Obai Kurd Ali – Legal Unit Manager at the Tahrir Institute for Middle East Policy
Since the onset of the Syrian revolution, Syrians have endured a wide range of atrocities that have impacted millions. From arbitrary detention to torture, enforced disappearance, unlawful displacement, looting, the use of internationally prohibited weapons, indiscriminate attacks, extrajudicial killings, sexual violence, and the recruitment of child soldiers—among many other abuses—civilians were subjected to serious violations committed throughout the armed conflict in a widespread or systematic manner.
These crimes cannot be attributed to a single party. All actors involved in the conflict, whether local or international, bear responsibility for violations committed over the years, leaving behind millions of victims who still seek a comprehensive justice that recognizes their suffering, uncovers the fate of their loved ones, provides reparations, and holds those responsible to account.
Concerns about the selectivity of justice in Syria
Since the fall of the Assad regime on December 8, 2024, human rights advocates have increasingly called for a comprehensive transitional justice process that centers victims’ rights, addresses atrocities and violations committed by all conflicting parties across the country, and extends beyond the narrow scope of criminal justice to include truth-seeking measures, reparations, institutional reforms, and guarantees of non-recurrence.
In the absence of a legal framework sufficient to regulate transitional justice in Syria, the new phase required establishing such a framework, the foundations of which began to emerge in some provisions of the Constitutional Declaration issued on March 13, 2025. However, these provisions fell short of meeting the demands for a comprehensive justice process. The language used in key articles explicitly referred to crimes “committed by the defunct regime,” without adopting a more general formulation or acknowledging violations committed by other parties to the conflict.
For instance, Article (49) of the Constitutional Declaration expressly excludes “war crimes, crimes against humanity, genocide, and all crimes committed by the defunct regime from the principle of non-retroactivity of laws.” In effect, the provision allows for the retroactive application of new criminal laws to past conduct falling within these categories.
Although the wording can be interpreted as authorizing the retrospective criminalization of all the listed crimes irrespective of the perpetrators’ identity—since the conjunction used appears to introduce a series of acts rather than linking them to the Assad regime—the phrasing nonetheless signals a political intent to focus accountability primarily on violations attributed to the former regime. This becomes particularly evident when read in conjunction with the subsequent paragraph of the same article, which criminalizes the glorification of the fallen Assad regime and its symbols, as well as the denial, justification, or trivialization of its crimes, without extending similar prohibitions to such acts if committed in support of other parties to the conflict. Such phrasing reveals a selective approach that compromises the inclusivity required for the transitional justice process in Syria.
On May 17, 2025, the President issued Decree No. 20 to establish the National Committee for Transitional Justice (the Committee), using language that reinforces the political intent to center accountability on the Assad regime’s crimes. According to the decree, the Committee is tasked with “uncovering the truth about the grave violations caused by the defunct regime, holding accountable their perpetrators in coordination with the relevant bodies, providing reparations to victims, and reinforcing the principles of non-recurrence and national reconciliation.” This text is more restrictive than the provisions of the Constitutional Declaration, as it explicitly confines the Committee’s mandate to crimes committed by the former regime, excluding violations committed by other parties to the Syrian conflict.
The decree has drawn widespread criticism for establishing a selective pathway to justice that risks entrenching discrimination among victims and marginalizing those who suffered abuses at the hands of other actors. Such an approach threatens to shift justice from a unifying national process into a political instrument wielded by the victors. In this context, the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights has urged the Committee to examine violations committed by all parties through a comprehensive, victim-centered approach that ensures the effective participation of civil society.
Attempts by the Committee to expand its mandate
Since the establishment of the Committee, many of its members have expressed their strong commitment and sincere desire for the transitional justice process to be comprehensive and not limited solely to the Assad regime’s crimes. They confirmed that they are making genuine efforts to move toward a more inclusive approach that provides justice to all victims, regardless of the perpetrator’s affiliation.
In this regard, members of the Committee have repeatedly emphasized their intention to adopt a flexible interpretation of Decree No. 20 of 2025, with the aim of expanding the transitional justice process to encompass all violations committed by various actors. Their approach relies on interpreting the phrase “grave violations caused by the defunct regime” broadly, based on the idea that the Assad regime was the root cause that enabled other actors to commit serious violations. According to Committee members, this interpretation could serve as an entry point for a comprehensive transitional justice process that is not limited to a single party.
A step in the right direction?
While the Committee has made commendable efforts to broaden its mandate, its interpretation, premised on drawing a causal relationship between the Assad regime and all other violations committed by various actors, raises significant legal and practical dilemmas.
Initially, it is legally inaccurate to assert that the Assad regime caused all crimes committed by other parties. In their assessment of causation, courts look for a direct link between the specific conduct and the resulting crime on a case-by-case basis. Therefore, presuming a causal link across the wide spectrum of violations perpetrated over fourteen years is legally unsound.
Moreover, the Committee’s reasoning contradicts the standard of causation required under Syrian criminal law. Article 203 (2) of the Penal Code provides that when an independent subsequent cause occurs that is sufficient on its own to produce the criminal outcome, it severs the causal link between the initial act and the resulting offense. In practical terms, it would be legally indefensible to argue, for instance, that a rape committed by a member of the National Army would not have happened but for the Assad regime, on the grounds that this armed group would not have emerged without the regime’s crimes and the outbreak of the Syrian revolution. Simply put, the act committed by this member is an independent, self-standing offense, fully capable on its own of producing the criminal outcome.
The Committee’s interpretation will also confront a legal dilemma when it comes to crimes that require a specific perpetrator status, such as the war crime involving the occupying power’s deportation or transfer of all or part of the population of the occupied territory, within or outside that territory. Such a crime can be perpetrated only by an occupying power during an international armed conflict and cannot be caused by the occupied state. Incidents meeting the elements of this crime occurred in Syria in areas under Türkiye’s control in the north, where displacement from predominantly Kurdish-populated regions was carried out in cooperation with the National Army at the time.
Moreover, asserting a causal link between crimes committed by other parties and the Assad regime would create significant practical challenges in court and place unnecessary burdens on public prosecutors. Each case involving non-Assad-regime perpetrators would require proving this causal relationship, complicating prosecutions and overloading justice actors without substantive need. Furthermore, this approach could lead to inconsistent interpretations of causality, granting judges broad discretion and potentially exposing them to undue political pressure.
Beyond the legal complications this interpretation would create in court, it also fosters unequal treatment between perpetrators and victims. If members of the Assad regime are assumed to be the cause of all violations committed by other groups, their liability would necessarily be greater, encompassing both their direct crimes and those indirectly caused by them. Meanwhile, perpetrators from other groups could be seen—at least publicly—as less culpable, based on the notion that they acted only because of the Assad regime. This approach is inherently unfair to the victims of these other groups.
The last chance for a comprehensive transitional justice
Some may consider holding all parties accountable as unrealistic and potentially threatening peace and stability in Syria, currently seen as a top priority alongside bringing the Assad regime to justice. However, excluding other parties from justice could be equally, if not more, detrimental to long-term security, stability, and social cohesion. Such a selective approach risks creating serious security challenges, undermining peace, and weakening the foundations of a state governed by the rule of law.
Given Syria’s fragile security situation, selective justice may trigger rebellious reactions from groups that would be subjected to accountability, who may perceive the process as politicized and exclusionary. It could also foster a sense of immunity among groups not held accountable, potentially encouraging abuses of power. Moreover, this approach would fail to provide an effective remedy for victims of parties beyond the Assad regime. Instead, it would reinforce the perception that these victims are marginalized within the transitional justice process and that their suffering is treated as a lower priority in the new Syria.
Moving forward, establishing a comprehensive transitional justice process will depend on the Committee’s current efforts to draft the transitional justice law and its subsequent adoption by the People’s Assembly. To avoid any explicit or implicit selectivity, the law must clearly stipulate that the transitional justice process is comprehensive, covering all crimes committed in Syria over the past years, regardless of the perpetrators’ affiliations. It should establish truth-seeking mechanisms, regulate reparations for victims of all parties, and pave the way for reforming state institutions and guaranteeing the non-repetition of atrocities. Accordingly, the law must avoid any wording that confines its scope to a single actor, so as not to require further convoluted interpretations to bring all other actors within the justice process.
The law must also avoid vague or ambiguous language that could lead to misinterpretations and create operational challenges, particularly in provisions related to crimes and modes of liability. Syrian legislation does not criminalize war crimes, crimes against humanity, or genocide, nor does it establish command responsibility for superiors who fail to prevent or punish such crimes. As a result, the new law will introduce criminal offenses and forms of liability into the Syrian legal system for the first time, without precedents or existing domestic jurisprudence to guide their application. Explicit provisions that closely align with international legal standards and instruments will therefore be essential, as they will allow domestic actors to rely on foreign and international jurisprudence for interpretation and application.
In addition, the law must guarantee the genuine independence of the bodies responsible for implementing the transitional justice process and protect them from any form of interference or influence. This requires establishing clear criteria for their composition and the appointment of their members, ensuring diversity in expertise and backgrounds, providing independent oversight of their work, and safeguarding them against intimidation or political and security pressures.
Transitional justice in Syria must not be hindered by vague language or complex interpretations. Achieving justice for all victims and recognizing the harms inflicted by all parties requires courageous decisions and decisive legal texts, free from political maneuvering.
