting, and the ways to deal with it are more complex and many problems, especially in light of the mutual accusations among the tribesmen and hold each other responsible for the fighting and revenge resulting from the absence of the Accurate and objective closely on those sensitive and thorny issue.

But through the results of the questionnaire, we can take a preliminary picture of the role that tribes, whether concerned or not, can play in coordinating revenge issues resulting from tribal fighting, especially that some social and customary functions are still reasonably acceptable to A large group of tribesmen in the province of Deir Ezzor

Recommendations:

- 1- The necessity of holding public discussions between the members of each clan on the one hand and among the tribesmen on the other in Deir Ezzor governorate to discuss mechanisms and tools for building the local civil peace, especially the issues of revenge resulting from tribal fighting and the policies of organizing the Islamic state.
- 2- Designing a program to support "civil peace" on the issues of revenge in the region of the tribes in the province of Deir al - Zour, commensurate with the nature of the problems and social privacy of the province.
- 3- The need to take into account the "tribal structures" as major domestic resources whose traditional criteria and tools can be used to hold peace and arbitration in some cases, thus enhancing the chances of civil peace in the province of Deir Ezzor.
- 4- The need to identify social pregnant women to build civil peace in the province, whether: "elders and elders of the tribes, social actors, competencies, clergy" accepted by the tribes in the province.
- 5- Empower and raise the capacity of local resources (individuals, organizations, groups) specialized in civil peace in Deir Ezzor governorate through training courses in conflict resolution, negotiation and mediation.
- 6- Examine the possibility of forming committees of tribesmen to document the deaths of tribal fighting, crimes committed by the policies of the "Islamic state", documenting the direct and indirect officials, and coordinating with individuals, organizations and groups that document human rights violations in Deir Ezzor .



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